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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, ) 
husband and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. ) 
and REAL PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an ) 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, ) 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS 
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho 













IN THE ALTERNATIVE ) 
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EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, ) 
husband and wife, and REAL ) 
PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
lin.bility company, ) 
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DEJ\11'US SALLAZ, GLEJ\1N TREFREN, ) 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS ) 
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho ) 




Each party has submitted their opening final arguments, and Post-trial Briefing, as it 
relates to the pending motions advanced during trial, and as it supports the authority each party 
would suggest provides the basis for the appropriate relief requested in this matter. The Plaintiffs 
having a right to "open and close" arguments, and the Counterclaimants, having that same right 
to "open and close" with respect to the allocution of their respective claims, and therefore do 
present this response in accordance with their right of such further allocution. 
It appears Plaintiffs have chosen to make Defendants' claims their primary target in this 
case, as they have withheld any argument or analysis concerning "Count V" of their Complaint 
until the last part of their briefing, starting on page 21 under paragraph 5. 
Because Plaintiffs have chosen to make Defendants' claims their primary target in the 
post-trial memorandum they submitted to the Court in this case, the Defendants will first submit 
a rebuttal to those claims, followed by a response to Plaintiffs' arguments on their Count V 
claims, and then close this memorandum with a further reply to the Plaintiffs' arguments on the 
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Defendants/Counterclaimants' motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, and on 
statute frauds statute of limitations issues. 
Rebuttal Argument On The Defendants' Counterclaims 
At some point in time, this Court will be required to simply look at the evidence 
presented at trial, disregard the animosity and hostility that seems to permeate this case whenever 
the occasion presents itself, and to make a detennination based only upon that evidence. 
The irrefutable fact remains that Mr. Rice obtained control of $630,000.00 worth of 
property, by the payment of only $63,402.82. Whether this was pursuant to a written contract; 
pursuant to an inducement for a bigger and better deal yet to be made; or pursuant to a 
combination of those events by which an attorney and a land developer were induced into 
conveying their $630,000.00 worth of property to Mr. Rice, for which those two individuals have 
received, to date nothing as to Mr. Trefren, and only $5,000.00 (and that's only a "maybe") as 
to Mr. Sallaz is for this Court to ascertain and decide. 
What now becomes most fascinating is that Alternative Plaintiffs request a judgment for 
$5,000.00 against Mr. Sallaz (pg. 2 of the Post-Trial Brief), yet, based upon sworn trial 
testimony, Mr. Rice has denied having paid the $5,000.00 pursuant to the Agreement, as he 
insists on calling it a loan, yet somehow Plaintiffs' attorneys think they can get to the $5,000.00 
that was "probably" or "most likely a personal loan", according to Mr. Rice. 
First, Plaintiffs wanted to dismiss their case, and have wanted to do so ever since August, 
2010. 
Secondly, they say they got the four parcels by agreeing to stop the foreclosure action, 
yet failed to discuss, let alone disclose the fact they failed to assume any of debt on Smith, 
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of interest, they are faced with their filed pleading where they acknowledged a commitment 
to so in their "verified pleadings", even saying they did so Count V, par. yet in 
truth, having never done so, and failed to address or even mention that fact, either way, at trial. 
Thirdly, they "alleged" in their pleadings they paid Mr. Sallaz $5,000.00, though now, at 
trial, have denied paying Mr. Sallaz anything under the "Purchase and Sale Agreement," but 
rather chose to claim he made a personal loan, stating that to be the case in the various 
depositions before trial, and then later at trial, but now in their Argument, only to find they want 
this $5,000.00 paid back under a theory of "unjust enrichment", despite Mr. Rice's testimony it 
was a loan, and never paid as part of the transaction in dispute. 
Fourthly, they "allege" in their verified pleadings a contract was made, in which a breach 
occurred over certain representations and warranties regarding title and marketability, yet they 
failed to mention any of that in their case in chief, and don't even mention the word "damage" or 
"loss", as they knew none existed. The introduction contained in Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief, 
rather than addressing the evidence in this case, instead was designed to reflect a continuing 
animosity and a complete lack of regard for what took place at trial. 
The Plaintiffs' bold broad-based accusations contain the following, to which the 
Defendants now respond: 
1. "This litigation arose out of Dennis Sallaz' false representations regarding the facts." 
Nothing could be further from the truth. There was never a "misrepresentation" by either 
of these Defendants; there was always a full disclosure of all documents that existed, and 
everyone had full knowledge about the occasion and opportunity upon which Ms. Baird 
undertook to fraudulently engage for her own financial gain. Furthermore, each 
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4 
of properties were inspected, researched, reviewed and the facts from all directions were 
,v'-""'"'"'" into, intensely and extensively, by all parties, including the D.L. Evans persom1el, 
Jim Runnell, who undertook title searches, lot book reports, and caused policies of title insurance 
to be ordered and issued, all of which was taking place throughout and during the summer, fall 
and winter of 2005, long before the Agreement came into being on January 6, 2006. Every facet 
of these properties and the dispute with Ms. Baird was revealed and reviewed during that time 
frame, and long before the January 6, 2006, when ultimately the Purchase Agreement was 
entered into. 
At some point in time, during those four years, and in the subsequent period from 
November 6, 2009 to August 3, 2010, Mr. Rice had made up his mind to disregard his 
obligations, and take another course of action. 
2. That "Mr. Sallaz, a licensed attorney, falsely informed the Rices." 
That is a grossly false statement. As noted above, all details about Ms. Baird's claim 
were disclosed by Mr. Sallaz and by Mr. Trefren to Mr. Rice prior to the execution of the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement. In addition, Mr. Rice conducted his own due diligence and relied 
upon a title report and his banker to disclose the title condition of the properties purchased 
pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. As the Court will recall, when asked if he wanted 
to rescind the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Mr. Rice testified during Mr. Sallaz's divorce 
proceedings and was emphatic that he was getting a really good deal on a business venture and 
he was not interested in rescinding the contract. He knew what it was and liked it. 
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3. That "Real Properties, LLC expended approximately $90,000.00 in improving and 
caring for the subject properties only to discover that Mr. Sallaz' ex-wife, Renee Baird, claimed 
an interest in Real Homes, LLC and the subject properties." 
There was no testimony to actually demonstrate how or when any funds were expended 
by Mr. Rice to improve any of the properties, but whatever he did, it was with full knowledge of 
all facts, from everyone's perspective. 
4. That "Mr. Sallaz then induced the Rices and Real Properties, LLC, to file this lawsuit 
against him and his ex-wife, Renee Baird, as well as Glen Trefren, based on false information." 
All facts were well known and digested throughout by all from 2004 on, and the 
Complaint was prepared, crafted, drafted and filed by Messrs. Becker and Runft, having 
confirmed what course of action they wanted to take against Ms. Baird. They were fully aware 
of all information available, and even elected to place some of that information they had at their 
disposal within some of the allegations in their pleadings. Mr. Rice verified the pleadings 
drafted by Messrs. Runft and Becker. 
At trial, he disavowed the contents of the verified complaint. Evaluating Mr. Rice's 
credibility is within the discretion of this Court and all evidence prior to Mr. Rice's recent 
testimony reveals that Mr. Rice understood the terms and conditions of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement, thought it was a great deal, and had no intention of rescinding it. However, Mr. Rice 
materially breached the Agreement when he failed and refused to pay the amounts due under the 
Agreement. Only after it became clear that he could not prevail upon a claim for breach of 
contract, did Mr. Rice decide to claim ignorance of the very Agreement upon which he obtained 
title to property, v1hich he has since utilized as security in other real estate transactions, 
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rent upon, and subsequently transferred to another entity which he controls, for no consideration. 
Unfortunately, Plaintiffs' "introduction" in their Post-Trial Briefing is neither factually 
supported, nor found to have any basis upon any evidence presented at trial. 
Count V was stated as an "alternative" claim, in order to assure recovery on their quiet 
title action. Clearly, Plaintiffs got title to the property, and their title was never threatened, as 
confirmed by and through the "settlement" with Ms. Baird. As to the final part of Plaintiffs' 
introduction, they state Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren argued claims of ownership and oral contracts 
at trial that were not even disclosed in the discovery responses. 
Typically, discovery "responses" are tailored to address the question, not designed to be a 
treatise about your claims or the theory of the case. If they wanted more detail, they could have 
(and apparently should have) undertaken oral depositions, so the details, circumstances, 
inducements, and minutia that you always find will enshroud any case of substance or 
complication, can be explored in some length. That was what we found to be necessary with Mr. 
Rice. The evidence before the court will provide a right to relief to these 
Defendants/Counterclaimants either pursuant to an adequate remedy at law, or by an implied 
contract, either in fact or in law, in which case the Court will provide to them either the value of 
the service or goods they provided (a net market value of $566,597.18, as of January 6, 2006, or 
the market value of the benefit which Mr. Rice received, and has retained within his various 
LLC's, which benefit has a market value of $566,597.18, as of January 6, 2006, as well). 
Moreover, given the testimony of Mr. Rice that he personally, not Real Properties, LLC, 
paid the $63,402.82, and that he subsequently transfened the properties obtained for no 
consideration to a separate LLC he controls, judgment should be entered against Mr. Rice, 
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individually, for the full amount. See Idaho Code 30-6-304 "This subsection pertains to the 
equitable doctrine of "piercing the veil" -i.e., conflating an entity and owners to hold one 
liable for the obligations of the other. The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is well-
established, and courts regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply that doctrine to 
limited liability companies. In the corporate realm, "disregard of corporate formalities" is a key 
factor in the piercing analysis. In the realm of LLCs, that factor is inappropriate, because 
informality of organization and operation is both common and desired. 
This subsection does not preclude consideration of another and equally effective key 
piercing factor-disregard by an entity's owners of the entity's economic separateness from the 
owners." Id. at Note 2. If the court finds there is an adequate legal remedy to make 
Counterclaimants whole under Idaho law, they will receive the sum of $181,597.18, together 
with pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney fees. If this Court determines there is no 
adequate legal remedy in law, due to the "failure" of having a "meeting of the minds" in the 
creation of this Agreement, the court must then determine if it is unjust and inequitable for Mr. 
Rice to keep the value of the service or goods, or the market value of the benefit he has retained, 
and not be required to compensate the sellers therefore, a factor that must be analyzed by the 
Court when considering granting a relief under the theory of an implied contract in fact or law. 
Obviously, Mr. Rice should have embraced the enforceability of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement, as he would have substantially reduced his liability to be just that of the balance 
owing under the contract obligation he entered into with them. Instead, his decision to repudiate 
the contract, by saying he never read it, and saying there was never a meeting of the minds as to 
any of the terms and conditions, has left him exposed to the duty of the court to do equity, when 
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no adequate remedy at law is available, such that, instead of a contract balance identified above, 
required to the reasonable value of the service or goods he received and retained 
( quantum meruit), or the market value of the benefit he has received and retained (unjust 
enrichment), which, in either case, from a reasonable analysis of the evidence, is $566,597.18, 
together with interest and attorney fees under either of those equations. 
5. That "the conduct of Mr. Sallaz was frivolous and an award of attorney fees incurred 
since September, 2010 is warranted under Idaho Code§ 12-121." 
That statement in the introduction lacks both common sense and logic, as well as a 
complete disregard for the reason why the suit was brought in the first place. The selected date, 
"since September, 201 O," can only refer to the Baird settlement, which took place on either 
August 2nd or 3rd, 2010. Clearly, Mr. Sallaz would not agree to dismiss the suit, not without 
being paid what was due under the Agreement, as now it was almost four years; Mr. Rice had not 
paid "any" of the obligations he has agreed to assume; clearly, there was nothing frivolous about 
Mr. Sallaz wanting Mr. Rice to honor the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement; nothing 
frivolous about wanting him to pay the balance he owed and had agreed to pay; there was no 
expressed reason or disclosed any justification why that could not be done, and especially at that 
moment once the settlement was announced by Mr. Runft, as now, nothing stood in the way. 
Once again, and it is important for this Court to take note, the settlement with Ms. Baird 
transferred absolutely nothing by way of any interest transferred in behalf of Real Homes, LLC; 
all Ms. Baird signed by way of a "deed" was a quitclaim deed, the sole effect of which was to 
"release" any "right, title or interest" she may otherwise personally claim in or to any of the 
properties. She did not execute a deed of conveyance on "behalf' of Real Hornes, LLC. 
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The only "conveyance" from Real Homes, LLC was that which came solely from the 
sellers, through the deeds executed by Mr. Trefren, which he did on behalf of Real Homes, LLC, 
and also he did as to the interests then held by Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC. 
What becomes frivolous at this point in time September, 2010 was Mr. Rice's failure and 
refusal to honor the contract terms and to pay the balance owing under the purchase price, which 
represented the principal sum of $181,597.18, with substantial interest accruing. He had already 
failed or otherwise refused to assume the balance owing to D.L. Evans bank in conjunction with 
the Smith property; had failed to pay the balance owing to Perry Harding; and had refused to 
complete the course of action he had committed to do, as he chose not to take title to and assume 
and pay what was owed on 15584 Riverside property, knowing full well that "assumed debt" 
would be deducted from the purchase price. 
In short, the "frivolous" conduct would only be that undertaken by Mr. Rice and Mr. 
Becker, each of whom chose to orchestrate a new direction for a new and deceitful purpose, to 
disclaim what was owed under the Purchase Agreement. Yes, the word "frivolous" has some 
application here, but the application and focus by Plaintiffs in their "introduction" is misdirected 
and misguided, and no doubt there will be a supporting basis in this Court's decision for granting 
and award of attorney fees to Defendants/Counterclaimants, as they have requested in these 
proceedings. 
B. Response to Plaintiff's Arguments on Their Count V Claim 
Certainly the Plaintiffs had expressed a desire to dismiss their case in its entirety after 
they had settled with Ms. Baird, and no doubt they wanted to dismiss the Complaint as Mr. Rice 
got everything he wanted out of Ms. Baird, but the landscape had changed dramatically in terms 
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the performance forthcoming from Mr. Rice, relative to his obligations and commitments to 
Sallaz and At moment in time Mr. Rice had committed numerous acts, or 
otherwise failed to perform various commitments, each of which were inconsistent with his 
agreement with them including the following: 
1. Mr. Rice had failed to assume and pay the obligation associated with the Smith 
parcel, refened to as the obligation to "D.L. Evans Bank" the encumbrance refened to and 
identified in paragraph 2a (pg. 1) of the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 41). 
2. January 6, 2008 had come and gone, and by August 2, 2010, the balance of the 
purchase price was long overdue under the Purchase Agreement, and another 2 2/3 's years had 
lapsed since the balance became due upon the Purchase and Sale Agreement, with nothing being 
paid. Despite this, Mr. Rice took full advantage of titles to four parcels he had acquired in the 
Purchase Agreement; used those parcels to secure all of the funds needed to purchase outright 
the "Melba" property, as well as finance others, yet failed in his commitment to pay the debt he 
agreed to assume under the Purchase Agreement against the Smith parcel, as was owed to D.L. 
Evans Bank. His failure to do that had caused need for Mr. Sallaz to pay that debt himself, as he 
had personally guaranteed that obligation, and it had come due and needed to be paid during that 
time. 
Mr. Rice simply chose to breach his commitments, once he got title and the foreclosure 
sale was cancelled, and abandoned all remaining terms of the Purchase Agreement. These 
Defendants would wholeheartedly agree that Plaintiffs had no cause of action whatsoever against 
these Defendants at any time, and the focus of the Complaint, at all times only, was to remove 
the Lis Pendens falsely asserted by Ms. Baird. It was accomplished to Mr. Rice's satisfaction by 
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of the settlement agreement with Ms. Baird on August 3rd, 2010, and as a result of 
there was no basis in fact or in law for Plaintiffs' Complaint to proceed forward. 
Let me repeat the statement Mr. Becker presents to us on page 3 of his Post-Trial 
briefing; "Plaintiffs tried to dismiss the entirety of this case after they settled with Ms. Baird". 
That statement is so telling that it could almost be called a "Freudian slip", as it reveals several 
very significant and telling factors: Plaintiffs knew they had no cause of action to go forward 
against these Defendants; Plaintiffs' attorneys knew they had no legal or factual basis to go 
forward with any "meritorious" claim against these Defendants. 
The continuation of Count V in the Complaint was being pursued for reasons "other" 
than a meritorious claim against these Defendants; continuing the advancement of Count V 
represents a clear breach of both the fiduciary and affirmative duty of good faith and fair dealing 
in their contractual transaction between these parties, as it was being pursued to advance a non-
existent claim, over a non-existent damage that could never be established in fact or in law, and 
was being done to defeat the existence of a valid and binding contract and the required 
performance of Mr. Rice, and was being done in a manner that was orchestrated and designed to 
eliminate his obligations and inducements created with these Defendants over a transaction 
where he obtained title to four parcels of property worth $630,000.00 on January 6, 2006. 
Despite the fact Plaintiffs never attempted to identify any particular breach upon which 
they were relying, let alone any particular theory of a damage, or even any suggested damage 
amount, or even a damage concept in their case in chief, we now see these Plaintiffs still 
suggesting to the court: "the maturation of this claim depends on the court's findings of several 
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addressed above - mainly the actual ownership of Real Homes, LLC, as of January 6, 
2006." See Plaintiffs Post-Trial Brief page 21 regarding "Count V of complaint". 
Because Plaintiffs were persistent in going forward with the presentation of Count V of 
their Complaint, and the malicious use of deceptive evidence of Ms. Baird to defeat the contract 
they before alleged existed, it may be of some interest to look at the allegations that actually 
formed the "basis" of Count V of the Complaint, commencing at paragraph 81 of their pleading. 
It begins by stating that: Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, and Real Homes, LLC "breached the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement". That allegation serves to claim a "Purchase Agreement" does 
exist; that there were warranties, representations and statements about property ownership, 
marketable title, and ownership interests, which, obviously, must have been understood and read 
by Plaintiffs, so as to thereafter be able to allege in paragraph 85 of their Complaint, the various 
other following allegations: 
a) pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended 
$63,402.82 to have extinguished the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd., Canyon 
County, Idaho and prevent a foreclosure of the same; 
b) Alternative Plaintiff paid the balance of a mortgage at $50,351.04 on the property 
known as 714 Smith Ave., Nampa, ID and advanced $10,000.00 toward repairs 
and improvements; 
c) pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiffs expended 
$5000.00 as an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz; 
d) Alternative Plaintiff purchased lumber and materials which they have been unable 
to use to improve the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial but 
believed to be in excess of $30,000.00 
e) Alternative Plaintiff expended money in managing, maintaining, improving, and 
paying property taxes on the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial 
but believed to be in excess of $84,000.00. 
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one at a time, in response to each paragraph: 
Paragraph a: At trail, Alternative Plaintiffs denied the existence of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement; claimed the $63,402.82 was the only amount to be paid, yet failed to identify an 
agreement to support upon what basis $630,000.00 worth of real estate is being conveyed. 
Paragraph b: There was a balance owed to D. L. Evans Bank concerning 714 Smith Ave. 
That obligation was identified in the Agreement by reference being made to D.L. Evans Bank in 
the Purchase and Sale Agreement, but Alternative Plaintiffs never paid that encumbrance, be it 
$50,351.04 or $30,000.00, or any other figure. The significance of their allegation, however, is 
the fact that Plaintiffs specifically "identified" a sum they knew was owing, and it was 
"identified" by Plaintiffs because they understood they had to assume and pay it, and they knew 
it before they filed their complaint on November 6, 2009, and fully understood it was their 
obligation to pay it under the Purchase Agreement, but having then not paid it, at trail they made 
no attempt to address it at all, as they knew Mr. Sallaz had satisfied that obligation because of his 
personal guarantee of that obligation, and they were now instead stressing their complete 
ignorance of the contents of the Agreement, as Mr. Rice claimed he never read the Agreement. 
Paragraph c: Plaintiffs alleged the $5,000.00 was paid to Mr. Sallaz pursuant to the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement, yet we saw Mr. Rice actually testify at trial, under oath, as an 
adverse witness, in a way completely inconsistent with that allegation, stating it was "probably" 
or "more likely" a loan to Mr. Sallaz, and not paid under the Purchase Agreement. 
Paragraphs d and e: There is no showing made that any amount was spent to improve, 
manage, maintain, or pay taxes on these properties, as the Plaintiffs realize such testimony would 
serve only to be "irrelevant" to their position no\v when they had already abandoned their 
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breach of contract claim, producing evidence, instead, only to demonstrate there could not be a 
and never attempting to prove the nature of any breach, or any resulting damage. 
Of further interest, within the Opening Final Argument presented by Alternative 
Plaintiffs in their Post-Trial Brief: they would suggest now that, based upon the "contingent 
language" in the Complaint, Alternative Count V should be construed as a "claim for unjust 
emichment" against Dennis Sallaz and Glenn Trefren in their individual capacities (see pg. 21 of 
the Post-Trial Brief). 
It would appear impossible to develop an unjust enrichment claim against Mr. Trefren, as 
he received nothing but lies and failed promises from Mr. Rice, be it under the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement, or be it under the larger development venture he was induced to accept as the reason 
to complete the Purchase Agreement. Similarly, it would be difficult to develop an unjust 
emichment claim against Mr. Sallaz, as the testimony presented from Mr. Rice was that he 
"probably or most likely" loaned that money to Mr. Sallaz, and it was not paid pursuant to any 
Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
Without any attempt by Plaintiffs to amend the pleadings under Rule l 5(a) I.R.C.P. 
similar to the fashion in which our motion was made, and without any credible evidence to 
demonstrate a sum of money was paid that was not owed, the Alternative Plaintiffs make it 
impossible to get an "implied contract in law" remedy out of the facts of "their" case, as they 
denied a contract could exist, and it appears as though they are not really sure upon what 
pretense the $5000.00 was tendered. For them to be seeking unjust enrichment, now out of a 
claim that moments before were seeking a breach of an express contract, initially identified in 
Count V of the Complaint, but now to be "construed" by some "distinct language in the 
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Complaint" to allow for such consideration by the court, when their shifted focus and objective 
had then become to defeat form of an Agreement, one to ponder their understanding 
of their case, and the evidence they elected to put forward. When it comes to the question: 
"whether an adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it" (pg. 22 of the Post-
Trial Brief), the only "notice" these Defendants had about a "claim" by Plaintiffs against any 
Defendants was the allegations contained in the Complaint, wherein those allegations were 
clearly to the point: there "was" a contract, and it was "known" to exist by all parties, and known 
to be that contract that was "attached to the Complaint", and is referred to as the "Purchase and 
Sale Agreement". Essentially, Plaintiffs want to go from a contention an agreement exists, and 
that Defendants breached it, to the idea that there was never any agreement for the sale of 
anything, or any agreement to do anything, but nonetheless, Mr. Sallaz somehow got $5,000.00, 
and although they are willing to testify it involved some unrelated loan, they now think they 
want it back, as they think it would be unjust for Mr. Nallaz to keep it, though it might have 
actually been a loan, and never paid under the terms of the Agreement, as, after all, they argue no 
such agreement exists. Now that's stretching an equitable doctrine beyond its limits, and into the 
realm and depth of the bad faith Plaintiffs' case has actually and truly come to offer. 
C. Effects Of Motion To Amend Pleadings To Conform To The Evidence 
Alternative Plaintiffs perceived the Motion to Amend made by Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants to relate only to Mr. Trefren's claim being made by him to recover the value of 
his services, upon a theory other than that of a general contractor, a11d those provisional 
requirements that are otherwise reflected in §54-5217 Idaho Code. Apparently Plaintiffs' 
attorneys did not fully comprehend the thrust of the motion, as it was intended to render 
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/ 
COlJNTERDEFENDANTS' POST TRIAL BRlEF AND OPENING ARGUMENT 16 
Court with subject matter jurisdiction to avail itself of all the issues and claims advanced by 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, so as to come within the purview of all available legal and 
equitable forms of recovery and rights to relief. 
The thrust of the motion goes to each of the equitable doctrines and legal remedies that 
should be made available to these Defendants/Counterclaimants, so as to allow them to recover 
upon each of the available rights to relief, "as this Court may deem to be proper and just under 
the circumstances". 
As the evidence demonstrates, Mr. Trefren engaged his services in the nature of a 
superintendent and construction manager, pursuant to his perception and understanding he was 
involved in a three-way profit splitting arrangement that was represented to include these four 
parcels of property, along with the Melba property, and any other properties, which were then in 
the process of being acquired through loans advanced by D .L. Evans Bank, upon the use of the 
four parcels as collateral to get the funds to make these purchases. 
Mr. Trefren was acting in good faith in accordance with the promise that there would be 
the development of those, and other acquired properties, obtained by Mr. Rice, and it was Mr. 
Rice, himself, who proposed the arrangements that he made with Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren, 
which included not only acquisition of the property as addressed in the Purchase Agreement, but 
also the greater, more expanded development venture that Mr. Rice had induced them to believe 
they were to embark upon as well. 
They had each agreed among the three of them to start with the Smith parcel, as it had the 
greatest potential for completion and sale upon the market, from which funds would be generated 
to continue the development process as envisioned by the parties. Mr. Trefrcn's services could 
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be seen as having been undertaken as a part of, or as an extension of, 
given the inducement he was led to believe he would paid 
Purchase Agreement 
profits that would be 
coming also from those parcels, as part of the greater development venture he was promoted by 
Mr. Rice to believe, as Mr. Rice obviously wanted Mr. Trefren to continue to be engaged in the 
development that had already been started, and to continue his services in the direction of 
finishing the houses, as there were three more out on Riverside still up on cribbing that needed to 
be finished. Messrs. Trefren, Sallaz, and Rice were either partners or joint-venturers, and co-
developers of these properties as a commercial venture, and therefore all three should or could be 
considered to be exempt from any regulation under the Contractor Registration Act under the 
provision of LC. § 54-5205(2)(m) (owners of commercial property who themselves perform 
maintenance, repair, alteration, or construction work on their own properties). If they were 
supposed to share in profits, they would have some interest in the ownership of the venture to 
which they had agreed. 
Mr. Trefren was rendering his services either under the guise of the development venture, 
or under one sort or another of a contract that should be implied in fact, or a contract that should 
be implied in law, and his right to recover the "value" of his "services" is best formulated under 
the equitable doctrine of an implied contract in fact, as he is entitled to recover the reasonable 
value of his services pursuant to the theory of recovery under quantum meruit, as described in 
more detail in our initial memorandum. 
The scope of the motion, however, is not just limited to Mr. Trefren's ciaim for his 
services; it was also intended to encompass the appropriate relief to be considered by the Court 
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regard to the original transaction by which Mr. Rice obtained title to $630,000.00 worth of 
he can walk away avoid paying what he is obligated to 
The pleadings filed by Counterclaimants alleged a claim for recovery upon unjust 
enrichment, a right to recovery envisioned under a contract implied in law. The right for 
recovery under quantum meruit, envisioned under a contract implied in fact, is an equitable 
principle as well, one in which the evidence has presented the Court the need to consider that 
equitable remedy also, and to that end, the pleadings were thought best to be amended, so as to 
avail this Court of that equitable principle in its consideration as well, though, in truth, the "value 
of the goods" received by Plaintiffs, under the quantum meruit theory, is probably synonymous 
with the "benefit received by the recipient", as in each case it would reasonably appear that the 
"value" in the one, and the "benefit" in the other, is the same: a net "value" or "benefit" of 
$566,597.18 as of the relevant point in time the implied contract came into existence, that being 
January 6, 2006. 
Consequently, the amendment to the pleadings is designed to coincide the evidence to the 
claims and issues presented, and to grant the relief to which the law and principles of equity 
require. In that sense, it affects each and every aspect of the evidence that supports a recovery, 
whether it be upon a legal remedy, or upon an equitable principle recognized under Idaho law. 
D. Whether An Oral Contract For The Development Venture Violates The Statute Of 
Frauds 
Alternative Plaintiffs have expressed a concern that the "larger development venture" 
comes within the statute of frauds, §9-505 Idaho Code. The language contained in the statute, 
however, appears not to apply to the "development venture" as it does not constitute a "lease" or 
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a "sale" of "real property", as there was never envisioned a "conveyance" of any property was to 
made to either of these venture partners. The interest had in the venture went to a share 
in the profits, not in the physical act of holding title to any of the property they were causing to 
be developed. 
E. Statute Of Limitations As To The Development Venture 
Alternative Plaintiffs have brought forth the concern over the statute of limitations 
pertaining to the larger development venture promoted by Mr. Rice, and have raised concerns 
over the application of §5-217 Idaho Code. Before any statute of limitations can be applied to a 
transaction, it must be determined "when" a "cause of action" accrued. It must be remembered 
that none of the parcels or lots have ever been sold, so there is no profits to date generated from 
which to share or fail to share. There have been no profits identified or disclosed to date by Mr. 
Rice, so, if there are no profits reportedly generated, and none available to distribute, then it 
would appear we do not have a basis to give rise to a "cause of action" for anyone to sue the 
other, as Mr. Rice appears to have put the project on hold, until this dispute is finalized. 
It does not appear reasonable to believe Mr. Trefren should have sued Mr. Rice, or any of 
his LLC entities, under a theory that there has been a breach of their oral venture agreement by 
these Defendants, until such time it has been determined a profit has been generated, and Mr. 
Rice failed or refused to disperse equally, that determined profit, to and among the three of them. 
Mr. Rice has admitted he still has the properties in Ada Properties, LLC, one of his LLC entities, 
and that he claims they are each "free and clear". 
He also now says he would take $300,000.00 for them, but he has NEVER told anyone 
he has made a profit through his involvement with them. Since a "profit", as we understand the 
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term to require, has never come to pass, a legal scholar could conclude there has been no accrual 
a "cause of action" from which a breach of contract claim could be successfully brought 
against Mr. Rice, or any of these "Plaintiffs" or any of his LLC's, upon a pretense he has failed 
to disperse, equaily, the "profits" from the development of these properties. 
Given the evidence, Mr. Rice has paid NOTHING to acquire the Smith parcel, and 
although he has paid some amount for "labor and materials", as funds were deposited into Mr. 
Trefren's account to pay those costs he incurred for the labor he hired, and the materials he 
bought, the evidence does not identify any amount that was actually spent. What was alleged in 
the Complaint was never presented in any form in their case in chief with any of their evidence. 
Mr. Rice, however, disclaimed the truth of the verified complaint, thus rendering any reliance 
upon the same dubious. Possibly he has kept the taxes current, as he says they are "free and 
clear", but that also has never been a clear fact, as the phrase has never been defined. 
Another, and a more encompassing, though equitable, manner upon which to formulate a 
remedy for these Counterclaimants would be to render a decision that declares Counterclaimants 
entitled to the equitable remedy under a theory of an implied contract, such that 
Counterclaimants are awarded $566,597.18 as a right ofrecovery under either theory, be it under 
quantum meruit or be it under unjust enrichment, as the reasonable value of the "goods" equals 
or equates to the market "value" of the "benefit" received by Mr. Rice (and his LLC's), and once 
that determination is made, then this court can afford Mr. Rice the limited option to "discharge" 
his obligation under that judgment or award by returning each of the four parcels of property to 
the Counterclaimants, thereby deeding the property back to them in the same manner and fashion 
upon which they received it, that being the execution of similar, but now being re-conveyance 
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVE PLAINTIFFS/ 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' POST TRIAL BRIEF AND OPENING ARGUMENT 21 
returning the property as described and as is reflected by the contents of Exhibits E, F, G, 
The Court will recall Mr. Rice testified he would accept $300,000.00 for all four parcels, 
but it must also be kept in mind he "holds" title to these properties in Ada Properties, LLC. His 
re-conveyance of those properties must also include a release or quitclaim deed from Ada 
Properties, LLC as one of the Grantors in these re-conveying deeds. If we take Mr. Rice at his 
word that (at least to his present way of thinking) that these properties are worth only 
$300,000.00, then he would be most happy to satisfy a debt of $566,597.18 with the surrender of 
property he has valued to be worth only $300,000.00, in the present market. 
Upon such a resolution, Mr. Trefren would then be able to receive and recover the full 
value of his service for what he has coming for his performance in the construction and 
supervision he did at 714 Smith Ave., as he would have found it to be included within the 
recovered assets, and he would then have the distinct opportunity (and ability) to resolve that 
issue with Mr. Sallaz, as the title conveyed back to Counterclaimant(s) would include both the 
names of Real Homes, LLC, Glenn Trefren, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, 
as their interest formerly so appeared in the deeds of conveyance (Exhibits E,F,G, and H) by 
which title was conveyed. 
By virtue of that equitable remedy being utilized to resolve this dispute by the Court, the 
Court would also conclude in its factual findings and legal conclusions that there was no 
conveyance of the "ownership interest" reflected in the Purchase Agreement, as it would be 
regarded as a non- enforceable agreement, as an equitable remedy was utilized to resolve this 
dispute, and that precludes application of a legal remedy for the enforcement of the transaction. 
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From the effects of that, it would be determined Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren did not convey their 
"m;vnership interests" to Real Properties, LLC. That "transa t~woufd-be-4ec111_red, in all 
respects, unenforceable, null and void, and of n ffect. That serves justice to the A~e-" 
Plaintiffs, as they have been advocating a positi n they have intended to denounce and defeat the 
existence of an enforceable contract for some period o · e now. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of December, 2013. 
·v emon K. Smith 
Attorney for Dennis J. Sallaz 
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This matter having come before the court trial on November 20, 21, 22, and 25, 2013; 
and the Plaintiffs having been represented by Mr. J. Kahle Becker and Mr. Gabriel J. McCarthy; 
and the Defendant Dennis J. Sallaz having been represented by Mr. Vernon K. Smith; and the 
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Defendants Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors having been represented by Mr. Iver J. 
and the court having considered the file and record in this action; the 
presented; the arguments and briefing of counsel; the Post trial Memorandum filed December 20, 
2013; the Final Argument and Authority to Support Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of 
Alternative Plaintiffs Count V, And Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence 
Presented on Counterclaims, filed December 20, 2013; and Alternative 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Post Trial Brief, filed December 20, 2013; and the Closing 
Argument and Response to Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Post Trial Brief and 
Opening Argument, filed December 30, 2013; together with the applicable law; this court does 
hereby render its memorandum decision as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
By verified Complaint filed November 6, 2009, Plaintiffs sought relief against 
Defendants on various claims, including declaratory relief (Count I), judgment quieting title to 
certain real property located in Canyon County (Count II), damages for unjust enrichment 
(Counts III, IV, and VI), and damages for breach of contract (Count V). As of the date of this 
Order, Plaintiffs' only remaining claim is for breach of contract, as set forth in Count V of the 
Complaint. Count V was originally asserted as an "alternative" claim, with its own caption. 
Since Count Vis Plaintiffs only remaining claim, the above caption represents the status of the 
parties on such claim. 
Defendant Sallaz filed his Answer with Affirmative Defenses on January 10, 2011. 
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On July 6, 201 Defendants Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC 
filed their Amended Answer Counterclaim, pursuant to an of this court, 
and the court ordered such Answer filed nunc pro tune to December 30, 2010. The Counterclaim 
includes three separate counts, two for damages for breach of contract and one based upon unjust 
enrichment. 
Plaintiffs filed their "Answer to Defendants Glenn Trefren's Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC.'s Counterclaim" on July 25, 2012. 
On November 20, 2013, the parties commenced trial before the court on Count V of the 
Complaint and Defendants Trefren and Tradesman's counterclaims. 
MOTIONS TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS 
Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC and Counterclaimants both seek an order, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 15(b), granting leave to amend their claims to conform to the evidence adduced at trial. 
I. Standard of Decision 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court is not limited to deciding the 
case on the issues as framed by the pleadings. MK. Transp., Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). "However, the court's authority under I.R.C.P. l 5(b) and, 
consequently, I.R.C.P. 54(c), to determine a case upon unpleaded theories is limited by the 
proviso in I.R.C.P. l 5(b) that for the court to consider unpleaded issues those issues must have 
been 'tried by express or implied consent of the parties ... .' Although I.R.C.P. 15(b) permits a 
comi to base its decision on a theory fully tried by the parties, an issue not tried by either express 
or implied consent cannot be the basis for the decision. See, e. g., 6 Wright & Miller Fed. 
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Practice & Procedure, Civil s 1493 ( 1971 ). " Id "Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded 
is not established because evidence to that issue was without 
objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the 
unpleaded issue." Id. (quoting MB! Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th 
Cir. 1974)). 
It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether the parties consented to 
the trial of an issue. Lynch v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238,241,561 P.2d 380,383 (1977). In making 
a discretionary determination, this court must: (1) correctly perceive the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reach its decision by an 
exercise ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 
993, 1000 (1991). 
II. Plaintiff's Motion 
Count V of the Complaint ("Breach of Contract in the Alternative) includes the following 
allegations by Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC: 
81. In the alternative, if this Court declares the purchase and sale agreement invalid or 
unenforceable and does not quiet title to the above referenced assets and property in Real 
Properties, LLC, Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren, Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes, 
L.L.C. breached the Purchase and Sale Agreement by failing to convey good and 
marketable title to Real Properties, LLC. 
82. In the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit C" Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren, 
Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes, L.L.C. warranted that they had authority to transfer good 
and marketable title to Real Homes, L.L.C. and all its assets. 
83. Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz made ce1iain statements and 
representations that they were owners and managers of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
- 4 -
84. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC purehased Real Homes, L.L.C. based upon 
Alternative Defendants' representations, and statements. 
85. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, 
LLC suffered the following damages: 
a. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended 
$63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, 
ID and prevent a foreelosure sale of the same. 
b. Alternative Plaintiff paid the balance of a mortgage of $50,351.04 on the property 
known as 714 Smith Ave. Nampa, ID and advanced $10,000 toward repairs and 
improvements; 
c. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended 
$5,000 as an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz; 
d. Alternative Plaintiff purchased lumber and materials which they have been unable 
to use to improve the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial but 
believed to be in excess of $30,000. 
e. Alternative Plaintiff expended money in managing, maintaining, improving and 
paying property taxes on the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial 
but believed to be in excess of $84,000. 
86. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC is entitled to and hereby requests a money 
judgment for the above referenced damages including prejudgment interest. 
Plaintiff now contends that, "[b ]ased on the contingent language in the Complaint, 
Alternative Count V should be construed as a claim for unjust enrichment against Dennis Sallaz 
and Glenn Trefren in their individual capacities," based on I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) and the fact that 
"Idaho is a 'notice pleading' jurisdiction." However, as noted above, the issue is not whether the 
alleged claim is a valid claim of relief, but whether the parties tried the claim by consent. 
The unjust enrichment claim Plaintiff seeks to asse1i is distinctly different from the 
breach of warranty claim asserted in Count V. In fact, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, 
Roy Rice, rather than Real Properties, LLC, would be the proper Plaintiff on the unjust 
enrichment claim, because Mr. Rice testified numerous times that he personally paid whatever 
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sums were paid to Defendants Sallaz and Trefren pursuant to the Agreement. This testimony is 
with the Mr. Rice filed support of Plaintiffs prior Summary 
Judgment on Count V. In fact, in its Order on such motion, this comi noted: 
In Paragraph 29 of his Affidavit, Mr. Rice states: "Due to exigent circumstances, namely 
an impending foreclosure, the funds utilized for the Real Homes/Real Properties 
transaction were my personal funds." This contradiction in Plaintiffs own evidence 
precludes the court from granting summary judgment in favor of Real Properties on its 
breach of contract claim because the evidence is insufficient to establish that Real 
Properties suffered any damage resulting from the alleged breach of the Agreement. 
Plaintiff had ample notice and time to properly assert a claim for unjust enrichment prior 
to the commencement of the trial in this action and Plaintiff has not identified any basis in the 
record supporting a conclusion that Defendants consented to try the alleged unjust enrichment 
claim. 
III. Counterclaimants' Motion 
In their Amended Answer and Counterclaim, filed July 6, 2012 nunc pro tune to 
December 30, 2010, Glen Trefren and Tradesman asserted three claims for relief: (1) Damages 
for breach of the January 6, 2006 Purchase Agreement for Sale oflnterest in Real Homes, LLC, 
asserted by Trefren on his own behalf and as assignee of "all right ... title and interest" of 
Defendant Sallaz in the Agreement (Count I); Damages for breach of a contract between 
"Plaintifffs" and Trefren and Tradesman "for goods and services to be used in the maintenance 
and improvements of the properties at issue in this litigation" (Count II); and restitution 
damages, based upon unjust enrichment, again, apparently asserted by Trefren only, "as a result 
of Defendant's transfer of all right, title and interest in and to Real Homes, LLC and all property 
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owned by Real Homes, LLC, and Plaintiffs failure to pay and subsequent breach of the Purchase 
III).1 
In his post-trial Motion to Amend Pleadings, Counterclaimant Trefren seeks leave to 
amend Count III so as to seek quantum meruit damages on the facts pled and, allegedly, proved 
(the Motion makes a number of sweeping factual assertions, especially regarding the values of 
various properties, with no citation to the record): 
Given the circumstances of this case, should the Court find the express contract to 
be unenforceable for any reason, the court must necessarily find the existence of a factual 
basis to apply an implied contract in fact or an implied contract in law, for which the 
reasonable value of the benefit received by Mr. Rice must be paid to these "sellers." 
Because Defendants/Counterclaimants alleged the equitable remedy of unjust 
emichment, under the theory of an implied contract in law, it was deemed necessary to 
move the Court to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented, by 
Counterclaimants in the case, so as to enable this Court to have the full availability of all 
equitable doctrines, including quantum meruit (a contract implied in fact) as well as the 
pleaded relief under an unjust emichment claim (a contract implied in law). 
Final Argument and Authority to Support Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Alternative 
Plaintiffs' Count V, and Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented 
on the Counterclaims, p. 26. 
Counterclaimant correctly notes that "[b]oth quantum meruit (implied-in-fact contracts) 
and unjust emichment (implied-in-law contracts) are 'measures of equitable recovery.'" Clayson 
v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, 234, 280 P.3d 731, 737 (2012) (quoting Farrell v. Whiteman ( Farrell I), 
1 Count III mistakenly states that Trefren seeks the equitable remedy of rescission for Plaintiffs alleged unjust 
enrichment - "the contract and all property transfers should be set aside with the parties being returned to their pre-
Purchase Sale Agreement positions." As Trefren clearly states in his post-trial Motion to Amend, he intended to 
state a claim for restitution based upon unjust enrichment in Count III ("Because Defendants/Counterclaimants 
alleged the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, under the theory of an implied contract in law," Final 
Argument and Authority to Support Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Alternative Plaintiffs' Count V, and 
Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented on the Counterclaims, p. 26), the 
appropriate remedy on such claim would be the amount of any benefit Real Properties unjustly retained. Gray v. 
Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378,389,210 P.3d 63, 74 (2009). 
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146 Idaho 604, 612, 200 P.3d 1153, 1161 (2009)). However, Trefren has not made a primafacie 
remedy of quantum is available to him on the this 
case. The remedy of quantum meruit is based upon the principle that "one who provides services 
should receive the compensation he or she deserves." Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 894, 934 
P.2d 951, 960 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Shacocass, Inc., v. Arrington Const. Co., 116 Idaho 460, 
464, 776 P.2d 469,473 (Ct.App.1989)). It is used to compensate a person who has performed 
services at the request of another, and recovery is based on an implied-in-fact contract. Id. The 
measure for recovery required for a claim in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of services 
rendered, not the actual benefit realized and retained. Id This is an objective measure and is 
proven by evidence demonstrating the nature of the work and the customary rate of pay for such 
work in the community at the time the work was performed. Id Since the implied-in-fact 
contract allegedly at issue in Count III is not one for the provision of goods and services, there is 
no basis for the court to apply the equitable remedy of quantum meruit. In addition, even if the 
implied-in-fact contract remedy applied here, Trefren has not identified evidence in the record 
demonstrating the reasonable value of the property he provided to Real Properties, LLC or Roy 
Rice under the alleged contract. In addition, even if the implied-in-fact contract remedy applied 
here, Trefren has not identified any evidence in the record demonstrating the reasonable value of 
the property-his member interest in Real Homes, LLC-which he provided to Real Properties, 
LLC or to Roy Rice under the alleged contract. 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
21, 13, at the close Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendants moved for 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4I(b). 
The court reserved ruling on Defendants' motion, noting the number of documents 
entered in the first day and a half of this case and the legal issues, both direct and indirect, that 
appear to be implicated on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
comi granted the parties leave to address the Motion to Dismiss in written submissions. 
I. Standard of Decision 
I.R.C.P. 41 (b ), in an action tried by the court without a jury, permits the defendant to 
move for involuntary dismissal of the plaintiff's case, at the close of the plaintiffs evidence, "on 
the ground that on the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." In response to 
such motion, the court may: (1) decline to render any judgment until the close of all the 
evidence; or (2) determine the facts and law, based upon findings as provided in I.R.C.P. 52(a), 
and render judgment against the plaintiff. 
[W]hen a defendant moves for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the 
plaintiffs presentation in a non-jury case, the court sits as a trier of fact and is not 
required to construe all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977); 
I.R.C.P. 4l(b); See Stratton v. Stratton, 87 Idaho 118,391 P.2d 340 (1964). Thus, in 
rendering a judgment pursuant to the defendants' motion for dismissal under I.R.C.P. 
41 (b ), the trial court is not as limited in its evaluation of the plaintiffs case as it would be 
in a motion for directed verdict. The court is not to make any special inferences in the 
plaintiffs favor nor concern itself with whether plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. 
Instead, it is to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where 
the preponderance lies. Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823,825,606 P.2d 473,475 
(1980). 
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Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim 
The Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC (Agreement), dated 
January 6, 2006, and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 41, includes the following provisions: 
WHEREAS, Sellers each hold 100% ownership interest in Real Homes LLC, 
which is all of the ownership interest therein, an LLC formed and recorded with the Idaho 
Secretary of State on January 19, 2001, and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that Sellers shall sell to 
the Buyer all of said Ownership Interest and all right, title and interest in and to all real 
property owned by Real Homes, LLC as sort forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
**** 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows: 
1. Sellers hereby agrees to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to purchase 
from the Sellers, all of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all of the 
Ownership Interest thereof, subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth. 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase price for said 
Ownership Interest shall be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars 
($250,000), lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid by the Buyer to the 
Seller as follows: 
(a) Buyer shall assume all recorded encumbrances against all real properties 
owned by Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited to, D.L. Evans 
Bank, Perry Harding, CPA, and Canyon County Property taxes and Buyer 
shall hold Sellers harmless therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held by 
Saxton Fruit Farms dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set for 
foreclosure sale on January 6, 2006, and Buyer agrees to pay same in full 
prior to sale. 
( c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title encumbrances 
shall then be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal cash shares from the 
net proceeds from sales, income or other disposition of any or all of the 
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said properties herein. In any event said payment shall be made no later 
than 24 months from the date hereof. 
Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dennis J. Sallaz an 
advance of $5,000.00 as partial payment on his Attorney fees due to Jim 
Bevis prior to April 10, 2006. 
3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
( a) That the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein constitutes l 00% 
of the Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to said Ownership Interest 
being sold and transferred hereunder with absolute right to sell, assign and 
transfer same to Buyer free and clear of all liens, pledges, security 
interests or encumbrances and without breach of any agreement to which 
he is a party. 
( c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC 
and being transferred herein are free and clear of all encumbrances not 
listed herein. 
( d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and Sellers 
shall execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to transfer all 
interest therein to Buyer. 
(e) Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the performance 
thereof. 
The Agreement was executed by Real Properties, LLC, by Eugene L. Rice as Manager, 
by Glenn Trefren and Dennis L. Sallaz, as "Co-owners," and by Real Homes, LLC by Glenn 
Trefren as "Co-owner." 
It appears, from the express language of the Agreement ("If possible, the intent of the 
parties should be asce1iained from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their 
intent." Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602,607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002)), as 
confirmed by the evidence rrdduced at trial, that the intent of the parties was to transfer the 
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member interests of Trefren and Sallaz in Real Homes, LLC, representing one hundred percent 
member interests to Real Properties, consideration the 
payment of $250,000.00 by Real Properties, LLC, together with an attendant transfer of all real 
property owned by Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, for which no payment was 
required. 
B. The Claim 
As noted previously, Count V alleges: 
81. In the alternative, if this Court declares the purchase and sale agreement invalid or 
unenforceable and does not quiet title to the above referenced assets and property in Real 
Properties, LLC, Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren, Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes, 
L.L.C. breached the Purchase and Sale Agreement by failing to convey good and 
marketable title to Real Properties, LLC.2 
82. In the Purchase and Sale Agreement "Exhibit C" Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren, 
Dennis Sallaz, and Real Homes, L.L.C. warranted that they had authority to transfer good 
and marketable title to Real Homes, L.L.C. and all its assets. 
83. Alternative Defendants Glenn Trefren and Dennis Sallaz made certain statements and 
representations that they were owners and managers of Real Homes, L.L.C. 
84. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC purchased Real Homes, L.L.C. based upon 
Alternative Defendants' warranties, representations, and statements. 
85. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, 
LLC suffered the following damages: 
a. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended 
$63,402.82 to extinguish the debt owing on 15580 Riverside Rd, Canyon County, 
ID and prevent a foreclosure sale of the same. 
b. Alternative Plaintiff paid the balance of a mortgage of $50,351.04 on the property 
known as 714 Smith Ave. Nampa, ID and advanced $10,000 toward repairs and 
improvements; 
2 It would appear that Paragraph 81 should state that the claim is contingent on the court finding the Agreement 
valid and enforceable, since the claim asserted in Count V is based upon the breach of certain warranties contained 
in that Agreement. 
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c. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Alternative Plaintiff expended 
$5,000 as an advance payment to Dennis Sallaz; 
d. Plaintiff purchased lumber and materials which have unable 
to use to improve the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial but 
believed to be in excess of $30,000. 
e. Alternative Plaintiff expended money in managing, maintaining, improving and 
paying property taxes on the subject properties in an amount to be proven at trial 
but believed to be in excess of $84,000. 
86. Alternative Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC is entitled to and hereby requests a money 
judgment for the above referenced damages including prejudgment interest. 
Based on the express language of Count V, Plaintiff Real Properties, LLC seeks damages 
for Defendants' alleged breach of the warranties in the Agreement that Defendants had good and 
marketable title to the membership interests in Real Homes, LLC and the absolute right to 
transfer those interests. In the context of this action, this breach of warranty claim "sounds in 
contract." Lewis v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 139, 145, 15 P.3d 1147, 1153 
(2008) ("breach of express warranty sounds in contract, and this claim is directly related to the 
terms and provisions within the contract."). 
It is important to note that Plaintiff did not assert a claim for damages for fraud or a claim 
for rescission of the Agreement. Instead, Plaintiff seeks an award of damages to protect its 
"expectation interest," or the benefit of the bargain, under the contract. Brown v. Yacht Club of 
Coeur D'Alene, LTD., 111 Idaho 195, 198, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Ct. App. 1986) ( citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1979)). 
The elements of a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of a contract; (b) the 
breach of the contract; ( c) the breach caused damages; and ( d) the amount of those damages. 
Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 297 P.3d 232,241 (2013). A breach of contract is 
non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate performance. Buku Properties v. Clark, 
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1 Idaho 828, 83 3 (2012). More specifically, a breach of contract consists of a failure, without 
excuse, to perfonn any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract." 
The burden of proof for showing the existence of a contract and breach is on the plaintiff 
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 747, 9 P.3d 1204, 1213 (2000). The 
plaintiff also has the burden of proving causation and damages. 
At trial, Plaintiff undertook to prove one specific issue: That Defendants Trefren and 
Sallaz breached the warranties in the Agreement regarding: (1) their ownership of one hundred 
percent of the membership interest in Real Homes, (2) their possession of good and marketable 
title to such interest; and (3) their right to sell such interest, because Renee Baird, not Sallaz and 
Trefren, owned the sole membership interest in Real Homes, LLC. Alternative 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Post Trial Brief, p. 21 ("The maturation of this claim depends 
on the Court's findings on several issues addressed above- namely the actual ownership of Real 
Homes, LLC as of January 6, 2006."); p. 25 ("The evidence demonstrated that the actual 
member/manager of Real Homes, LLC (Renee Baird) has already settled this case with 
Alternative Plaintiffs on behalf of Real Homes, LLC .... "). 
III. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants have moved to dismiss Count V, at least in part, because Plaintiff failed to 
prove,primafacie, that Renee Baird was a member of Real Homes, LLC at the time the 
Agreement was executed. Final Argument and Authority to Support Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal of Alternative Plaintiffs' Count V, and Motion to Amend Pleadings 
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to Conform to the Evidence Presented on the Counterclaims, p. 10 ("Renee Baird was never 
a of 
IV. Membership Interests: Idaho Law 
Limited liability companies (LLCs) "are hybrid business entities, with attributes both of 
corporations and partnerships. They provide their equity holders or 'members' with the liability 
shield of corporations while giving them the benefit of partnership tax treatment." In re Avalon 
Hotel Partners, LLC, 302 B.R. 377 380 (Bankr.D.Or.2003) (citing Blakemore, "Limited 
Liability Companies and the Bankruptcy Code: A Technical Review," 13 Am. Bankr.Jnst. J 12 
(1994)). Idaho LLCs are currently governed by the provisions of the Idaho Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (Uniform Act), Idaho Code section 30-6-101 et seq., which became 
effective July 1, 2008. Prior to enactment of the Uniform Act, Idaho LLCs were governed by the 
Idaho Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act), Idaho Code section 53-601 et seq. The LLC 
Act remained in effect until June 30, 2010. Between June 1, 2008, and June 30, 2010, the 
Uniform Act governed: (1) Idaho LLCs formed on or after July 1, 2008; and (2) LLCs formed 
before July 1, 2008, that elected to be subject to the Uniform Act. There is no evidence in the 
record that Real Homes, LLC was ever governed by the provisions of the Uniform Act during 
the period relevant to the claims asserted in this action. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-601(10), a "member" of an LLC is "a person or 
persons who have been admitted to membership in a limited liability company as provided in 
section 53-640, Idaho Code .... " Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-640(l)(a), a person may 
become a member of a limited liability company by "acquiring a limited liability company 
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directly from the limited liability company, upon compliance with an operating 
" 
A "limited liability company interest" is "the interest that can be assigned under section 
53-636, Idaho Code, and charged under section 53-637, Idaho Code." LC. § 53-601(7). "A 
limited liability company interest may be issued in exchange for cash, property, services 
rendered, gurantee of an obligation of the limited liability company, a promissory note or other 
obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services, or other valuable consideration." 
I.C. § 53-626. 
V. Plaintiff's Evidence 
Plaintiff relied primarily upon the testimony of Renee Baird, together with certain 
documents introduced into evidence during Baird's testimony, to prove that Renee Baird was the 
only member of Real Homes, LLC at the time the Agreement was executed. 
Ms. Baird testified that Real Homes, LLC was formed in January 2001 to purchase and 
sell real property. Ms. Baird also testified that she "owned" Real Homes, LLC: 
Q. You owned the company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were there any other owners of the company? 
A. No. 
Q. You were the 100 percent owner? 
A. Yes. 
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Ms. Baird was not asked, and did not testify, whether her interest in the company was 
in exchange for cash, property, services rendered, gurantec of an obligation of the limited 
liability company, a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or property or to 
perform services, or other valuable consideration, as required by LC. § 53-626. In fact, Ms. 
Baird testified that Defendant Sallaz "made" her the owner: 
Q. Why were you made the owner? 
A. In the course of the way Dennis has always practiced in business, he does 
not put himself on the corporations or LLC or whatever. We were maITied, and so he put 
me on as 100 percent. And it was - it was 50/50. I mean, it's the way I always looked at 
it he wasn't on it, but we made the decisions together. 
Q. He was from the beginning going to be part of the - the company? 
A. Yeah. Making - yes. 
During the course of her testimony, Ms. Baird also identified Plaintiffs Exhibit 24 as a 
true and coITect copy of the operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC. Ms. Baird testified that 
she signed the operating agreement on January 19, 2001, and that Exhibit 24 represents the 
complete operating agreement that she signed: 
Q. Ms. Baird, how many pages is the operating agreement? 
A. It appears all the pages are here. And 21 pages. 
On cross-examination, Ms. Baird was asked: 
Q. And on page 2, is that where it says that you are the 100 percent member? 
A. Yes. 
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Paragraph 2.1, on page 2 of Exhibit 24, includes the following: 
2.1 Names, Addresses and Initial Contributions. The names and addresses of 
the initial members of the LLC, and the agreed value of their respective initial capital 
contributions and initial percentage ownership interests in the LLC (the "Sharing Ratios") 
are as stated in the chart below . . . . Each of the members as his initial contribution 
has contributed his undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to those certain two 
parcels of commercial real estate, more particularly described in on Exhibit A 
attached hereto, together with all appurtenances, and any existing leases, contracts or 
agreements relating thereto. 
Name and address 
Renee Baird 
1000 S. Roosevelt 
Boise, Idaho 83 705 
(emphasis added). 




However, there is no real property description attached to Exhibit 24, which Ms. Baird 
testified was a complete copy of the operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC. Plaintiff did not 
ask Ms. Baird, and she did not testify, regarding whether she ever contributed any interest in 
commercial real estate to Real Homes, LLC. 
VI. Analysis 
As Idaho Code section 53-640(1) provided at all times relevant to this action, a person 
could become a member in a limited liability company by acquiring a limited liability interest 
directly from the company upon compliance with an operating agreement. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 53-626, a limited liability company interest could be issued in exchange for cash, 
property, services rendered, guarantee of an obligation of the company, a promissory note or 
other obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services, or other valuable 
consideration. 
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According to Plaintiff's Exhibit 24, the operating agreement of Real Homes, LLC 
those certain two parcels of commercial real estate, more particularly deseribed in on Exhibit A 
attached hereto," in exchange for an interest in the LLC. 
Plaintiff did not elicit any testimony from Ms. Baird explaining the clear contradiction 
between the above language regarding the initial contribution of "each member" and her 
assertion that she was the only member of Real Homes, LLC. In addition, Plaintiff did not 
adduce any evidence that Ms. Baird actually contributed, or that she was able to contribute, the 
real property interest described in the operating agreement. Finally, Plaintiff failed to adduce any 
evidence that Ms. Baird actually provided any of the forms of consideration identified in section 
53-626 in exchange for her claimed membership interest in Real Homes, LLC. 
Based on the lack of any evidence that Ms. Baird provided consideration in exchange for 
her claimed interest in Real Homes, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that Ms. 
Baird was a member, much less the only member, of Real Homes, LLC at the time of execution 
of the Agreement. Since Plaintiff based its Count V breach of contract claim on establishing that 
Ms. Baird was the only member of Real Homes, LLC, the court also concludes that Plaintiff 
failed to prove all the required elements of its Count V breach of contract claim and Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Count V must be granted.3 
3 For the same reason, even if the court had granted Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to include a claim for unjust 
enrichment based upon the facts alleged in Count V, Plaintiffs claim would still be properly dismissed on the 
evidence. 
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COUNTERCLAIM COUNT I 
In Counterclaim Count I, Glenn Trefren, on his own behalf and as assignee of Defendant 
Sallaz, seeks damages for breach of the Agreement: 
102. That Defendant's [sic] did transfer all right, title and interests in and to all 
property owned by Real Homes, LLC, and Plaintiffs [sic] have only paid the the 
$63,402.82 Note and Deed of Trust and the $5,000.00 advance, for a total of $68,402.82, 
but failed and/or refused to pay any of the remainder, leaving a balance owed of 
$181,597.18, and is breach [sic] of the Purchase and Sale Agreement as a result thereof. 
Real Homes, LLC is not a party to the counterclaim and has not asserted any claim with 
respect to the real property transferred to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement. 
As noted previously, to support a recovery on Count I, Trefren had to prove: (a) the 
existence of a contract; (b) the breach of the contract; ( c) the breach caused damages; and ( d) the 
amount of those damages. Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., 297 P.3d 232,241 
(2013). 
A. Existence of a Contract 
When consideration supports a distinct and common understanding of the parties, the 
understanding becomes an enforceable contract. Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605,607, 
428 P.2d 524, 526 (1967). A promisee's bargained-for action or forbearance, given in exchange 
for a promise, constitutes consideration. Id. (citing Restatement, Contracts,§ 75 (1932)). 
The express language of the Agreement, together with the evidence adduced at trial, is 
sufficient to establish that Real Properties, LLC and Sallaz and Trefren had a distinct and 
common understanding that Sallaz and Trefren would transfer their member interests in Real 
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Homes, LLC, and Real Homes, LLC would transfer all real property it owned4, to Real 
return for payment of $250,000.00 to Sallaz and Trefren. 
On the issue of consideration, Sallaz and Trefren promised to transfer their member 
interests in Real Homes, LLC in return for the promise of payment by Real Properties, LLC. 
With respect to the member interests in Real Homes, LLC, in contrast to the testimony of Ms. 
Baird elicited by Plaintiffs in support of their breach of contract claim, Counterclaimants 
provided sufficient unrebutted evidence, in the form of testimony by both Sallaz and Trefren, 
that they contributed valuable consideration in support of their member interests to satisfy the 
requirements of Idaho Code section 53-626. For instance, Sallaz testified: 
Q. And that refers to members, contributions, and interests? 
A. Oh, yeah. That was mandatory 
**** 
A. Well, of course it was Glenn and I. We were the owners. We did the 
whole thing. It was my money. 
Q. And in terms of the agreed value of contribution, do you see that, 25,000 
each? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Is that where you put in cash and Glenn put in the equivalent value of 
materials? 
4 There was conflicting evidence adduced at trial as to whether one specific parcel of prope1ty, generally referred to 
as "15584 Riverside," was owned by Real Homes, LLC at the time of the Agreement and/or transferred by Real 
Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement. The court need not determine that issue to resolve 
the claims in this action. 
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A. Well, yeah. And plus he did have a little cash that we were spending at 
point getting together. So - he had a good, strong grand as well as my 
cash. 
Q. And was it ever intended to have fewer than two members? 
A. Never. 
Q. And was it ever intended to have more than two members. 
A. Absolutely not. It was our deal. We built it and we're going to sell it. 
And we're going to split 50/50, win or lose.5 
Trefren provided similar testimony regarding his and Sallaz's contributions to Real 
Homes, LLC. In light of this testimony by both Trefren and Sallaz that they were the only 
members of Real Homes, that they each had a fifty percent interest, and the nature and agreed 
value of their contributions ("An 'operating agreement' is any agreement, written or oral among 
all the members as to the conduct of the business and affairs of a limited liability company.) LC. 
§ 53-601(11) (emphasis added)), the court concludes that Treferen has established that there was 
consideration supporting the mutual understanding of the parties as set forth in the Agreement. 
5 This testimony was given in response to questions regarding Defendant's Exhibit A, which Mr. Sallaz testified was 
a "form operating agreement" that he created. Exhibit A was never admitted into evidence, so it would be improper 
for the court to rely on it as substantive evidence in this decision. See Cro!lard v. Crollard, 104 Idaho 189, 190, 657 
P.2d 486, 487 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Answers to interrogatories are not part of the pleadings and are not considered 
evidence unless introduced as such at trial. ... It has been held that error sufficient to reverse a judgment occurs 
when a judge has used interrogatories that have not been introduced into evidence, to establish a fact by inference."). 
Exhibit A was marked for identification during Defendants' cross-examination of Renee Baird, Defendants offered 
Exhibit A for Admission, and the cowt sustained an objection to its admission. Exhibit A was never again offered 
for admission and was not admitted into evidence. However, counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants questioned 
witnesses with respect to Exhibit A. 
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B. Breach of the Contract 
A of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate 
performance. Buku Properties v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 833 (2012). More specifically, a breach 
of contract consists of a failure, without legal excuse, to perfonn any promise which forms the 
whole or part of a contract." Id. 
Counterclaimants have adduced sufficient evidence to establish that Real Properties, LLC 
breached the Agreement by failing to make payment as promised and that such breach caused 
damages. 
I. Affirmative Defenses 
Real Properties, LLC has asserted a number of affirmative defenses to Count I, including 
that Real Properties' performance was excused due to Counterclaimant's breach of the 
Agreement (Eighth and Eighteenth Affirmative Defenses) and Counterclaimant's failure to 
comply with Real Homes, LLC's operating agreement. The burden of proving the existence of a 
contract and fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff, and once those facts are established, the 
defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative defenses, which legally excuse 
performance. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 747, 9 P.3d 1204, 1213 
(2000) (citing O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,813,810 P.2d 1082, 1099 (1991)). 
"If a breach of contract is material, the other party's performance is excused." JP. 
Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46, 49 
(Ct.App.1996). A material breach of contract occurs as the result of "'a non-performance of [a] 
duty that is so material and important as to justify the [non-breaching party] in regarding the 
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whole transaction as at an end." Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740, 536 P.2d 
735 (1 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 946 at 809 (1951 
is one that touches the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties 
in entering into the contract. JP. Stravens, 129 Idaho at 545. 
As evidenced by the language of the Agreement quoted above, the fundamental purpose 
of the contract between Trefren and Sallaz, as "co-owners" of Real Homes, LLC, and Real 
Properties LLC was the transfer of all of the ownership interest in Real Homes, LLC. As 
Defendants/Counterclaimants' counsel stated at trial, "[t]here is no document in existence, dated 
January 6, 2006, in which any sellers therein conveyed Real Homes property as we have a two 
sellers, Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren, who are selling or assigning their ownership interest to Real 
Properties, LLC." In furtherance of that purpose, Trefren and Sallaz covenanted to Real 
Properties that they had the "absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer . . . without 
any breach of any agreement to which" they were a party. 
As noted previously, Defendants' Exhibit A, which was generally identified as 
Defendants/Counterclaimants' version of the operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC was 
never admitted into evidence. However, both Sallaz and Trefren testified that they had a written 
operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC and that Exhibit A was a true and correct copy of that 
Agreement. In addition, Mr. Sallaz testified that he authored Exhibit A and that it is identical to 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 in all but three specific respects: 
Q. Is this particular operating agreement [Exhibit 24] an identical copy 
excuse me identical 21-page with essentially three changes? 
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A. Well, yeah. It's a model to the original. 
Sallaz then identified the three provisions of the two agreements that were not identical: 
(1) Paragraph 2.1 ("Names, Addresses and Initial Contributions"); (2) Paragraph 5.1 ("Books of 
Account"); and the signature page. 
Based on the evidence before it, the court finds that Exhibit 24 is a true and accurate 
representation of Defendants/Counterclaimants' operating agreement, with the exception of the 
above-noted variances. 
Pursuant to Section 9.2 of Exhibit 24: 
Events of Dissolution. Except as otherwise provided in this Operating 
Agreement, the LLC shall dissolve upon the earlier of ... (b) sale of all or substantially 
all of the LLC's assets .... 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-642, a "limited liability company is dissolved and its 
affairs shall be wound up upon the happening of the first to occur of the following: (1) At the 
time or upon the occurrence of events specified in writing in the articles of organization or an 
operating agreement" ( emphasis added). Idaho Code section 53-644 authorized persons winding 
up the business or affairs of a limited liability company to perform a number of actions, none of 
which includes the transfer of membership interests to third parties. 
Based upon the evidence before it, the court finds that the property transferred by Real 
Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement constituted all or substantially 
all of Real Homes, LLC's assets. By operation of the terms of the operating agreement and 
applicabie Idaho statutes, Real Homes dissolved upon execution of the Agreement. Upon such 
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dissolution, Real Homes, LLC's business and affairs were required to be wound up. The 
statute did not authorize the transfer of a member interest the winding up process. 
In light of the above, the court concludes that Treferen and Sallaz breached the covenant 
that they had the "absolute right to sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer ... without any 
breach of any agreement to which" they were a party and, in fact, were not authorized to transfer 
the member interests in Real Homes to Real Properties. In addition, the court concludes that 
such breach defeated the fundamental purpose of the Agreement, as between Trefren and Sallaz 
as "co-owners" and Real Properties, LLC, to transfer all of the ownership interest in Real 
Homes, LLC to Real Properties. Accordingly, Count I of the Counterclaim is dismissed. 
COUNTERCLAIM COUNT II 
In Count II of their Counterclaim, Trefren and Tradesman allege: 
105. Plaintiffs contracted with Glenn Trefren and Tradesman ... for goods and 
services to be used for the maintenance of the properties at issue in this 
litigation. 
106. That Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors & Construction, LLC did 
provide materials and services used in the maintenance and improvements 
of the subject matter properties as agreed, until they were prevented from 
performance by the actions and/or requests of Plaintiffs. 
107. That Plaintiff's failed and or refused to pay Glenn Trefren or Tradesman 
Contractors & Construction, LLC for the goods and services they did 
perform and are in breach of the agreement as a result thereof in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
I. Count II: Prior to and Through Trial 
Prior to the trial of this action, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine seeking an order 
precluding Counterclairnants from introducing evidence of damages on Count II, because 
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Defendants served discovery responses stating that they are not seeking damages for goods or 
or 
At the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion, Counterclaimants' confirmed that Counterclaimants 
were not seeking damages for labor or materials but for Mr. Trefren's "services as the general 
contractor." Counterclaimants apparently contend that Mr. Trefren's labor is somehow exempt 
from Plaintiffs' interrogatory seeking information regarding "the cost(s) for any and all labor for 
which you are seeking reimbursement in Count II of your Counterclaim" ( even though 
Counterclaimants' counsel also stated, at the hearing, that the claim is for "his unpaid labor"), 
because such labor constitutes services Mr. Trefren provided as general contractor. It is this 
statement of the substance of Plaintiffs claim upon which Plaintiff, and the court, went into the 
trial of this action. 
The court concludes that Counterclaimants are precluded from recovering damages 
pursuant to Count II for services rendered by Trefren and/or Tradesman as a general contractor, 
pursuant the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (the Act), Idaho Code section 54-5201 et seq., 
because Counterclaimants have not alleged or proved that either Trefren or Tradesman was a 
duly registered contractor or was exempt from registration. 
A. The Act 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 54-5217(2): 
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, unless 
otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the 
collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which 
registration is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly 
registered contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this chapter, at 
all times during the performance of such act or contract. 
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defines "contractor" broadly, section 54-5203: 
( 4) "Contractor" means: 
(a) Any person who in any capacity undertakes, offers to undertake, purports to have the 
capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others, 
perform construction; or 
(b) A construction manager who performs construction management services. 
3) "Construction" means the performance of building, altering, repairing, adding to, 
subtracting from, improving, reconstructing, moving, excavating, wrecking or 
demolishing any building, highway, road, bridge, or other structure, project, development 
or improvement to real property, or to do any part thereof, including the erection of 
scaffolding or other structures or works in connection therewith. 
Counterclaimants allege that they "contracted" with Plaintiff for the maintenance and 
improvement of the real property at issue in this action. The evidence adduced at trial is clear 
that Trefren and/or Tradesman engaged in "construction" in performance of the alleged contract. 
Counterclaimants are precluded from maintaining an action for the collection of compensation 
for the performance of the alleged contract without alleging and proving that they were 
registered and/or exempt from registration. 
II. Count II: Post-Trial 
In a four-page narrative at pages 16-19 of their Closing Argument and Response to 
Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Post-Trial Brief and Opening Argument, 
Counterclaimants make several new, and vague, assertions regarding claims, and regarding their 
entitlement to judgment on Count II, despite the failure to plead the fact of compliance with the 
Act or exemption therefrom. 
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Venture 
contends that he is, fact, seeking to enforce a partnership or joint venture 
agreement between himself, Sallaz, and Roy Rice, in which Trefren was entitled to receive one-
third of the profits "pursuant to his perception and understanding he was involved in a three-way 
profit splitting arrangement that was represented to include these four parcels of property, along 
with the Melba property, and any other properties, which were then in the process of being 
acquired through loans advanced by D.L. Evans Bank, upon the use of the four parcels as 
collateral to get the funds to make these purchases." Closing Argument and Response, p. 17. 
This argument fails for a number of reasons. 
First, this is a distinctly different claim from that asserted in Count II and from that 
asserted by Trefren in response to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and there is no basis for the court 
to conclude that the parties tried this claim by consent. 
Second, Trefren has not identified any competent evidence in the record that supports the 
conclusion that a partnership was created between himself, Sallaz and Rice. "(A] mere 
agreement to share in profits, of itself constitutes neither a partnership nor a joint adventure. 
There must be other facts, showing that relationship to have been the intention of the parties, or 
such as to estop a denial of it as against third parties." J\lfoon v. Ervin, 64 Idaho 464,472, 133 
P.2d 933, 937 (1943). Trefren testified: 
A. No. I'm just claiming payment for what I have done. Didn't do it as a 
general contractor. I did it as an owner. Now, I realize Roy's name was on the property. 
But we had made an agreement between ourselves to finish these properties, boy, and 
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we'll take all the moneys, and ... just work our way right through these. We'll 
a little chunk of profit, because there is a lot of profit here, and we will go to 
Melba, where we're going to do this great big storage unit where we're even going to 
have a third .... 
Q. When was that agreement made? 
A. Before he even signed that contract. 
Q. The January -
A. When we went over and looked at all the properties at the lake and drove 
around to the we drove around to all the properties. We talked about those. I told him 
about the property out at Melba. We had even went out and had a look at it. It came a 
little while later, but we were talking about let's finish these properties. We'll just finish 
them one at a time. We'll split the money when we get done. 
Q. That agreement, that took place 
A. At 30 percent. Or one-third. Not 30. One-third owner. We were going to 
sell everything at the end when it was all done, we were going to divvy it up one-third. 
place? 
Q. That agreement took place before January 6, 2006; correct? 
A. We talked about it, yes we did. 
Q. You said that there was an agreement. When did the agreement take 
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A. Are talking about the oral agreement? Or are you talking about the 
The oral agreement we had many 
it eight to ten different times. 
We must have talked about 
So, Trefren's testimony was that, prior to Real Properties, LLC even acquiring the 
properties at issue from Sallaz and Trefren, Roy Rice agreed to split the profits from the 
development of such properties evenly with Sallaz and Trefren and then committed to pay Sallaz 
and Trefren $250,000.00 to acquire the properties from them so that the parties could then split 
the profits from their sale three ways. The court does not find this testimony credible. 
Third, and related, is the absence of sufficient competent and credible evidence in the 
record to find the existence of an enforceable agreement. In order for a contract to be formed 
there must be a meeting of the minds. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779 
P.2d 15, 17 (1989). A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to contract 
which takes the fom1 of an offer and acceptance. Id The "meeting of the minds" must occur on 
all material terms to the contract. Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 233-34, 697 P.2d 1244, 
1247-48 (Ct.App.1985). Trefren's testimony is simply too vague to support the existence of the 
alleged partnership/joint venture contract. 
· B. Exemption from Registration 
Trefren also posits that he "should or could be considered to be exempt from any 
regulation under the Contractor Registration Act under the provision of LC. § 54-5205(2)(m) 
( owners of commercial property who themselves perform maintenance, repair, alteration, or 
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work on their own properties)." There are at least two problems with this 
First, there is no evidence in the record that the properties at issue were "commercial 
properties," within the meaning of the Act. All the evidence adduced at trial identifies the 
subject properties as residential properties, not subject to the exemption cited. In fact, based on 
Counterclairnants' own contentions ("Mr. Trefren's services could be seen as having been 
undertaken as a part of, or as an extension of, the Purchase Agreement itself, given the 
inducement he was led to believe he would be paid from profits that would be coming also from 
those parcels, as part of the greater development venture he was promoted by Mr. Rice to 
believe, as Mr. Rice obviously wanted Mr. Trefren to continue to be engaged in the development 
that had already been started, and to continue his services in the direction of finishing the 
houses, as there were three more out on Riverside still up on cribbing that needed to be 
finished." Closing Argument and Response, p. 18 (emphasis added)). This statement would 
most properly invoke the exclusion from exemption set forth in Idaho Code section 54-
5205(2)(1): 
An owner performing construction on the owner's personal residential real property, 
whether or not occupied by the owner, provided however, this exemption shall not 
apply to an owner who is othenvise regulated by this chapter who constructs a 
building, residence or other improvement on the owner's property with the 
intention and for the purpose of promptly selling the improved property, unless the 
owner has continuously occupied the property as the owner's primary residence for 
not less than twelve (12) months prior to the sale of such property. 
( emphasis added). 
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~~·v~,,~. there is no evidence in the record that Trefren and/or Tradesman was either the 
owner or lessee of at issue, as required for application of the exemption set forth in 
section 54-5205(2)(m). 
C. Construction Manager 
Trefren also asserts that he was not required to plead or prove compliance with the Act, 
because "[a]s the evidence demonstrates, Mr. Trefren engaged his services in the nature of a 
superintendent and construction manager . ... " Closing Argument and Response, p. 17 
(emphasis added). It is not clear to the court how Counterclaimants contend that this asserted 
fact eliminates the requirement to plead and prove registration or exemption therefrom. 
As noted previously, the Act defines "contractor" broadly, in section 54-5203: 
(4) "Contractor" means: 
(a) Any person who in any capacity undertakes, offers to undertake, purports to have the 
capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to, or does himself or by or through others, 
perform construction; or 
(b) A construction manager who performs construction management services. 
(emphasis added). Again, the evidence, and Counterclaimants' own contentions, place Mr. 
Trefren squarely under the requirements of the Act. 
D. Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment 
Finally, Counterclaimants assert that, despite the evidence that Trefren is seeking 
recovery for services that require registration under the Act and the fact that Trefren failed to 
plead or prove the fact of registration or exemption therefrom, Trefren is entitled to recover on 
Count II "under one sort or another of a contract that shouid be implied in fact, or a contract that 
should be implied in law, and his right to recover the "value" of his "services" is best formulated 
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the of an implied contract fact, as he is entitled to recover the reasonable value 
pursuant to the theory of recovery under quantum meruit, as described in more 
detail in our initial memorandum." Closing Argument and Response, p. 18.6 This assertion 
ignores the fact that the language of section 54-5217(2), quoted above, refers to "compensation 
for the performance of any act" for which registration is required, and is not limited simply to 
a claim based on an express contract. 
In addition, Trefren has not identified any competent evidence in the record establishing 
the amount of the reasonable value of his services, as opposed to his testimony regarding his 
expected "share" of each parcel of property at issue. 
Based on the foregoing, Counterclaim Count II is dismissed. 
COUNTERCLAIM COUNT III 
In Counterclaim Count III, Counterclaimants seek recovery for unjust enrichment under 
the Agreement and "as a result thereof ... the contract and all property transfers should be set 
aside with parties being returned to their respective pre Purchase Sale Agreement Positions." 
The court first notes that Counterclaimants have not adduced any authority for the 
proposition that a rescission remedy is appropriate on an unjust enrichment claim. 
More importantly, "[r]ecovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an 
express contract covering the same subject matter. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 642, 249 
6 Apparently, the latter part of this sentence refers to Counterclaimants' Motion to Amend the Counterclaim at the 
close of trial. Once again, the court notes that Counterclaimants have adduced no basis for the court to conclude that 
the parties tried the issue of an implied contract, based upon the allegations in Count II, by consent. In fact, while 
Counterclaimants apparently request that the court view Count II broadly in order to support a recovery in their 
favor, they ignore the fact that they first raised the issue that Trefren was acting as a contractor in order to justify not 
responding to Plaintiff's discovery requests regarding the damages claimed on Count If, based on their very narrow 




P.3d 829, 836 (2011). "The reason for this rule presently is that the remedies for breach of an 
contract, whether law or by express afford adequate relief." Id. ( quoting 
Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir.1985)). "[O]nly when 
the express agreement is found to be enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable 
doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract." Id (quoting Wolford v. 
Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984)). 
Since the court found that the Agreement was enforceable against Plaintiff: Counterclaim 
Count III is also dismissed. 
ORDER 
This Memorandum Decision constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law pursuant to Rule 52(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS SO ORDERED . 
. -/,£~-
Dated this '7..3 day of February, 2014. 
District Judge 
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lT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Complaint filed in 
this action is dismissed, with prejudice~ and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S BROWN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, ) 
husband and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. ) 
and REAL PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an ) 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, ) 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS 
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho 
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EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, 
husband and wife, and REAL 








Case No. CV 09-11855 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; 
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RELATES TO THE APPLICATION 
OF CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; FINDING OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; MOTION 1'0 CLARIFY ASPECTS AS TO THE 








DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, ) 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS ) 
AND CONSTRUCTION L.L.C., an Idaho ) 
Limited Liability Company, ) 
) 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. ) 
COMES NOW the Defendants/Counterclaimants herein, by and through their respective 
attorneys of record, V emon K. Smith and Iver J. Longeteig, and do herewith request this Court to 
1.) Reconsider certain aspects of its Memorandum Decision and content of its Judgment entered 
February 28, 2014, pursuant to Rule ll(a) (2)(B) I.R.C.P., 
2.) To alter or amend its findings of fact and conclusion of law contained within the 
Memorandum Decision pursuant to Rule 52(b) l.R. C.P., and 
3 .) To otherwise provide appropriate and needed clarification, as deemed consistent with the 
facts presented, as it relates to the application of claim and issue preclusion, stemming from 
those findings and conclusions made and entered by the Court, thereby providing future direction 
for the parties to address the relief to which these moving parties are entitled to pursue, given the 
Court's Decision the fundamental purpose of the contract came to an end and is void, as rendered 
by the Court in this action. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court has found there was, in fact, a contract entered into between certain 
contracting parties, that being Dennis Sallaz, Glen Trefren, and Real Properties, LLC, and that 
the Buyer therein, Real Properties LLC, did, in breach that contract, by failing to pay the 
balance upon the purchase price :Niemorandum and as a result that 
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factually established breach, the Court did find, as a factual matter, that the breach of Real 
had caused damages. (See Memorandum page 23). 
contained in the Courts Decision, did confirm the 
evidence established that the "intent" of the parties when entering into the contract, was to 
"transfer" the "membership interest" of Dcn11is Sallaz and Glen Trefren, who together held 100% 
of the membership interest in Real Homes, LLC, and that "transfer" of interest was to go to Real 
Properties, LLC, a limited liability company owned, operated, and managed by Roy Rice and his 
wife Janet Rice. The Court found the "intent" of the parties is demonstrated by the very title of 
the contract itself, as the contract is referred to as the "Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest in 
Real Homes, LLC", and furthermore the "intent" is embellished by the reference contained in the 
"Whereas" clause itself, where it states: "It is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that sellers 
shall sell to the buyer all of said "ownership interest" and all right, title and interest in and to all 
real properties owned by Real Homes, LLC, as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto". This 
Court did find that the fundamental purpose and intent was the sale of the ownership interests, 
which included along with it, the "attendant transfer" of the real property referred to and being 
described therein. 
The Court, thereafter, undertook to conduct a very detailed analysis of the "operating 
agreement" of Real Homes, LLC, as it relates to the consequential effects of "transferring" all or 
substantially all of its assets, and the Court concluded those "real property interests" described in 
Exhibit "A'' to the contract constituted "all or substantially all" of the entities' assets, and as a 
consequence of the expression of such a "mutual desire" to sell "all right, title, and interest" in 
and to all real property owned by Real Homes, LLC, expressed desire "triggered" a 
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provision that required commencement of dissolution proceedings of Real Homes, LLC, and a 
process was therefore mandated by the "operating agreement" of that entity. 
thereupon found that if was Messers. Sallaz and 
Trefren to transfer real property interests, also, that they would then no longer have any 
"authority" (under the Operating Agreement) to "transfer" the "ownership interests" of the 
members to the Buyer, and any attempt to do so would constitute a "breach" of the "operating 
agreement" to which Messers. Sallaz and Trefren are the members therein, and therefore bound 
thereby. 
We certainly understand and appreciate the analysis of the Court, and it's "logical" 
analysis of the "authority" issues and "consequences" of the transactions, but with all due 
respect, the "intent" of the parties was to accomplish the transfer of the right to the ownership 
and control of the parcels of real property, and it was never anyone's intent to create a 
meaningless or void transaction. This "contract" was actually the first step in a larger venture 
process, that being the fact the parties intended to continue their mutual involvement and 
participation in a development venture, where each had a one third interest in the "profits" to be 
generated in the development venture, and that "profit" would be generated from these and other 
properties, all of which was being promoted under the inducements of Roy Rice, and his 
insistence the parties to take the initial action now, as three of the parcels, referred to as the 
Riverside parcels, (not including 15584 Riverside, as it had been "released" from the original 
sale) were scheduled for a trustee sale, set to take place on January 16, 2006. 
The Court will recall from the testimony presented at trial by both Messers. Sallaz and 
Trefren that because of concerns that had been discovered over the conduct of Renee Baird, 
resulting from the deterioration of her relationship with Mr. Sallaz, that some reaction was in 
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order, and a determination was made by Messers. Sallaz and Trefren, as Mr. Trefren had to 
protect his interest in limited liability company, because of what they were experiencing with 
funds, coupled with to move from the 
residential property at 15584 Riverside, along with her contrary attitude and breach of the 
agreement that the 15584 parcel of property was being held in trust for the benefit of Real 
Homes, LLC, an agreement that was made between Messers. Sallaz and Trefren when that parcel 
had been transfened out of Real Homes, LLC, to Dennis Sallaz (and later discovered to Renee 
Baird), so Mr. Sallaz could obtain a loan to finance the ongoing development venture of those 
various properties. Messers Sallaz and Trefren agreed that title to the three remaining parcels at 
Riverside, along with the Smith property, would need to be "transferred" temporarily, and for 
security and safekeeping purposes, to Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, as that 
company was owned exclusively by Mr. Trefren and he would hold the property "in trust" for 
Real Homes, LLC. The Court has those "transfer" exhibits in the record, and they were 
undertaken, as the testimony confirmed, to protect the property from any more of the fraudulent 
claims being asserted by Ms. Baird. In a similar fashion, the Court will recall the balance of the 
loan proceeds generated from the loan of $105,000.00 taken out against 15584 Riverside, that 
was given as collateral for that loan in February 2004, was also removed from the bank account 
of Real Homes, LLC, being that bank account maintained by Mr. Sallaz at DL Evans bank in 
Boise, Idaho. The balance of the account funds (but for the sum of $1,000.00) was withdrawn by 
Mr. Sallaz on or about May 7, 2004, just four days before Renee Baird was then "fired" and 
removed from the Sallaz law office. The real property that was transferred out of Real Homes, 
LLC, and the withdrawal of the balance of the loan funds, was each being undertaken upon the 
rationale that Mr. Trefren had come to no longer harbor any reservation as to the extent and 
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degree of manipulation and fraud Ms. Baird was capable of doing, as she clearly would seek to 
undertake any course needed to get her hands on Mr. Sallaz' assets, and Mr. Trefren 
was that, those from DL Evans Bank, and 
also, at least temporarily, remove the parcels of property out of the LLC, either or both assets 
would somehow be wrongfully appropriated by Ms. Baird, as she had, prior to September 2003, 
held the "authority" in this Sallaz-Trefren LLC partnership venture, in her limited capacity as the 
"manager" of Real Homes, LLC. It was trne that Mr. Sallaz had removed her from that position 
as his "manager" in September, 2003, but she seemed to show little concern about her loss of 
authority and "removal" from that managerial capacity where she was acting for him, as she was 
simply on the hunt, and interested only in taking whatever she could get her hands to take and 
keep for herself, as she was now best described as "persona non grotta". The documents 
supporting those events are contained in the Record of this case, and listed as among the exhibits 
presented at trial. 
Consequently, it could be regarded to be a "true" statement to say that "all or substantially 
all" of the assets (parcels of real property and bank accounts) of Real homes. LLC, were taken 
out of the existing corpus of Real Homes, LLC, at least temporarily, as they were being relocated 
or "transferred", for safekeeping, but none-the-less, was being done for the benefit and in trust, 
for Real Homes, LLC members, who consisted truly and lawfully as being Dennis Sallaz and 
Glen Trefren only, and NEVER Renee Baird. The basis for them taking that action was more 
than justified, as Ms. Baird had already shown her true colors when she had chosen to parlay the 
"quit claim" deed, that being the deed she had created, when she "transferred" 15584 Riverside 
from Real Homes, LLC, on February 10, 2004, so Mr. Sallaz could get the operating loan he 
needed to fund the ongoing development. She listed herself along with Mr. Sallaz, as the 
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grantees which was to have been done solely so Mr. Sallaz could get the loan, and his having not 
seen the document at the time, had no reason to believe or think something detrimental would 
result that. later, course, trne to her nature, she refused to honor the clear 
understanding why that title was changed temporarily from real Homes, LLC, and fae only 
reason for that transfer in the first place, as Messers. Sallaz and Trefren had agreed it was to be 
held in trust by Mr. Sallaz, for the benefit of Real Homes, solely for the purpose to obtain the 
loan they otherwise could not obtain in the name of the LLC itself,as it had no established credit, 
and so they had to use Mr. Sallaz' s borrowing capacity to get the loan, so they could further the 
development objectives envisioned by Dennis and Glen. Now that Ms. Baird had acquired this 
"new found interest" in a parcel of real property, in which she had no interest whatsoever, she 
refused to return that "quit claim" interest obtained in that process, and then refused to move 
from the residential facility at 15584 Riverside, and by refusing to do either, Mr. Sallaz could not 
accomplish selling that parcel and residential facility, as now she had successfully clouded the 
title, and now occupied the house, so it could not be sold, as was always the mutual "intent" of 
Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren when the loan was obtained. The sales' proceeds to be generated 
from the sale of 15584 Riverside were intended to be used to retire that loan, and what balance 
remaining would continue to be spent to advance the development. Instead, Ms. Baird artfully 
claimed her infamous "community interest" in that parcel of property, and continued to do so as 
she then filed her Complaint for "divorce" from Mr. Sallaz in May 2004. 
It is of some significant importance for this Court to fully appreciate the "landscape" in 
which Messers. Sallaz and Trefren found themselves in dealing with Ms. Baird, and then the 
traditional "restraining order" that later compromised his personal ability to go out and transact 
another property loan in his name to get operating funds for their LLC. It was in that financial 
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environment in which these three individuals (Sallaz, Trefren and Rice) were structuring their 
development and it was their "mutual desire" and "mutual intent" to 
m transaction, having to operate m that 
environment. Messers Sallaz and Trefren were attempting to protect the real property, the 
remainder of the loan proceeds from the loan obtained on the 15584 Riverside parcel, and their 
"membership rights" from the greed and corruption of Ms. Baird, who was then on a rampage to 
11 upgrade 11 her financial position, about which she thought she could avail herself from what 
Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren were doing in their land development venture, and she believed she 
needed to "get what she could", by virtue of her 11 marriage" to Mr. Sallaz, as she was soon to be 
among the "unemployed and unwelcomed". 
, Thusly, once Mr. Rice had come to conclude that he now wanted to embark upon this 
"development venture" with Messers. Sallaz and Trefren, starting out with these parcels of real 
property they had ownership already, he made it clear to them that it only made sense to start 
with the development of those properties that Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren already owned (or at 
least controlled the "ownership" to them), and what was then necessary for them to do was to 
decide what "vehicle" would be used to undertake the development of these parcels of property, 
bearing in mind the "management and control" would be under Mr. Rice, as he v;ould now be 
the sole source of the financial requirements. It was decided that Mr. Rice wanted a new LLC, 
and into that he wanted the placement of the parcels of real property, all of which was logical, 
and within keeping of the specific intent and the furtherance of the practical method for the 
"development venture project" to proceed, which meant the parcels of real property were to be 
transferred, NOT FROM REAL HOMES, LLC, but from Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC, as Tradesman then had the title to those properties. The agreement was that 
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the title would be conveyed to the "developing " entity, and to do that, the parcels needed to be 
titled over to Real Properties, which Mr. Rice, at his instruction, had formed just two days 
before, as that was to be the in which the development was to be undertaken, as these 
parties were then intending to so embark upon, and it was the choice of the "Buyer", whether 
that be considered to be Real Properties, LLC, or whether it be regarded to be Mr. Rice himself, 
the fact remained it was Messrs. Rice, Sallaz and Trefren that wanted to conduct the 
development of those properties in that particular vehicle or venue, and no one has any basis, let 
alone have ever attempted to contest that fact or present it differently in this case. 
Rather than place the "title" of these properties, once again back into the name of Real 
Homes, LLC, as could have been done, the election was made instead by Mr. Rice to have Mr. 
Trefren execute quitclaim deeds, that would effectively "transfer" title to the properties directly 
to Real Properties, LLC, as that was where the "loans" would be processed, and that was where 
the disbursements would come from, and where the development of the properties itself would 
be conducted. By doing it that way, it was thought there would be no "title" complications to 
arise with the "lending" bank, as the plan was to use these properties to "finance" the 
development of the properties, and should Renee Baird ever later decide to "attempt" to expand 
upon her greed by filing some bogus claim against Real Homes, LLC, it would never reach the 
actual "title" to these properties. The Record in this case demonstrates that, in fact, she later did 
attempt to cloud the title, by filing her Lis pendens, as the Record in this case does confirm. She 
ultimately did embark on that avenue in her attempt at "civil" theft, when, on July 25, 2006, she 
caused to be filed with the Canyon County Recorder's Office, in conjunction with the "divorce" 
proceedings, through the instrumentality of her attorney, Debra Eismann, such a claim against 
the "ownership" of those properties. It is to be noted by this Court that Ms. Baird did not 
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undertake to file any claim in the name of, or on behalf of, Real Homes, LLC, but rather her 
focus of greed was that she instead undertook to file a claim in her "own" name, as part of 
any explanation or historical that could 
support any right of ownership by such a claim of "Renee Baird", individually, as she never had 
any historic involvement as an "individual", in such a capacity whatsoever, and she at no time 
ever appeared in the "chain of title" to any of these properties, save only and except for the fact 
she had "fictitiously" been successful in generating the appearance of an interest in 15584 
Riverside, as she created the "quitclaim" interest she created for herself, when she undertook the 
transfer 15584 to Mr. Sallaz, and she included herself in the transfer of that ownership on 
February 10, 2004. There was never any agreement for her to do that, and it was absolutely 
contrary to what Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren had agreed to do. 
Consequently, the objective of having the parcels of property placed in the name of, and 
titled to, Real Properties, LLC, was logical, consistent, and within the fundamental purpose and 
objective of the contracting parties, and it was part of the "mutual desire" and the "mutual intent" 
of these parties, and it proved to be the best alternative available to them at the time, and it was 
the most satisfactory arrangement from the standpoint of Roy Rice, as he owned Real Properties, 
LLC. The intent of the "transfers" of the parcels of property, along with the "transfer" of their 
members' interest were intended to "come together", where it all would be held with Real 
Properties, LLC, as the loans, disbursements, construction transactions, and processing of the 
various stages of the development venture would only come through, and go through, Real 
Properties, LLC, in the final analysis. No one saw such a process as being a violation of their 
objectives or intended results, and there obviously has been no such claim of a resulting breach 
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or damage claimed or demonstrated to have resulted from the effects of that "combined" transfer 
of real property and membership interests in this "contract" between these parties. 
i\s a consequence, there is no legal or factual basis for any of these Plaintiffs to assert a 
"material" or "fundamental" "breach" in the "purpose" or "objective to be accomplished" by 
their contract, or any of the actions or process in the way it has now resulted, merely from this 
"bundling" or "combining" of Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren's membership interests in Real Homes, 
LLC, with the conveyance of that real property. As the Record reflects, the "transfer" of the real 
property came from Tradesman, as that was being held by the "third party" source (Tradesman) 
where title to the real property was being temporarily held for "safekeeping", as it was 
understood by all parties that Tradesman was the "repository" and the current resting place of the 
title to those parcels, and Tradesman was recognized to be a completely separate entity whose 
ownership was held exclusively by Mr. Trefren, alone. As this Court will recall, Mr. Trefren 
insisted upon and demanded his protection from Ms. Baird, and his holding title to the real 
property parcels was his way of securing his interest in it, and Tradesman was the best way for 
him to preserve not only his interest, but also to protect that of Mr. Sallaz, so it was agreed title 
would be held by it. But now, with this first stage of their development "contract" in place on 
January 6, 2006, they had to then take action to "convey" the parcels of real property, as 
otherwise there was no "real property" titled in the name of Real Homes, LLC, from which to 
develop. Ultimately, at some point in time, the real property had to be transferred to the Rice 
entity, and everyone knew that was required under the agreement they had entered into. 
Consequently, they represented the real property interests were to be conveyed. So the member 
interests, as well as the real property interests, were each necessarily being transfenecl, 
which were to go into Real Properties, LLC, as that is the way Roy Rice wanted it to be done, 
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and this Court will find it rather difficult to point to an allegation or testimony where these 
Plaintiffs have elected to say the earlier protection of real property assets constituted a 
or breach any warranty or representation regarding any unintended 
application or effects of an operating agreement that could be "verbally" modified by the 
"members", which, arguably was verbally modified by the actions taken by the only members in 
the LLC. If Messers. Sallaz and Trefren decided to "bundle" and "combine" the "assets" and 
"interests" IN THE FASHION THEY DID, we would respectfully argue they had the right to do 
so, as they were the 100% members of the LLC, just as this Court has so found the evidence to 
have been in the trial of this case, and that result could be, and apparently was, what had resulted 
from their action of combining those matters as they did. Consequently there could be no 
actionable claim raised by these Plaintiffs, as Mr. Rice got what he wanted; got what he 
bargained for; took the membership interests, as well as the title to the parcels of property; held 
both in Real Properties, LLC, wanted to receive and hold both in that entity, and has never 
complained, let alone claimed any such technical "violation" of the operating agreement, or for 
that matter, attempted to show any basis from which to assert a damage from this "academic" 
exercise and "theoretical" assessment of the Operating Agreement, which the facts would 
suggest and arguably demonstrate was functionally "modified" by the mutual actions of its total 
membership (Sallaz and Trefren) on January 6, 2006. With all due respect, the Plaintiffs have not 
advanced any theory or claim that Real Properties, LLC has a problem over the way in which the 
"membership interests" were handled; their concern and "claim", at best, was to remove Ms. 
Baird from her bogus claim to the properties or to an interest in Real homes, LLC, and they got 
their wish come true with their settlement with her took place in August, 2010, as a result of 
suit against her, as it was intended to accomplish by all parties to this litigation. If these "Sellers" 
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did not transfer real property on or shortly after January 6, 2006, then since Real Homes, LLC, 
was only a "shell" entity, a fact known to Mr. Rice, without the follow through transfers, of the 
property parcels, that could be a breach of their fundamental That was "why" the 
real property parcels had to be transferred as well. He needed to receive both, just as envisioned 
and as contemplated by the paiiies, and he therefor did receive both. Had he not gotten both, he 
certainly could claim a breach of the intended purpose of the contract. He cannot claim such, or 
take advantage of some theoretical concept that was never an issue, never made an issue, never 
argued to be an issue, and no "damage" or loss claim ever been shown to exist, let alone be based 
upon a technical term in an operating document that could be (and apparently was) altered by the 
very actions of its 100% members' interest when the contract was entered into by the contracting 
parties. If the Sellers held back on the transfer of the real property parcels (being those three 
parcels in Riverside and the Smith lots that Mr. Rice wanted), that would certainly be regarded as 
a "fundamental" and "material" breach of what the parties had agreed to accomplish. The Court 
must well appreciate that Mr. Rice didn't decide he would not pay the balance of the purchase 
price mere I y because he had become aware of some "operating Agreement" technicality that 
required a "dissolution" and "winding up of a "shell" entity; he withheld his payment of the 
balance of the purchase price because the economy had become of such a state of despair, that to 
call it anything less than a "depression" in the eyes of the real estate market would be to 
undermine the effects it had in that industry. As this Court will recall, Mr. Rice had two years to 
pay the balance ( due January 6, 2008), and the economy in January, 2006, when the contract was 
created, was then just starting to tum blue-white hot, from the red flame it had already become 
since starting in 2004, but by January, 2008, the housing industry and land development, along 
with any kind of financing, was non-existent, with a national foreclosure rate, the likes of which 
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had not been seen since the Great Depression. The very economy itself had turned to ice, and Mr. 
was simply unwilling to shell out cash on a deal that the economic rug had been pulled out 
under him, and what had before been a "red had turned into a bowl of "sour 
grapes", and he was not about to pay out funds on a project that was no longer able to fund itself. 
The way in which the situation now stands, the Court has found the existence of a 
"breach" by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren over the transfer of their membership interests, yet it was 
the parcels of real property that Real Properties, LLC, received that actually provided the "value" 
in the transaction. The Court will recall Mr. Rice, through Real Properties, LLC obtained huge 
loans from D. L. Evans Bank to purchase the Melba property and other holdings, all of which 
was able to take place because Mr. Rice used these parcels of real properties it had received from 
Tradesman as collateral for those loans. Consequently, the "value" that allowed those loans to 
occur were NOT the member interests in Real Homes, LLC; as that was only represented to be 
an interest in a "shell" company. The only "value" lies in the parcels of real property; and it was 
the real property that Roy Rice wanted to receive, as the "real" basis of the "purchase price", not 
what he perceived to be the worthless member interests to the entity he had no intention of 
conducting business within. That being said, and notwithstanding, he received the right of 
ownership to, and benefit of both, that is the real property parcels themselves, and the 
"membership interest" in Real Homes, LLC. The Plaintiffs' "Complaint" was over Ms. Baird's 
lis pendens claim, which was to the real property parcels themselves, not her assertion to a claim 
to the ownership, as sole member of Real Homes, LLC. Her lis pendens demonstrated that, and 
her "release" arrangements in her settlement documents with Plaintiffs demonstrate that fact. 
Plaintiffs claim(s) against Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren was only to the effect of Ms. Baird actually 
succeeding in having a "valid" claim to the real property parcels; she never did have, she never 
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was willing to defend or advance her bogus claim, and in fact, she surrendered the claim by 
releasing her lis pendens, once she realized Mr. Rice had no desire to pursue 15584 Riverside, 
truth, that was she ever had any form of a "documentary" interest in, as that stolen 
"interest" was reflected in the quitclaim deed she created when she claimed to be the "president" 
Real Homes, LLC, when the "transfer!! to Renee and Dennis took place back on February 11, 
2004, in order for Mr. Sallaz to process the operating loan. 
Mr. Rice had no interest or desire to pursue any "title", interest or claims to 15584 
Riverside, and that fact he had made clear, as he repeatedly told Mr. Sallaz, not less than "forty 
times", that he believed there was no remaining value in the residential house and lot of 15584, 
over and above what was owed against it, and he had no desire to own or develop it further. That 
was his "hard and fast" attitude towards that parcel, despite the fact Mr. Rice was told repeatedly 
by Mr. Sallaz that whatever the outstanding encumbrance was still owed against that parcel, once 
they got title to it, and the debt was assumed and paid, that sum would be deducted from the 
balance of the purchase price. Mr. Rice had this "deal" sowed up from one end to the other, as he 
orchestrated it from the start to finish, but he just clearly felt there were other investments out 
there to be had in other properties, as there were many properties out there to be developed, and 
the market was a sizzling hot environment. Once Ms. Baird stepped forward and simply released 
her lis pendens, the Plaintiffs acknowledged they had no warranty breach or any further "quiet 
title action" to pursue, and that was not only evident from the case Plaintiff presented at trial, but 
was admitted to be such, in their opening final argument to this Court, where they confirmed 
they had been trying to dismiss Count V in their complaint ever since the settlement with Ms. 
Baird. Understandably so, as they had no claim upon which to base any "breach" over anything, 
and clearly, had no basis or evidence to establish they had suffered any damage over a restriction 
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or provision in an operating agreement of a "shell" entity. Clearly, Plaintiffs had no damage of 
kind; that was reason Count V had to be dismissed. 
Court's finding of a material breach by Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren is 
only of a theoretical concern, not a realistic function that has served to create an actionable claim 
to a damage or loss. Factually speaking, the "member interests" in Real Homes, LLC have 
served to be of no concern to Real Properties, LLC or to Mr. Rice, as all he wanted was to 
develop the properties Tradesman had title to, as that was to be the beginning of their 
development venture, and it was NEVER to be conducted or pursued in the name of Real 
Homes, LLC. 
From the standpoint that this Court found there was a "valid" contract entered into 
between the parties, and that Plaintiffs were unable to prove a breach, let alone a damage, they 
are estopped to claim or to assert any affirmative defense of a breach of any kind, by virtue of 
claim and issue preclusion from the failures of their own case in chief when presented at trial. 
The non-suit decided that legal application. They could never dispute that Real Properties, LLC 
received the membership interests (they contracted to have placed with it), and received the real 
property assets that were caused to be transferred to Real Properties, LLC, from Tradesman, as 
that also they wanted to receive. There is no basis to assert a breach by Messrs. Sallaz and 
Trefren, as none were proved, and none ever caused a resulting damage in any "material or 
fundamental" way in this transaction that could be acted upon, as Real Homes, LLC has been left 
dormant, and there has never been a contention or claim by anyone that it "illegally" or 
"unlawfully" transacted any business, as it was left dormant, to the same effect if it had been 
dissolved and wound up. It has done nothing, and was not intended to do anything, since January 
6, 2006, and the transfer of the membership interest into Real Properties, LLC assured that it 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; FIND1NG OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; MOTION TO CLARIFY ASPECTS AS TO THE 
APPLICATION OF CLAlM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION P. 16 
would remain a reality if it was dormant. A breach can never be "material and fundamental" if 
you never suffer a damage or loss. Quite interestingly, there has NEVER been even a resulting 
...,~.,HUFY claimed in the context of that concept of t.l-iis operating agreement. Since there was no 
damage claimed as a result of this "provision", and at no time has there been any damage even 
to have occurred, despite the fact none has been proven, let alone demonstrated to have come 
into existence, it could be seen only as a "potential" claim of a damage or loss, had there been 
any attempt to conduct "business" under the name of Real Homes, LLC. In that regard, it is also 
of significant importance to note that the "business" of Real Homes, LLC ceased entirely after 
Tradesman received title to the parcels of real property. Consequently, if the restriction or 
limitation created by the term of the operating agreement was not orally or verbally modified, by 
virtue of the actions of its members, in doing what they did on January 6, 2006, or that the effects 
of claim and issue preclusion have estopped Plaintiffs from any attempt to take advantage of a 
theory they never alleged, let alone ever known to exist, given the fact there has been no business 
conducted since the transfers of the real property interests were made by quitclaim deed to 
Tradesman, then the idea of any affirmative defense of a theoretical breach being discussed(in a 
vacuum no less, and without any pleading notice whatsoever), the clear and undisputed fact 
remains no damage OF ANY KIND has occurred, so it cannot be considered to be a material, 
substantial, fundamental, or destructive to the very purpose or intent of the transaction 
contemplated by the parties, and "fundamentally" speaking, Real Properties, LLC orchestrated 
the transaction, having gotten everything it wanted, used the properties, without restriction or 
limitation, to get loans and make new acquisitions, and has not only NEVER SUFFERED ANY 
DAMAGE OF ANY KIND, but has gained phenomenally by the transaction, and has 
substantially improved the wealth of Mr. Rice and his Real Properties, LLC, having now also 
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"stolen" the parcels of real property, by conveying them to his Ada Properties, LLC, without any 
"consideration", I might add, and despite the huge gains has accomplished, he simply has 
is owed, for the obvious reason market apart thereafter, and he 
would not fund the transaction with his own stashed funds. 
This Court should now consider amending its Finding of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, and find that Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren did perform as Mr. Rice expected of them, and did 
substantially meet the expectations of Mr. Rice, and met full compliance as to the intended 
performance of their agreement, and Real Properties, LLC received everything Mr. Rice ever 
wanted to be transferred to and placed with Real Properties, LLC, and no affirmative defense of 
any actionable claim of a breach or damage prevents entry of a money judgment, whereby Mr. 
Rice himself, or Real Properties, LLC owes Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren the remaining principal 
balance as identified in Defendants' opening and closing arguments, together with interest since 
January 6, 2008. Otherwise, Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren have parted with their "membership" 
interest in Real Homes, LLC, as well as Tradesman having parted with the ownership of the 
parcels of real property that Mr. Trefren conveyed to Real Properties, LLC, as a companion 
transfer, in accordance with the intended purpose of the development venture agreement, all of 
which has occurred without receipt of any value or consideration. Thus far, Messrs. Sallaz and 
Trefren have parted with everything and have received NOTHING, but for (arguably) the sum of 
$5,000.00 that we genuinely acknowledge was paid to Mr. Sallaz under the transaction, despite 
the ongoing position of Mr. Rice, where he continues to say it was "probably" a loan to Mr. 
Sallaz. As they say: 0 what a tangled web we weave when at first we begin to deceive. 
If this Court declines to amend its findings and conclusions, and fails to reconsider the 
scope contained within the effects of this final judgment, then we are left to ponder the fact, that 
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we are left to believe this Court has chosen to conclude that the transfer of the "membership 
interest" could not occur because of the transfer of the "parcels of real property" took place also, 
despite the fact that \Vas to occurred as it did, by the clear agreement the parties, 
notwithstanding the state of, or the content of, the operating agreement that was never made a 
material concern of these parties to this agreement. The conveyance of each such "component" 
in the transaction of their agreement was never contemplated to constitute a breach of their 
"intended transaction", as the issue of "authority", affecting either one or both of these 
"components", was not material to the purpose of the intended expectations of the parties, and 
since the transfer of the member interests came to be "transferred" through the Purchase and sale 
agreement, and the real property came to be actually conveyed through separate quitclaim deeds, 
in a separate transaction undertaken by Tradesman, that we are then left to believe the "transfers" 
of the "parcels of real property" was done without consideration, and came through deeds of 
conveyance (quitclaims) executed by Glen Trefren, in behalf and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC, who held those real property interests pursuant to the conveyances made to 
Tradesman from Real Homes, LLC, as identified in the exhibits in this Record. Consequently, 
the "conveyances" from the Grantor, Tradesman, to Real Properties, LLC, receiving the interests 
as the grantee, has taken place without any consideration whatsoever having been paid as 
required, as nothing has been paid as was the intended purpose and expectations of the parties. 
That transaction, therefore, is void, for complete lack of consideration. Therefore, title to those 
properties MUST come back to and be restored in the name of Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC, and if this Court declines to do that in its reconsideration, or amendment of 
its findings and conclusions, then it will result in a requirement for the expansion of some 
additional litigation, between and among some of these parties, which would necessarily include 
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a quiet title action, the very action that Plaintiffs had commenced to conduct, but chose to 
dismiss, without prejudice, several years ago. This quiet title action would be commenced upon 
Court's determination has been a contract proven by Defcndants/Counterclaimants, but 
due to mutual and material breaches, the fundamental purpose and objective of the agreement 
had come to an end, and the agreement is void. Though the Court has determined the written 
contract is now void and therefore has come to an end, it would appear the equitable doctrines 
should be available to the Court, and the Court "could have" elected to apply the damage theory 
of "unjust emichrnent" to the transaction, rather than send the parties off to do another round of 
expensive litigation in the future, as there can be no question that no consideration has been paid 
by Real Properties, LLC for the real property that has been conveyed to it by Tradesman, and we 
know that Mr. Rice has repeatedly declined to agree to a rescission of the transaction, as he liked 
the deal so well in 2006, that he wouldn't even consider it when "offered" to him by Judge Epis. 
Currently, this Court's decision has confirmed that no consideration has been paid for the real 
property, as the Court has found the fundamental and principal purpose of the purchase 
agreement was for the "transfer" of the membership interests only, and the real property, was an 
"attendant" transfer only. The parties, however, saw the transaction to have been the other way 
around, but in any event, the consideration to have been paid was never paid, a.11d the "real 
property" conveyance, regardless how the transaction is viewed, construed or dissected, has not 
been paid as the consideration was contemplated to be paid by the parties. 
It is therefore incumbent upon this Court to provide the appropriate clarification, thereby 
confirming there has been no consideration for the conveyance of the parcels of real property to 
Real Properties, LLC from Tradesman Contractors and Constrnction, LLC and that transaction 
therefore is void and of no effect. Messers Sallaz and Trefren are willing to endorse that 
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conclusion, and that finding of fact and conclusion of law, from which the necessary steps may 
now be taken to initiate the quiet title action against Eugene Roy Rice, Janet Rice, Real 
LLC, Ada Properties, LLC, and any other party, entity or corporation claiming any 
right, title or interest in or to any of these parcels of real property identified in those deeds of 
conveyance created by Tradesman. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the Court is inclined to amend its Findings o~ Fact, Conclusions of Law, or 
reconsider its decision and thereby and amend or alter its final judgment, it would serve to be in 
the best interests of these parties for the Court to "clarify" its decision, with regard to the effects 
of the final judgment, as it relates to the concerns of issue and claim preclusion to pursue the 
quiet title action between and among some of these parties. We would ask this Court to take the 
initiative to enter a further finding of fact and conclusion of law that the evidence demonstrates 
from the documents presented at this trial that the consideration contemplated by the parties to be 
paid, has not been paid as expected have been forthcoming from Real Properties, LLC, in 
conjunction with the conveyance of the parcels of real property transferred to Real Properties, 
LLC through the quitclaim deed conveyances made by Tradesman Contractors and Construction, 
LLC, executed by Glen Trefren on January 6, 2006. That as a result of that failure of 
consideration, the transaction, regarding said transfers of interests in real property, in all respects, 
are null and void, and entry of an order to that effect would then preclude need for these parties 
to engage in further litigation to conduct a quiet title action to return title of those parcels of 
property back to Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, as otherwise required by 
application of law, and the void status of the parties' agreement. 
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Case No. CV 09-11855 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: 
DEFENDANTS'/ 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION, MOTION 
TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR 
A TTORl~EY FEES AND COSTS 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: DE:FENDA1'-ffS'/ COUNTERCLAIMATS' MOTION 
RECONSIDERATION, MOTION TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
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COME NOW Alternative Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Real Properties, LLC, and 
Counterdefendants Eugene Rice by and through their counsel of record, J. Kahle 
file their to '/ Counterclaimants' 
Reconsideration, Motion to Clarify, and !vlotion For Attorney Fees and Costs: 
INTRODUCTION 
Four years of litigation resulted in a five day trial conducted November 20-26, 2013. A 
Judgment was issued on February 28, 2014, dismissing plaintiff's single remaining claim (plead 
in the alternative) as well as Mr. Trefren/Tradesman's counterclaims. Now Mr. Sallaz and his 
proxy, Glen Trefren, seek reconsideration of the 37-page Memorandum Decision and Order, an 
advisory opinion on how to unlawfully collaterally attack the judgment, as well as attorney's fees 
for a lawsuit they admittedly requested Plaintiffs file against them. For the reasons set forth 
herein, this Court should deny Sallaz/Trefren/Tradesman's motions. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The JVIotion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
Defendants/Counterclaimants have timely filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant 
to IRCP 52(b) and IRCP l l(a)(2)(B). No paiiy however has filed a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to IRCP 59 and pursuant to IRCP 59(b) the time to do so has now expired. The 
applicable standard of review to Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Motion for Reconsideration is 
the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
[The Supreme] Court exercises free review over conclusions of law, Smith v. J.B. 
Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 941, 908 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1996), but will not set 
aside a finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Idaho R. Civ. P. 52( a). When 
a case is tried to a court, determinations as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight of their testimony, their probative effect, and inferences drawn from that 
testimony are the province of the district court. Estate of v. Security 
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Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 19-20, 89 P.3d 856, 859-60 (2004); Idaho 
Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 746, 9 P.3d 1204, 1212 (2000). 
Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P .3d 1052, 1056 (2013 ). 
Defendants/Counterclaimants not asserted any new factual grounds or 
theories in their briefing. Not a single case was cited in either of Defendants/Counterclaimants' 
jointly filed briefs. Rather the arguments for reconsideration are simply an incoherent 
regurgitation of the arguments found in the closing briefs filed by Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
This Court has already made a thorough and well-reasoned 37 page ruling. Therefore, in 
addition to the Court's findings that Plaintiffs met their burden in proving their eighth and 
eighteenth affirmative defenses, Plaintiffs simply incorporate their arguments previously made in 
their own post-trial briefing to the extent necessary to refute any assertions made in Mr. 
Sallaz/Trefren's 21-page rambling brief seeking reconsideration. 
2. Defendants/Counterclaimants are seeking an impermissible advisory opinion on 
how best to violate IRCP ll(a)(2)(A) and the doctrine of resjudicata. 
Mr. Trefren, Tradesman, and Mr. Sallaz have telegraphed their disregard of this Court's 
findings of fact, their contempt for the finality of judgments, and their impending unlawful 
course of action: 
That transaction, therefore, is void, for complete lack of consideration. Therefore, 
title to those properties MUST come back to and be restored in the name of 
Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, and if this Court declines to do 
that in its reconsideration, or amendment of its findings and conclusions, then it 
will result in a requirement for the expansion of some additional litigation, 
between and among some of these parties, which would necessarily include a 
quiet title action, the very action that Plaintiffs had commenced to conduct, but 
chose to dismiss, without prejudice, several years ago. This quiet title action 
would be commenced upon the Court's detennination there has been a contract 
proven by Defendants/Counterclaimants, but due to mutual and material breaches, 
the fundamental purpose and objective of the agreement had come to an end, and 
the agreement is void .... 
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Messers Sallaz and Trefren are willing to endorse that conclusion, and that 
finding of fact and conclusion of law, from which the necessary steps may now 
be taken to initiate the quiet title action against Eugene Roy Rice, Janet Rice, 
Properties, LLC, Ada Properties, LLC, and any other party, or 
corporation claiming any right, title or interest in or to any of these parcels 
of real property identified in those deeds of conveyance created by 
Tradesman. 
1vlotion for Reconsideration: Finding of Fact Conclusions of Law: 1vfotion to 
Clarify Aspects as to the Application of Claim and Issue Preclusion at 19-21. 
(Emphasis added). 
Mr. Trefren/Tradesman's proposed course of action would appear to divulge an 
impending violation ofIRCP l l(a)(2)(A). 
In any action, if an application by any party to the judge of a court for the 
issuance of an order or writ is denied in whole or in part by such judge, neither the 
party nor the party's attorney shall make any subsequent application to any other 
judge except by appeal to a higher court; provided that a second application may 
be made for a constitutional writ after a disclosure of the first application has been 
made to the second judge. Any writ or order obtained in violation of this section 
shall be immediately vacated by the judge issuing the same upon discovery of the 
prior application to another judge, and the party and the attorney shall be subject 
to such costs and sanctions as the court may detennine in its discretion .... 
IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(A). 
Furthennore, Mr. Sallaz (who has previously assigned his interest in the subject contract 
to Jim Bevis as well as Glen Trefren, see Assigrnnents of Interest attached to Affidavit Of J 
Kahle Becker in Support of Response and Objection to: Defendants'/ Counterclaimants' 1vf otion 
for Reconsideration, 1vfotion to Clarify, and Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, herein after 
"Becker Affidavit," as Exhibits A and B), Tradesman, and Mr. Trefren are now seeking an 
advisory opinion from this Court on how to go about filing a lawsuit otherwise prohibited by the 
doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9, 232 P.3d 327, 330 (2010) ("In 
effect, the State is asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the m 
future cases; an exercise this Court will not undertake."). Thus, as a threshold requirement, a 
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declaratory relief action must involve an actual "case or controversy" so the court does not 
render an impermissible advisory opinion. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. 83, 95-96, 88 S.Ct. 
(1 a Cal. v. 386 (9th 
Cir.1996) (recognizing that "federal courts have never been empowered to render advisory 
opinions"). Veoh Networks, Inc. v. UA;fG Recordings, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268 (S.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
Should this Court accept Mr. Sallaz and Trefren's invitation to sanctify this hypothetical 
impending lawsuit, the doctrine of res judicata indicates that Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Trefren, and 
Tradesman's proposed course of action is prohibited. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the 
same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been 
made. Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 915-916, 684 P.2d 314, 317-318 
(Ct.App.1984) ("[T]he rule against splitting a claim applies even though the 
remedies or forms of relief demanded in one suit are different from those 
demanded in another."); see also US. Bank Nat'! Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 
222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000) (noting Idaho has adopted the "transactional 
approach" to res judicata ). 
Hindmarsh v. Nfock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (Emphasis 
added). 
Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in 
the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the 
original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim 
involves the same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises 
out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 
(2012). 
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The record reflects Mr. Sallaz has already answered the question he now poses to this 
do 
A. I should 
suing my clients m this case? 
But you'll have to ask my attorney if I am. 
P. 53 of November 21, 2013 Trial Testimony of Dennis Sallaz attached to Becker 
Affidavit as Exhibit C. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Sallaz, his attorney (as well as Trefren/Tradesman's attorney) appears to 
have realized their error long after the "120 days prior to trial" deadline imposed for amendments 
to pleadings as is dictated in the April 12, 2013 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. "For of 
all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest are these: 'It might have been!''' John Greenleaf 
Whittier, Maud Muller, 1856. 
The record reflects neither Dennis Sallaz, Glen Trefren, nor Tradesman brought a claim 
for quiet title or alleged their claim to title to any of the subject properties was superior to that of 
Real Properties, LLC or the present owner, Ada Properties, LLC. Defendants/Counterclaimants 
acknowledge that the subject properties were transferred to Real Properties, LLC in 2006: 
The conveyance of each such "component" in the transaction of their agreement 
was never contemplated to constitute a breach of their '"intended transaction", as 
the issue of "authority", affecting either one or both of these "components", was 
not material to the purpose of the intended expectations of the parties, and since 
the transfer of the member interests came to be "transferred" through the Purchase 
and sale agreement, and the real property came to be actuallv conveyed 
through separate quitclaim deeds, in a separate transaction undertaken by 
Tradesman, that we are then left to believe the "transfers" of the "parcels of real 
property" was done without consideration, and came through deeds of conveyance 
(quitclaims) executed by Glen Trefren, in behalf and Tradesman Contractors and 
Construction, LLC, who held those real property interests pursuant to the 
conveyances made to Tradesman from Real Homes, LLC, as identified in the 
exhibits in this Record. 
Afotion for Reconsideration: Finding of Fact Conclusions of · 1Vfotion to 
Clarify Aspects as to the Application of Claim and Issue Preclusion at 19. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Defendants/Counterclaimants simply contend the transfer was made without 
consideration and yet they neglected to file a proper claim for quiet or mesne 
their individual or on behalf of Tradesman Construction, 
LLC. Likewise, Defendants neglected to bring a claim on behalf of Real Homes, LLC pursuant 
to LC. 53-644(2). See Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 106 P.3d 465 (2005) citing Idaho 
Limited Liability Company Act, Idaho Code § 53-644(2) (Persons winding up the business or 
affairs of the LLC, may prosecute and defend suits in the name of, and for and on behalf of, the 
LLC). 
The holder of title to property (Real Properties, LLC and, as of 2010, Ada Properties, 
LLC for all the property at issue except Riverside lB/15584 Riverside, which as of August 2010 
was owned by Renee Baird) is the presumed legal owner of that property, and if someone else 
claims ownership of such property, he must establish his claim by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence. Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253, 145 Idaho 741 (2008). 
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or 
interest in real or personal prope1iy adverse to him, for the purpose of determining 
such adverse claim, provided that all actions to adjudicate water rights and obtain 
a decree as to water source, quantity, point of diversion, place of use, nature of 
use, period of use, and priority as against other water users shall be brought under 
the provisions of chapter 14, title 42, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 6-401. 
[A] party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his own 
title, and may not rely merely upon the weakness of his adversary. Aldape v. Akins, l 05 Idaho 
254, 260, 668 P.2d 130, 136 (Ct. App. 1983). Likewise, neither Mr. Trefren, Tradesman, nor 
Mr. Sallaz brought a claim for mesne profits. "In an action for mesne profits, the plaintiff may 
recover the mesne profits of the land and also all damages which have been sustained by reason 
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of the disturbance of his possession by the defendant." Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61, 62-63, 558 
P.2d 632, 633-34 (1977). for title or mesne profits would have been 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the 
pleading the pleader has against any opposing paiiy, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim 
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the 
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if ( 1) at 
the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending 
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or 
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this 
Rule 13. 
IRCP 13(a). 
A nearly identical attempt to re-litigate a real estate transaction (which was made in 
anticipation of an impending divorce) was rejected in Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 569 
P.2d 358(1977) based on the res judicata effects of the prior litigation. 
In the course of our discussion of the law of voluntary partnership dissolution in 
Ramseyer I, we stated that a dissolution agreement of this nature "is presumed to 
include all disputed matters among the partners, and will be final and conclusive 
upon them in the absence of fraud, mistake or duress." (Emphasis added.) 98 
Idaho at 52, 558 P.2d at 81. In short, by demanding a judicial dissolution, an 
accounting and a division of partnership assets, Homer put in issue all his interests 
in the former partnership property during the course of the Ramseyer I litigation. 
He lost. This Court affirmed the trial court's detennination that no judicial 
dissolution was in order because a full dissolution and winding up of the 
partnership had been reached by mutual agreement of the partners on June 12, 
1969. The finality and completeness of the resulting decree in tying up all loose 
ends, is emphasized by the fact that the trial court in Ramseyer I granted the sons' 
cross-claim for refonnation of the 1969 settlement to include water rights and 
AUM's (rights to animal unit months on federal grazing land) inadvertently 
omitted from the settlement agreement. 
The final judgment in Ramseyer I quieted title to Antelope Springs Ranch in the 
sons. Homer now attempts to avoid that judgment by a cause of action to quiet 
title to Antelope Springs Ranch in him to the extent of his alleged community 
interest in that property an interest which, for reasons of their own, he and his 
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attorney preferred not to make explicit in the 1969 dissolution agreement or in the 
partnership action. The attempt so to avoid the res judicata effect of the earlier 
judgment is without merit. 
V. Idaho 554, 556, 360 (1 
The trial court in Ramseyer I held that Homer had no interest m or title to 
Antelope Springs Ranch and quieted title to the property in the sons. When 
Homer brought the present action to quiet title, partition and recover mesne 
profits in 1975, the state of facts giving rise to his claim had not changed. When 
he changed the label applied to his theory of recovery, the essential relief sought 
was no different from that sought in the partnership action. Accordingly, Homer's 
quiet title action was barred by the judgment in the partnership action, and the 
respondents' motions for summary judgment should have been granted for that 
reason. As was stated in Treinies v. Sunshine klining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78, 60 
S.Ct. 44, 51, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939), "One trial of an issue is enough. 'The principles 
ofres judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,' as well 
to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties." 
Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 557, 569 P.2d 358,361 (1977). 
Therefore, due to Defendants' /Counterclaimants' failure to bring a quiet title or mesne 
profits claim in this action, the judgment entered herein is final and should not be subject to a 
collateral attack. 1 
3. Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Request for Attorney's fees should be denied. 
Dennis Sallaz and Glen Trefren invited this lawsuit on themselves, "Both Trefren and 
myself are willing and supporting Defendants and stand ready to participate to the max." See 
Exhibit D to Becker Affidavit. In fact, Mr. Sallaz testified before this Court that what he actually 
sold to his former clients, in the middle of his own divorce trial, was a lawsuit against him: 
1 For examples of Mr. Sallaz's propensity to assert collateral attacks on judgments, see Complaint for an 
Independent Action to Obtain Relief from a Judgment, Ada County Case CV OC 1217666, as well as November 9, 
2013 Order Denying Suspension of Appeal in Ada County Case No. CV DR 04-01075D attached to Becker Affidavit 
as Exhibits E and F. This "Independent Action to Overturn Judgment" sought to collaterally attack Mr. Sallaz's 
pending appeal of his divorce (5 years after the trial) based on the newly discovered "facts" that he was not actually 
manied to Renee Baird since the officiant (allegedly) did not have a valid license to solemnize their marriage which 
had taken place approximately 16 years earlier. See August 8, 2013 Notice of Appeal ( which has now become 
Supreme Court No. 41301 appeal of Fourth Dist. Case No. CV DR 04-01075D) attached to Becker Affidavit as 
Exhibit G. 
AND OBJECTION TO: DEFENDANTS'/ COUNTERCLAIMATS' MOTION FOR 
MOTION TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR ATTORNEY l<'EES 
Q. So what you really sold my clients was a lawsuit? 
A. Absolutely. And he knew it. He knew he -- that was the reason for the 
two years that he required, because it was going to take us that long to get it done. 
It was · idea. 
P. 190 of November 26, 2013 Trial Testimony of Dennis Sallaz attached 
to Becker Affidavit as Exhibit H. (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs tried to dismiss the entirety of this case after they settled with Mr. Sallaz's ex-
wife, Renee Baird. Mr. Sallaz objected to the dismissal and filed three counterclaims (I. Breach 
of Contract; II. Breach of Contract - Reimbursement for Materials and Labor; and III. Unjust 
Enrichment) through his proxy, Glen Trefren. From approximately September 2010 until trial, 
the Rices and Real Properties, LLC were largely in a defensive posture. At trial, it was revealed 
for the first time that Defendants/Counterclaimants were seeking approximately $680,000 in 
damages. The Judgment entered by this Court awarded Defendants/Counterclaimants $0 in 
damages. "Avoiding liability is a significant benefit.. .. " Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). 
Plaintiffs contend there has been a concerted effort by Mr. Sallaz to delay this litigation, 
delay litigation in Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253, and to delay professional disciplinary 
proceedings which have been initiated by the Rices against Mr. Sallaz. See January 16, 2014 
Report of Speciai Master Jim Lynch at 2 as weil as transcript of January 21, 2014 hearing in Ada 
County Case No. CV OC 1107253 at 18-19 attached to Becker Affidavit as Exhibits I and J. 
Based on the Judgment that has been entered, there are no legal grounds for asserting that 
Defondants/Counterclaimants prevailed in this action under 54( e )(1) such that they ( as "willing 
and supporting Defendants ... ready to participate to the max") would be entitled to fees under 
any section of LC. 1 120. 
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Defendant/Counterclaimants arguments for fees pursuant to I.C. 12-121 are likewise 
without merit. Dennis Sallaz testified he assisted preparing the Complaint and drafting initial 
Rices/Real See pp. 21, 3 
Trial Testimony of Dennis Sallaz attached to Becker Affidavit as Exhibit C. The bulk of the 
infonnation Mr. Sallaz provided at the outset of this litigation turned out to be false. Thereafter, 
Mr. Sallaz refused to provide information and documents that were the subject of discovery 
requests he helped draft, necessitating a Motion to Compel and ultimately an award of sanctions 
against him. Mr. Sallaz also hid behind Glen Trefren in: 1) assigning the subject contract to him 
despite having already assigned that same interest to Jim Bevis four days earlier; 2) asserting a 
counterclaim through judgment-proof Glen Trefren and even having his own attorney, Vernon K. 
Smith, present Mr. Trefren's case at trial; 3) admitting to preparing Glen's pleadings; 4) having 
his attorneys take 72 hours of Mr. Rice's deposition (though some portions of the deposition 
were admittedly taken in connection with discovery in Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253) 
despite the extreme hardship this placed on Mr. Rice due to his COPD, only not to use any of the 
deposition transcripts at trial; and 5) filing a lis pendens on all of the subject properties, including 
Riverside 1 B/15584 Riverside, which is owned by non-party Renee Baird, despite not having 
asserted a single claim that would entitle him to any interest in any of the subject properties. See 
lis pendens filed May 8, 2013. 
Additionally, Mr. Trefren and then Mr. Sallaz asked for a jury trial, only to waive it at the 
last minute after Plaintiffs prepared jury instructions. Mr. Trefren provided testimony at trial 
which the Court specifically found to not be credible. Memorandum Decision and Order at 31 . 
. Sallaz, a licensed attorney, was evasive during cross examination and provided inconsistent 
testimony throughout his examination. The Court pointed out that exhibits 
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Defendants/Counterclaimants produced at trial were strategically withheld from Plaintiffs' 
counsel until the last minute. See Pp. 114-118 November 26, 2013 Trial Testimony 
to Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Trefren' s litigation were 
frivolous throughout this case and they should not be rewarded with attorney's fees under LC. 
12-12 l. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should make a speedy ruling upholding its Af emorandum Decision and Order 
as well as the current version of the Judgment in order to avoid farther delay in the myriad of 
cases Mr. Sallaz's divorce from Renee Baird has spawned. An award of attorney's fees is not 
warranted under the present Af emorandum Decision and Order nor the Judgment. 
DATED this di day of March 2014. 
J. KAHLE BECKER 
Attorney for Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
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that on this ~ I day of March 201 a true correct 
of the foregoing RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: DEFENDANTS'/ 
COUNTERCLAIMA TS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, :rv10TI0N TO CLARIFY, 
and MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Iver J. Longeteig 
5304 Turret 
Boise, ID 83703 
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren 
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
LLC 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz 
James B. Lynch 
Special Master 
2047 Blaine Way 
Boise, ID 83702 
y' US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
;( US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
;( US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
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~KAHLE BECKER 
~ Attorney for Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
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l\IOTION TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
KAHLE BECKER (ISB # 7408) 
Attorney at Law 
l 020 W. Main Street, 400 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: =~'.::'..',~=°'~==:'..'cc.'::..!.".-'..O= 
Attorney for Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband ) 
and wife, REAL HOMES, L.L.C. and REAL ) 
PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLEN"N TREFREN, 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
EUGENE RICE and JANET RICE, husband 
and wife, and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN, 
TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS AND 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC., an Idaho limited 
liability company, and REAL HOMES, 






























Case No. CV 09-11855 
AFFIDAVIT OF J. KAHLE BECKER 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE AND 
OBJECTION TO: DEFENDANTS'/ 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION, MOTION 
TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
J. IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: 
DEFENDANTS'/ COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, MOTION 
COSTS - Page 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
Ada ) 
J. being over the eighteen years and competent to 
make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal knowledge, states as 
follows: 
I. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel for the 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants ("Plaintiffs") herein. 
2. That I am an attorney for these Plaintiffs in the District Court of the Fou1ih Judicial 
District, Ada County case Dennis Sallaz and lvlarcy Fox v. Eugene and Janet Rice et 
all, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253. 
3. That I make this Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Response and Objection to: 
Defendants' / Counterclaimants' Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Clarify, and 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
4. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an "Assigmnent of Purchase 
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC" from Dennis Sallaz to Jim 
Bevis, dated March 6, 2006, Bates numbered RICE 00522, marked and admitted as 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 37 in trial for this case, held on November 20-26, 2013. 
5. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of an "Assigmnent of Purchase 
Agreement for Sale of Interest in Real Homes, LLC" from Dennis Sallaz to Glen 
Trefren, dated March 10, 2006, Bates numbered RICE 00521, marked and admitted 
as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 38 in trial for this case, held on November 20-26, 2013. 
IN OF RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: 
'/ COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, MOTION 
FEES COSTS Page 2 
6. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and conect copy of "Court Trial - Testimony of 
Dennis J. Sallaz November 21, 2013" taken in the Court tiial in this case, held on 
13. 
7. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a letter from Dennis l Sallaz to 
John L. Runft, dated January 8, 2009, Bates numbered RICE 00886 and marked as 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 in trial for this case, held on November 20-26, 2013. 
8. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Complaint for an Independent 
Action to Obtain Relief from a Judgment, filed by Dennis J. Sallaz and Vernon K. 
Smith on September 28, 2012 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada 
County Case No. CO OC 1217666. 
9. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Order Suspending Appeal, 
denied by Judge Sticklin on November 13, 2012 in the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District, Ada County Case No. CO OC 1217666. 
10. Attached as Exhibit G is a true and c01Tect copy of the Notice of Appeal, filed on 
August 8, 2013, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County Case 
No. CV DR 04-01075 D. 
11. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of "Court Trial - Testimony of 
Dennis J. Sallaz November 26, 2013" taken in the Court trial in this case, held on 
November 20-26, 2013. 
12. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of a letter from James B. Lynch 
(assigned as special master in this case) to myself, and counsel for Dennis Sallaz -
William Fuhrman, Vernon K. Smith, and Iver J. Longeteig, dated January 16, 2014. 
SUPPORT OF RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: 
' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, MOTION 
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13. Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the Reporter's Transcript of 
Proceedings held on January 21, 2014 before Hon. Judge Wilper in the District Court 
the Judicial Dennis Sallaz and Fox v. Eugene and Janet 
Rice et all, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught 
DATED thisJ! day of March 2014. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thi fMarch 2014. 9-( si.. 1 M.~ 1 2..ol '-f 
Notary Public fi r the State of Idaho 
Residing at: Bo 1se 1.1> 
My Cornrnissi n Expires: / e 1 · I 'I· df) ,~ 
SUPPORT OF RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this --2!__ day of March 2014, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing J. KAHLE BECKER IN SUPPORT RESPONSE AND 
OBJECTION TO: '/ COlJNTERCLidM/•,NTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, MOTION TO CLARIFY, and MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Iver J. Longeteig Lus Mail 
5304 TmTet __ Personal Delivery 
Boise, ID 83703 Facsimile 
Attorney for Defendant Glenn Trefren 
& Tradesman Contractors & Construction, 
LLC 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant Dennis Sallaz 
James B. Lynch 
Special Master 
2047 Blaine Way 
Boise, ID 83 702 
LusMail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile 
,)( US Mail 
__ Personal Delivery 
Facsimile --
Attorney for Alternative Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
[T J. BECKER OF RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO: 




s continuing his 
and to Bevis, at 
to that certain Purchase Agreement dated 1-6-06 by and 
as Seller as Buyer, as Exhibit "A'', sufficient to pay 
any and all at1omey costs by Assignor related to that certain Iegal action entitled 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Case No. CV DR 0401075D, filed in Ada County, State ofidaho. Tbe Assignee 
shaH have full power and authority to enforce said Purchase Agreement to collect all sums due to rum 
hereunder in his name and remit to Assignor any sum remaining therefrom. 
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DENNIS SALLAZ, GLENN TREFREN,) 
and TRADESMAN CONTRACTORS ) 
AND CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C., ) 
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Katherine J. Klemetson. 
Case No. CV2009-11855 
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Thursday, November 21, 2013, 8:33 a.m. 
(Court Trial - Day 2) 
(Start of requested portion of proceeding.) 
THE COURT: Court wi!! take up CV2009-11855, Rice 
7 versus SaHaz,, et at Counsel are presenL And 
8 Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Trefren are here today. 
9 
10 
Good morning, counsel. Everybody came back. 
MR. SMITH: And good morning, Your Honor. We 
11 wouldn't miss it for the world. 
12 THE COURT: We worked so hard yesterday. We 
13 really did. So okay. We finished with the witness --
14 the first witness yesterday, and so the plaintiffs will 
15 call -- well, I'm sorry. 
16 Any preliminary matters from the plaintiffs? 
17 MR. McCARTI-fY: No, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: From the defendants? 
19 MR. SMITI-1: Judge, I believe not at this time. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. LONGETEIG: No, ma'am. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you. 
23 Plaintiffs may call the next witness. 
24 MR. BECKER: We call Denny Sallaz. 
25 THE COURT: And if the witness would approach the 
1 
1 Runft, of being my attorneys and backing out and 
2 double-crossing me. That's the first document I 
3 brought. I hired both of you. 
4 MR. BECKER: Okay. If the bailiffs -- will we 
5 have the bailiff, the marshal? 
6 THE COURT: All right. Let's -- maybe I should 
7 leave, and everybody could say what they want to say to 
8 each other. And then I'll come back, and we'll by the 
9 case. So let's just start. Ask the question, and we'll 
10 proceed. 
11 MR. BECKER: I'd like to have the opportunity to 
12 review the documents that the witness has brought to the 
13 stand before I begin my questioning, Your Honor. 
14 MR. SMITH: To which, Judge, I will object. 
15 THE COURT: Well, why do we need to do that if he 
16 isn't referring to them? If he ends up referring to 
17 some of those things, then we may need to get into that. 
18 But let's just --
19 MR. SMITH: Yes. For the record, Judge, at this 
20 time the bar complaint that Mr. SaHaz intends to bring 
21 against Mr. Becker and/or Mr. Runft is at this moment in 
22 time not relevant to the examination I anticipate that 
23 Mr. Becker will inquire of Mr. Sallaz. 
24 He may happen to have his file. And if -
should to refer to at that point 
1 derk to be sworn, please. 
2 Kind of got you blocked. 
3 THE WITNESS: Kind of locked up. 
4 
5 DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plainllifu, 
7 having been first du!y sworn, was examined and testified 
8 asfo!lows: 
9 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. BECKER: 
11 Q. can you please state your name for the record. 
12 A. Denny Sallaz. 
13 Q. Is that your full name? 
14 A. Close. 
15 Q. What is your full name? 
16 A. Dennis James Sallaz. 
17 Q. Mr. Sallaz --
18 A. Does that sound better? 
19 Q. Mr. Sallaz, I see you brought some documents 
20 up to the -- or the witness stand there. What did you 
21 bring with you? 
22 A. Pardon? 
23 Q. What did you bring with you? 
24 A. Well, I brought my - the first thing I 
25 brought with me is my complaint to the bar about you and 
2 
1 time, then Mr. Becker may get the opportunity to review 
2 some of the complaint and documentation before the bar 
3 association. But until that becomes an issue, let's not 
4 dutter this record at this point in time, Judge. Thank 
5 you. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Well, I agree. Let's 
7 proceed. 
8 MR. BECKER: Fair enough. May I remain at counsel 
9 table here, Your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Oh, certainly. 
11 MR. BECKER: Thank you. 
12 BY MR. BECKER: 
13 Q. Mr. Sallaz, what's your profession? 
14 A. I'm an attorney. 
15 Q. And how long have you been an attorney? 
16 A. In all, probably close to 40 years. 
17 Q. And you were my dient's attorney for 
18 approximately 25 years; correct? 
19 A. No. It was longer than that. 
20 Q. How long do you believe you were my client's 
21 attorney? 
A. Probably 35 years, 40. 
Q. Can you scoot forward? I'm having 
hearing you. And I want to make sure the court n>rmr~c,r 
gets rt down. 




A. Well, I'll just speak up. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I'd be gfad to. 
4 Q. Thank you. And you were my client's personal 
5 attorney; correct? 
6 A. Wen, don't know what you mean by personal. 
7 had half a dozen or a dozen ~ttomeys through this 
8 whole period of time. Attorneys that I've got for him 
9 and some that he's found himself. We were always good 
10 buddies for that 30 years. 
11 Q. So you're contending you were simply his 
12 business attorney? 
13 A. Well, I'm not concerning anything. He's a 
14 good buddy, and I helped him out. He helped me out. We 
15 had a lot of - a whole lot of things together that we 
16 operated and did. 
17 Q. Okay. Now, I understand you were married to 
18 Renee Baird on July 4, 1996? 
19 MR. SMITH: To which, for the record, Judge, I'll 
20 preserve my objection to the term of -- the use of the 
21 word •marriage. r It turns out, in fact, that they were, 
22 according to Oregon law and Idaho law, never married. 
23 Therefore any reference made in this case by any counsel 
24 to either, quote, marriage, end quote, or divorce, 
25 quote, end quote, is merely for convenience. It does 
5 
1 such a certificate issued. Never produced in any court, 
2 not in the court In which they had this purported 
3 divorce. 
4 So that's now on appeal to the Supreme Court. 
5 The magistrate had no jurisdiction, subject matter 
6 jurisdiction from which to undertake the so-called 
7 divorce of a so-called ceremonial marriage July 4, 1996. 
8 I want the record quite clear throughout these 
9 proceedings if that anybody makes any reference to it, 
10 it's solely for convenience, not fur any legal 
11 consequence. It's on appeal to be decided by the Idaho 
12 Supreme Court. 
13 IBE COURT: All right. Mr. Becker, are you 
14 willing to go forward with that, just make that -- that 
15 that is part of the record? That the defendants are 
16 contesting that issue? 
17 MR. BECKER: I understand that there is an appeal 
18 filed. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Alf right. let's proceed. 
20 MR. BECKER: It's --
21 THE COURT; So there's a question. 
22 MR. BECKER: Could you read the question back 
23 before the objection? 
24 TI!E COURT: Why don't you just reask it? 
25 
7 
1 not connote any legal connotation by virtue of that. 
2 Because it's on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
3 I want my objection noted throughout this 
4 entire record. And so any reference by anybody to those 
5 words is merely for convenience, not for the legal 
6 consequence it creates. 
7 THE COURT: All right. And so -- well, you've 
8 objected. But what you're basically saying is 
9 darifying the context in which your dient is going to 
10 respond to that question. 
11 MR. SMITH: That would be correct, Judge. 
12 IBE COURT: Because I think there has been 
13 reference in this case to the fact that that divorce 
14 case is on appeal, and one of the issues is whether or 
15 not there was a marriage. 
16 MR. SMITH: That is correct, Judge. Just so I can 
17 complete the record in that regard, there has never been 
18 in this purported divorce between Ms. Baird and 
19 Mr. Sallaz never any certificate of marriage or marriage 
20 license or matrimonial documentation from any state 
21 anywhere at any time, from any county of any state at 
22 any time. And that's the criteria under Idaho Code for 
23 the creation of a valid marriage, absent of which any 
24 purported attempt at a maniage is void. 
25 So that's where we are at. There's never been 
6 
1 BY MR. BECKER: 
2 Q. Were you married to Renee Baird on July 4, 
3 1996? 
4 A. No. I thought I was. After the divorce was 
5 entered, her girlfriends were talking about how she got 
6 half of my property, she never married me. I sent 
7 letters over to Oregon to find out if it was true, and I 
8 got the reports back that it was absolutely true. So I 
9 -- I wasn't married to her, unfortunately. Or 
10 fortunately, one or the other. 
11 Q. You attended a wedding with Renee Baird on 
12 July 4, 1996; correct? 
13 A. I thought I did. It turned out to be a party. 
14 Q. And you contend the officiant who was at that 
15 wedding wasn't licensed in the state of Oregon; correct? 
16 A. That's exactly what Oregon told me. 
17 MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 134. 
18 (Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
19 BY MR. BECKER: 
Q. Mr. Sallaz, this is defendant Dennis Sallaz's 
supplemental response to plaintiffs' first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production. Do you see 
that? 
A. Yeah. I have it. 
Now, can you tum to page 17 of that document? 
8 
1 Can you see where your name is written below a line with 
2 a signature on it? 
3 A. I do. 
4 Q. Is that your signature? 
5 A. I'm sure it is. 
6 Q. And there's a paragraph above that that's 
7 entitled "Verification." Do you see that? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. And do you agree that when you signed that 
10 document, that paragraph places you under oath; correct? 
11 A. Well, I didn't read it, but that's what my 
12 opinion was. 
13 Q. /ls a lawyer of 40 years? 
14 A. Well, as a man that can read. 
15 Q. And there's a stamp of a notar/ below that. 
16 Do you see that? 
17 A. I do. 
18 Q. Okay. And it's the name says Tracy Brown. 
19 Do you see that? 
20 A. Okay. 
21 Q. Do you see where it says Tracy Brown? 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. Who's Tracy Brown? 




2 MR. BECKER: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: You can inquire of the subject matter 
4 and then, if necessary, refer to the document for 
5 further questions. 
6 MR. BECKER: All right. 
7 BY MR. BECKER: 
8 Q. Can you tum to page -- tum to page 6 first. 
9 Do you see where interrogatory number 9 is? 
10 A. I do. 
11 Q. It says, have you or anyone acting on your 
12 behalf obtained any kind of written, recorded, 
13 stenographically transcribed, oral, or other type of 
14 statement from plaintiffs and/or their employees, 
15 agents, or officers? If so for each statement: State 
16 the date on which the statement was taken, identity of 
17 the person taking the statement, and identify and 
18 produce each statement, whether wril1:en, recorded, or 
19 transcribed. 
20 And you provided an original answer to that 
21 below there. Do you see that? 
22 A. I do. 
23 
24 
Q. TI1en if we can tum 




1 Q. She used to work for you; correct? 
2 A. Oh, yeah. She worked for me for a couple 
3 years. 
4 Q. And she was a notary in your office; correct? 
5 A. Well, she was a notary. She brought her own 
6 notary with her-. Does that make any difference to 
7 0. Do you recall signing this dou.;r,ent? 
8 A. No, I don't. 
9 Q. Would you like to take a minute to review the 
10 document? 
11 A. No. rm - this is my signature. 
12 Q. Okay. And you understand !:hat this -was 
13 discovery responses given in response to requests made 
14 in this case; correct? 
15 A. That's what it says.. 
16 MR. BECKER: Okay. rd move fOf'" the admission of 
17 Exhibit 134. 
18 MR. SMITH: I would object to the admission of 
19 Exhibit 134. It's a hearsay document. In fact, if they 
20 wanted to inquire from it oc through it as to whether or 
21 not he's of the same opinion as to any question there 
22 asked or the ans,ner there given, that's one thing fur 
23 purposes of cross-examination, butt: not fur initial 
24 evidence. 
25 THE COURT: All right. rm going to sustain the 
10 
1 Q. At the - it's the second paragraph there. 
2 Supplemented, colon, answer, colon. It begins with 
3 Dennis Sallaz? 
4 A. Pardon? 
5 Q. The paragraph begins with Dennis Sallaz? 
6 A. That's the first one; right? 
7 Q. It would be the first full paragraph. 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. can you read what that says? 
10 A. Yeah, I read it. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you see v,here it says, Dennis Sallaz 
12 as both the personal and bffiiness attorney for 
13 plaintiffs? 
14 A. I do. 
15 Q. Okay. And, again, you made that statement 
16 underoam? 
17 A. Didn't I tell you that? 
18 Q. So you're my dienfs personal and businESS 
19 attorney for 25 years; correct? 
20 A. Among a fot of other things, yeah. 
21 Absolutely. 




handed to the witness.} 
-. "Ju:11.t:.u-1.l 1:::ugene KJce, ec ar., v. uenn. az, ec ai., l;ase NO. t;V.!W~-1-1lS:>:J 
1 Q. Do you have it in front of you, Mr. Sallaz? 1 A. Where I see Sellers on is on item D. Is that 
2 A I do. 2 the - what you're talking about? 







A A purchase agreement. 
Q. Forwhat? 
A. Property and lLCs. 
Q. Did you draft this document? 
A. Yeah. T'WO or three times. Rice kept having 
me change it. 
10 
11 
Q. And I see it's dated January -- let's see 
here. The fax heading on it that says 4--6-2006. Do you 
12 see that? 
13 MR. SMITH: Well, wait just a moment. He's asking 
14 him to identify it, or is he asking him to read from it? 
15 If he's inquiring as to its contents, we'd better have 
16 it admitted into evidmce first. Otherwise I'm not 
17 quite sure how we're trying to address this exhibit. He 
18 can identify it, lay a foundation for ts admission. 
19 But if he's going to testify from it, it better first be 
20 admitted. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Sustain the objection. 
22 BY MR. BECKER: 
23 Q. Do you see -- let's tum to the third page of 
24 that document, Mr. Sallaz. Do you see where it says 
25 Seller? Sellers? 
13 
1 Q. Now, there's some other pages behind here that 
2 attach some legal descriptions. Do you see that? 
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. Okay. And so I wanted you to take a moment to 
5 review this. But do you believe that this is the true 
6 and accurate copy of the purchase agreement for sale of 
7 interest in the Real Homes, LLC, working --
8 A. As far as I - excuse me. 
9 Q. That we're here about in this case? 
10 A. As far as I know, it certainly is. 
11 MR. BECKER: I move for the admission of 
12 Plaintiffs' Exhiat 41. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Smith? 
14 MR. SMITH: We have no objection to admission of 
15 Exhibit 41. 
16 . T'nE COURT: Mr. Longeteig? 
17 MR. LONGETEIG: No objection. 
18 THE COURT: Exhibit 41 admitted. 
19 (Exhibit 41 admitte-1-) 
20 BY MR. BECKER: 
21 Q. Now, let's tum to page 2. Do you see number 





uuco,.-rc,nl- and agree 
sc-e it says, Sellers represent, 










Q. The signature lines, Mr. Sallaz? 
A. Ohr the signature line. Yeah, see rnv name's 
in p.int. 
Q. And is that your signature? 
A. I'm sure it is. 
Q. And is that Glenn Trefren's signature? 
A. I - I would think so. 
12 Q. Is that Mr. Rice's signature? 
13 A. Well, yeah. I watched him sign it. 
14 Q. Did you watch Glenn Trefren sign it? 
15 A. Well, I can't remember. But I probably did. 
16 I was standing there. 
17 Q. And you were watching him sign it as co-owner; 
18 correct? 
19 A. Absolutely co-owner. 
20 Q. And you watched him sign it on behalf of Real 
21 Homes, LLC? 
22 A. Well, I'm not sure I watched him, but I was 
23 there when it happened. 
24 Q. Was this in your office? 
25 A. That's my recollection that's \'\here we did it. 
14 
1 A. Um-hmm. Yeah, that's what it says. 
2 Q. And you were a seller; correct? 
3 A. Well, I think we've talked about that, and 
4 I've admitted it. 
5 Q. Paragraph A. The ownership interest which is 
6 being sold herein constitute 1 -- 100 percent of the 
7 ownership of Real Homes, LLC. Do you agree that's what 
8 it says? 
9 A. Well, of course. 
10 Q. Okay. Paragraph 8. You're warranting that 
11 you have good and marketable title to the ownership 
12 being sold and transferred hereunder. Do you see that? 
13 A. I don't see anything in there that says 
14 warrant. 
15 Q. Well, paragraph 3. Sellers represent, 
16 warrant, and agree with buyers as foilows, colon; 
17 correct? 
18 A. That's what it says up there. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. Not not in B. 
21 Q. Sellers have good and marketable title to said 
22 ownership interest being sold? 
A.. 
Q. Okay. And you agrre that that's what you 
I 
t::ugene K1ce, e1 a1., v. uenrns .)c.. 
1 A Agree this is what I said. 
2 Q. And you agree that you said you had absolute 
3 right to sell, assign, and transfer the same to buyer? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. free and cfear of all liens, pledges, security 
6 interests, encumbrances, without any breach of any 
7 agreement to which he is a party? 
8 A That's exactly what it says. 
9 Q. Paragraph C Again, you agree you're 
10 warranting the statements in paragraph a 
11 A. I don't understand "warranting," !:mt that's 
12 exactly what I put in there, exactly what I intended to 
13 put in there. 
14 Q. Now, do you contend my clients agreed to all 
15 the essential tenns of this transaction? 
16 A. Yeah. I changed it two or three times for 
17 things that he wants and didn't want in there. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. And this is the final -- the finale. 
20 Q. Now, earlier we had talked about the fax 
21 heading date. It says April 6, 2006. Do you see that? 
22 A Where are you looking? 
23 Q. At the top of each page. 
24 A. Oh. Now, what's your question? 
25 Q. Do you see the fax heading at the top of the 
17 
1 Do you see that? 
2 A Yeah. 
3 Q. Who is Millis Anderson? 
4 A. Millis Anderson was a legal assistant for the 
5 firm for many years. 
6 Q. It says a legal assistant to Dennis J. Sallaz, 
7 attorney at law. Do you see that on the signature line? 
8 A. Sure. 
9 Q. Okay. Was she your legal assistant? 
10 A. No. The whole firm, she took care of very 
11 well. 
12 Q. And on the lower left, a little bit below the 
13 signature, do you see where it says DJS/MA? 
14 A. Yes, I do. 
15 Q. Okay. DJS, that's your initials; correct? 
16 A It certainly is. 
17 Q. Okay. And slash MA, that's Millis Anderson; 
18 correct? MA? 
19 A. Well, I would sure think that's what is, 
20 but I -- I didn't do it. 
21 Q. Okay. We've got that fax header up at the top 
22 of the page again. Do you see that? 
23 Yeah. 
24 Q_ Is that your fax line for the firm? 
page? 1 
2 A You're talking about the date and the time and 
3 - or fax and whatever? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A. That's what It says. 
6 Do 'fOU! recognize that fax 
7 A. Yeah. Tnat wouid be a fax number to my 
8 office. 
9 Q. Okay. And next --
10 A. From my office. 
11 Q. Next -- sorry. 
12 A. To or from my office. 
13 Q. That's y001r office fax number? 
14 A. It is. 
15 Q. And it says Sallaz & Gatewood law next to it? 
16 A. Yeah. 
17 Q. Okay. And your contention is that my dien:t 
18 was shown all three of these pages at the time he signed 
19 this on Jarmairy 6, 2006, aliegedly? 
20 A. Several times. 
21 MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 42. 
22 (Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
23 BY MR. BECKER: 
24 Q. Mr. Sallaz, I've handed you a January 17, 
25 2000, letter on Sallaz & Gatewood Olartered letterhead. 
18 
1 Q. Sallaz & Gatewood law is written next to the 
2 fax header? 
3 A. Pardon? 
4 Q. Salnaz & Gatewood law is written nexl: to the 
5 rax header? 




Q. And the date is Janu:ary 16, 2007? 
A Yeah. 
Q. On the fax header? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As well as the date of the letter? 
10 
11 
12 A No, it's not the date of the fetter. 
13 Q. January 17, 2007's the actual date of the 
14 letter? 
15 A. Yeah. 
16 Q. Okay. Now, the letter appears to be written 
17 to Roy Rice. Do you see that? 
1S A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. The same Roy ruce that we've been 
20 talking about? 
21 A. You asked that question. Of course it is. 
22 Jeez. let's get on with this. 
23 Q. Okay. Now, says, dear Roy and Janet 





1 Have you met her? 
2 Q. It says here in closing, Real Properties, LLC, 
3 managing member Janet Rice. Do you see that? 
4 A. Yeah, I see it. I don·t know w-haf: it means. 
5 let's tum to the next page. 
6 Um-hmm. 
7 Okay. It says it's the articles of 
8 organization for a limited lfability company? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 And it says the initial registered office is 
11 at 1000 South Roosevelt? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Is that your home address? 
14 A. My office address. 
15 Q. Also your home; correct? 
16 A. No. Technically it's not the same number. 
17 Q. But it's the same building? 
18 A. Yeah. The same office. 
19 Q. And the initial registered agent is Dennis J. 
20 Sallaz; correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And the company -- the limited 
23 liability company that these articles are refening to 
24 is Real Properties, llC. Do you see that? 
25 A. Yes. 
21 
1 Yeah, that's exactly what it is. 
2 Q. And there's a signature on that document. Do 
3 you see it? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. It says Dennis J. Sallaz typed below that 
6 signature? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Do you agree that's your signature? 
9 A Sure. 
10 MR. SMITH: let me renew my objection, Judge. 
11 Either we're going to introduce the exhibit if we're 
12 going to later testify from it, or we're just going to 
13 fay a foundation and stop going through it. One of the 
14 two. 
15 So I wouid object to the line of questioning, 
16 the format it's been, and encourage counsel to either 
f7 move for its admission or just lay further foundation 
18 without trying to get testimony as to the content of the 
19 exhibit if he's not intending to use it as an exhibit. 
!O THE COURT: Okay. Sustained. 
!1 MR. BECKER: Well, I move for the admission of 
~2 Exhibit 1L 
'.3 MR. SMITH: We stipulate to its admission. 
:4 
5 
THE COURT: Mr. longeteig? 
MR. LONGETEIG: 
1 Q. Now, it says management is vested in members. 
2 Do you see that check? 
3 MR. SMITH: Judge, let me inquire. Are we laying 
4 a foundation for its admission, or are we trying to 
5 examine the document which for itself? 
6 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to sustain the 
7 objection in that if -- Mr. Becker, if you're going to 
8 have the witness go through and testify about the 
9 document, you need to have the document introduced in 
10 evidence. 
11 MR. SMITH: I'm trying to be patient about all 
12 this, but I'll let the court make a determination how 
13 best to proceed. 
14 BY MR. BECKER: 
15 Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page there, we've 
16 got Millis M. Anderson; correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. And, again, that's your office 
19 assistant, former office assistant; correct? 
20 A. For the thin:I time, she's been with me for 
21 years, and she's -- was a wonderful person. 
22 Q. The third page of that document appears to be 
23 an annual report form; correct? Do you see that? 
24 A. Well, I'm not sure what it is. I'm looking at 
25 it.. 
22 
1 THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 42 is admitted. 
2 (Exhibit 42 admitted.) 
3 BY MR. BECKER: 
4 Q. Okay. So let's tum to page 2 of Exhibit 42, 
5 Mr. Sallaz. Do you see the number 4? And it says, 
6 management of the limited liability company is vested 
7 in? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. Okay. And you see where it says members? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And would you agree that that is a typed check 
12 mark? 
13 A. I don't have any idea how it was put there, 




Q. You agree that it's typed and not handwritten? 
A. Well, this copy is certainly not handwritten. 
Q. Okay. Do you believe -- strike that. 
18 Now, the next pc1ragraph says, if management is 
19 to be vested in one or more managers, list the names and 
20 addresses of at least one initial manager. If 
21 management is vested in the members, list the names and 
22 addresses of at least one initial member. And you see 
23 the name Janet Rice; correct? 
24 
this document? 
1:::ugene KJce, et a,., v. uenrns ~- aL, t,;ase NO. t,;vzuu~-11tl!)!) 
1 A. Well, Roy and I prepared it. This is what he 1 Q. Exhibit 42, I believe. 
2 wanted. I put it together. 
3 Q. And you agree that it was filed with the Idaho 
4 secretary of state on January 4, 2006; correct? 
5 A. Well, I didn't do it, but it's stapled that 
6 way, and I have no reason to - to deny it. But I -- I 
7 nothing to do with filing it. 
8 Q. Who do you contend filed it? 
9 A. Weir, either Roy or somebody out of my office. 
10 Q. Millis? 
11 A. Prnbably. Or possibly. She usuaUy didn't go 
12 to town, but who knows. Somebody sure got it to town. 
13 Q. Okay. And so Real Properties, LLC, it appears 
14 that it was filed effective January 4, 2006; agreed? 
15 A. I agree everything that's on this document. 
16 Q. And the Exhibit 41 we were talking about 
17 earlier was dated January 6, 2006; correct? 
18 A. Well, if you say so. I don't have it 
19 MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 41. 
20 (Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
21 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 6th day of January 2006. 
22 BY MR. BECKER: 
23 Q. Okay. And you see on the signature page on 
24 page 3? 



























Q. Okay. Now, this document, one of the 
properties that you were selling in there was Riverside 
lot 1B; correct? 
MR. SMITH: To which I object, Judge. Nowhere in 
this document does this purchase agreement convey real 
property. It only conveys ownership interest in Real 
Homes, LLC. So I object to the fonn of the question. 
It misstates the content of the document currently in 
evidence as Exhibit 41. 
THE COURT: Mr. Becker, your response? 
MR. BECKER: My response is Mr. Sallaz confirmed 
that Exhibit 41 was the agreement he executed, and this 
was the full and complete copy. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, what's your 
objection? Because it looks like to me that on page 1 
of Exhibit 41 --
MR. SMITH: What that document purports to do is 
sell the ownership interest of 5al!az and Trefren to the 
buyer, being Real Homes, LLC. That's what it does. It 
does not convey any real property interest. 
MR. BECKER: I'm looking at paragraph 3, 
Your lfonor.. 
THE COURT: Right. 


















































rm sorry. 41. You have that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. And on page 3 where it says Buyer? 
A. Page 3? 
Q. Page 3 of Exhibit 41. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you see the signature line where it says 
Buyer? And you see where Eugene L Rice has signed; 
correct? 
A. Ido. 
Q. Okay. And it says By manager? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And that's manager of Real Properties, LlC? 
A. Well, buyer and manager, I guess you co1.dd 
say. 
Q. Of Real Properties, LlC? 
A. Right. One says buyer, and then the signature 
says manager. I don't - that's what it says. 
Q. Underneath Real Properties, LLC? 
A. Is where he signed as manager. 
Q. Okay. And on the first page of that document, 
the first paragraph, do you see at the end of the first 
paragraph where it refers to Real Properties, LLC, as 
the buyer? 
26 
MR. SMITH: Is he back on the warranties? 
MR. BECKER: I'm on page 1, Mr. Smith. 
THE COURT: No. This is the -- under the 
witnesses. 
MR. BECKER: Whereas. 
THE COURT: Whereas. Not the first paragraph but 
the 5,_oeond. It Is the mutual desire of the parties 
hereto that seller shall sell to the buyer all of the 
ownership interest and all right, title, and interest in 
and to all real property owned by Real Homes, UC, as 
set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto. 
All right. I'm going to overrule the 
objection. Because at a minimum I think there's at 
least some ambigu!ty here that I've got to sort through. 
BY MR. BECKER: 
Q. Now, Mr. Sallaz, one of the parcels you 
induded in this agreement was Riverside lot 18; 
correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Now, you daim that that was that Riverside 
lot lB was sold on January 6, 2006; rorrect? To Real 
Properties? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, presentiy that's your ex-wife's house; 
f 
11/21/2013 
1 A. Parnon? 
2 Q. That's your ex-wife's house? 
3 A. Well, it's Renee's house. 
4 Q. Okay. Now -
5 Well, I guess -
6 Q. There's no question before you, Mr. Sallaz. 
7 Now, on this -- in connection with this 
8 trcmsaction, you received some money from my client; 
9 correct? 
10 A. Welf, I got - let's see. He gave me five 
11 g,and as a prepay. That's the only money that I can 
12 remember ever getting. 
13 MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 39. 
14 {Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
15 BY MR. BECKER: 
16 Q. Mr. Sallaz, I've just handed you an April 4, 
17 2006, letter, again on your letterhead. Do you see 
18 that? 
19 A. Well, yeah. 
20 Q. And in the lower left comer, again, we have 
21 DJS/MA? Do you see that? 
22 A. Where's that at? 
23 Q. In the lower left. In the middle, middle of 
24 the page. 
25 A. What's your question? 
29 
1 fetter and the date, Mr. Becker, for clarity of the 
2 record, please. 
3 BY MR. BECKER: 
4 Q. Do you recall writing the April 4, 2006, 
5 letter which encloses the documents behind that? 
6 A. No, I don't remember it. I see it here, but I 
7 don't remember it. 
8 Q. You don't remember sending this letter to Jim 
9 Rennell? 
10 A. No, I don't remember It. I certainly could 
11 have done it 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. But I -- you asked me if I remember it:. I 
14 don't. 
i5 Q. Well, let's tum to the second page, then. Do 






regarding a foreclosure? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. You were in negotiations with the 
attorney for Saxton Fruit Farms; correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. that was White Peterson? 
1 Q. Do you see where it says DJS/MA? 
2 A. Oh, down at the very bottom? 
3 Q. Yes. 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. Okay. initials and Millis 
6 Ande-sor."s initials; correct? 
7 A. That's what I would think. 
8 Q. And you see this letter is enclosing some 
9 documents with it. Do you see that? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And then there's some pages behind this 
12 letter. Why don't you rake a minute to flip through 
13 those and see that. 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Do you recall writing this letter? 
16 A. Which one? 
17 Q. Exhibit 39. 
18 MR. SMITH: Well, for the record, there's not less 
19 than four letters reflected in Exhibit 39. So if he can 
20 be more specific in laying a foundation which letter 
21 he's referring to. 
22 BY MR. BECKER: 
23 Q. Mr. Sallaz, you wrote this letter --
24 THE COURT: Now, just a second. I -- Mir. Smith is 
25 correct. So make sure you make reference to which 
30 
1 A. Well, we had -- we were dealing with two 
2 attorneys. 
3 Q. Jill Holinka and Kevin Dinius? 
4 A. Very likely. 
5 Q. And do you recall requesting what the total 
6 payoff amount was for the Saxton note? 
7 A. No, but I'm sure I did. 
8 Q. Does the number $63,4-02.82 sound familiar? 
9 A. Well, that'd be -- that'd be right- real 
10 dose. And obviously when he sent this,. i.t was the 
11 exact amount. 
12 Q. Let's tum to page 3, a January 6, 2006, 
13 letter, again on your letterhead. Do you see that? 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Q. The same day as the other two - rm sorry. 
16 As the previous letter; correct? 
17 A. Whatever. Yes. 
i 8 Q. There's a signeture that page. Do you see 
19 that7 
20 A. Ido. 
21 Q. Is that your signat1_;re? 
22 A. I'm sure it is. 
A. 'Neil, there was two of them, but he was one of 23 Q. And do you see where you're demanding what the 
'.4 them. of price is Saxton note in 




A. Yeah, I see that right here . 
Q. Do you recall doing that? 
A. WeUr no. rm sure I did. 
4 Q. Did you pay off that amount? 
5 A. Roy Rice paid off that amount buying the 
6 property. 
7 Q. let's look at the last page of that exhibit. 
8 
9 
Do you see the dollar amount on that cashier's check? 
A. I do. 







A. The same amount they told us it was. 
Q. And you agree you received that from my 
client? 
MR. SMITH: Judge, let me inquire. Are we laying 
a foundation, or are we going to testify from Exhibit 
No. 39? I would object to the line of question until 
17 it's admitted. Or are we just laying foundation? What 
18 are we doing? 
19 MR. BECKER: And, Your Honor, I understand that 
20 I'm going a little -- to be a little more thorough on 
21 some of these, but I think Mr. Sallaz is demonstrating 
22 some difficulty here. 
23 And so part of laying the foundation on 
24 fetters with exhibits, I think, based on the answers 
25 I've gotten thus far, I need to go through some of these 
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1 MR. SMITH: No objection to the admission of 
2 Exhibit 39. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Longeteig? 
4 MR. LONGETEIG: No objection. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 39 admitted. 
6 (Exhibit 39 admitted.) 
7 MR. BECKER: Let's hand the witness Exhibits 149 
8 to 152. 
9 MR. SMITH: You want Exhibits 149 through 152? 
10 MR. BECKER: Yeah. They're all quitclaim deeds. 
11 I think he's referring with his client to see 
12 if we can eliminate some paperwork, to see if we can 
13 either agree on something or use their version if they 
14 prefer. 
15 (Exhibits handed to the witness.) 
16 MR. BECKER: So we're going to use our exhibits, 
17 Mr. Smith? 
18 MR. SMITH: Let's work from yours initially. 
19 MR. BECKER: Okay. 
20 BY MR. BECKER: 
Q. Mr. Sallaz --21 
22 THE COURT: Let's wait until they get all of the 
I t.'link they're still working on th2t. 
LONGETEIG: One more to go, 
COURT: right. I think -- have we 
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the 
1 exhibits with hi o lay that foundation. 
2 MR. SMITH: Well, the truth is he's trying to have 
3 him testify from the document before it's admitted into 
4 evidence. 
5 THE COURT: Right. I'm going to sustain the 
6 objection. Because when you said -- your last question, 
7 what was the amount of the check for. So that's 
8 testifying from the document as opposed to laying the 
9 foundation for the document So sustain the objection. 
10 BY MR. BECKER: 
11 Q. Do you recall this cashiers check that's on 
12 page 4? 
13 A. Well, I don·t recall it, but here it is. 
14 Q. Do you recall a cashier's check was sent --
15 A. Sure. 





19 A. Yes. I absolutely remember it. Rice had 
20 given It to me to deliver to this attorney for his 
21 purchase of the properties. And I don't know who 
22 delivered the check for him. Maybe he did. But that's 
23 what was done at everybody's agreement. 
24 MR. BECKER: I move for the admission of 
25 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 39. 
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1 exhibits out now? 
2 MR. LONGETEIG: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. You may inquire. 
4 BY MR. BECKER: 
5 Q. Do you see Exhibit 149 in front of you, 
6 Mr. Sallaz? 
7 A. I do. 
8 Q. What is that? 
9 A. It appears to be a quitclaim deed from Gfenn 
10 Trefren. 
11 Q. And what's the date of that quitclaim deed? 
12 A. January 6, '06. 
13 Q. And who is the grantor? 
14 A. Welf, Glenn Trefren. 
15 Q. And who's the grantee? 
16 
17 
A. Real Properties. 
Q. LLC? 
18 A. Yeah. 
19 Q. And in the witneSs statement there, do you see 
20 where it refers to 714 Smith Avenue? 
A. Yeah. 21 
22 Q_ And that was one of the properties that you 











On January 6, 2006? 




4 And on the next page there, we have a notary 
5 stamp. Do you see that? 
6 Ido. 
7 And what's the name on that notary stamp? 
a A. Notary public for Idaho. 
9 Q. Whose name? 
10 A. Oh. Minis Anderson. 
11 Q. Do you see on the front page of this document 
12 where it stamps that it's recorded? 
13 A. Ido. 
14 Q. And what's the date on that? Is it March 2, 
15 2006? 
16 A. Well, it's a little blurry, but I think that's 
17 E"ight. Mine's a little blurry. 
18 Q. Do you recall this quitdaim deed? 
19 A. Well, I don't recall it. 
20 Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Glenn 
21 Trefren did not execute this quitdaim deed? 
22 A. Not at all. 
23 MR. BECKER: Move for the admission of 149. 
24 MR. SMITH: The document as such, Judge, is not a 
25 certified copy of a recordation with the Canyon County 
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1 Q. And turning to the second page, do you see a 
2 signature? 
l A. Yes. 
4 
5 
Q. Is that your signature? 
A. Absolutely. 
6 MR. BECKER: Move for the admission of Plaintiffs' 
7 Exhibit No. 1. 
8 MR. SMITH: Unless they can demonstrate that this 
9 is somebody's business record, it contains hearsay, and 
10 therefore I'm going to object to the admission of 
11 Exhibit 1. 
12 MR. BECKER: Your Honor, this is --
13 THE COURT: He's acknowledged that that's his 
14 signature and --
15 MR. SMITH: He indeed does. I don't see the 
16 relevancy -- the question is did he encourage this suit 
17 to be filed. So if we want to get into the suit being 
18 fifed, we're going to open the door that, in fact, 
19 Mr. Becker and Mr. Runft were the attorneys for 
2.0 Mr. Sallaz and Mr. Rice and, if necessary, Mr. Trefren. 
!1 I'm trying to keep the door somewhat from becoming ajar. 
!2 So I think it's irrelevzmt to the Count V. 
~3 If this court wants to let it in, I can only 
!4 say you've expanded the context of this So I'll 
!5 let the court first if 
1 recorder's office. It rould come in as a business 
2 record if, in fact, there was a foundation laid that 
l this is somebody's business record. Also they could lay 
4 further foundation to that effect. 
6 MR. BECKER: You can take -- we don't need those 
7 exhibits anymore if that's how Mr. Sallaz is going to 
8 handle the situation. 
9 MR. SMITH: I can't -- I couldn't understand you 
10 or hear you. 
11 MR. BECKER: I said Mr. Sallaz does not need to --
12 we can move on from those exhibits. 
13 MR. SMITH: Oh. 
14 BY MR. BECKER: 
15 Q. Mr. Sallaz, you instructed my clients to sue 
16 you, Mr. Trefren, and Renee; correct? 
17 A. No. Absolutely not correct. 
18 MR. BECKER: can we hand the witness Exhibit 1. 
19 (Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
20 BY MR. BECKER: 
21 Q. Mr. Sallaz, I'm handing you a January 8, 2009, 
22 letter, again on your letterhead. Do you see that? 
23 A. I do. 
24 Q. Is that your letterhead? 
25 A. It is. 
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1 If Mr. Becker is -- reflecting upon what I 
2 just said, is insistent that it be admitted -- if you 
3 want it in --
4 
5 
MR. BECKER: I do. 
IBE COURT: Well, it doesn't have to be qualified 
6 as a business record. Yeah. He's moved the admission. 
7 Mr. Sallaz has testified that that's his signature. And 
8 it's on his letterhead. It could be an admission of a 
9 party. It coufd come in under that. And so I'm going 
10 to admit Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
11 As far as the other, you know, ethical issues, 
12 that's something that really is separate and apart, 
13 Mr. Becker. That's your choice. 
14 MR. BECKER: I don't --
15 TrlE COURT: Because I don't necessarily -- i know 
16 there was an issue earlier on in this. But I haven't 
17 been aware of any other things since that time, and so 
18 I'm not in a position to really sort it out. Okay. 
19 (Exhibit 1 
20 BY MR. BECKER: 
21 Q. Now, Mr. Sallaz, this --
22 So it's <3dmitted? 
23 THE COURT: It is admitted. 
BY MR. BECKER: 
1::ugene race, et al., v. uenrns :sa1, at, case No. CV-LUU!J-11355 11!21r.l013 
1 Do you see where it says in the last two-line paragraph 1 A. Okay. Let's -
2 there, both Trefren and myself are willing and 2 Q. And we're in a lawsuit today; correct? 
3 supporting defendants and stand ready to participate to 3 A. Of course. 
4 the max? Do you see that? 4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. I sure do. 5 A. I've been invited. 
6 
7 
And you wrote 











Q. Okay. Now, the main target of this lawsuit 
that you instructed Mr. Rice to file was --
MR. SMITH: Now, wait a moment. I'm going to 
object to the form of that question. But, firstly, "the 
main target of this lawsuit." He hasn't defined a 
lawsuit. Secondly, he instructed Mr. Rice to file. So 
I'm going to object to the form of the question as a 
compound question. It's assuming facts yet not in 
evidence. 
17 THE COURT: Sustained. 
18 BY MR. BECKER: 
19 Q. We're here in a lawsuit today; correct? 
20 A. I deny that it's a valuable one. 
21 What's your next question? 
22 Q. We're in a courtroom today. Correct, 
23 Mr. Sallaz? 
24 A. Absolutely. Don't you know that? 
25 Q. I do. 
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1 BY MR. BECKER: 
2 Q. Mr. Sallaz, I've handed you an affidavit of 
3 Dennis J. Sallaz in support of motion to disqualify 
4 J. Kahle Becker from further representation of 
5 plaintiffs. Do you see that? 
6 A. I do. 
7 Q. And on the page 6 of that document there's a 
8 signature. Do you see that? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Is that your signature? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And do you see the signature below that where 
13 it says Keli M. Walts? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Is she an employee at your law office? 
16 A. She is. 
17 Q. She's a notary? She's a notary? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you recall making this affidavit? 
20 A. Yeah. I recall when we did it. 
21 MR. BECKER: Okay. Move for the admission of 
22 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 71. 
This is, Your Honor, becoming an issue 
the representation of Mr. Becker 1n 
purposes of what I believe Sallaz 
6 Q. And Renee Baird party to this lawsuit at 
7 one time; correct? 






Q. And you're a party to this lawsuit; correct? 
A. Well, yeah. But I need to explain that. 
Q. When there's a question in front of you, 
perhaps you can. 
A. If I get a good question£ ru answer it right 
14 immediately. 
15 MR. BECKER: Can we hand the witness Exhibit 102. 
16 (Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
17 MR. BECKER: This could be the wrong one. I 
18 apologize. 
19 MR. SMITH: The wrong one? 
20 MR. BECKER: Yeah. I'm sorry. We have a few 
21 affidavits in this case. 
22 Yeah. The exhibit's labeled wrong, and I 
23 apologize to the court and to opposing counsel. 
24 
25 
can we hand the witness Exhibit 71. 
(Exhibit handed to the witness.) 
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1 may prefer to have in the record of this case, it might 
2 be appropriate then for me to stipulate to the admission 
3 of Exhibit 71 concerning Mr. Sallaz's initial concern 
4 about the representation of Mr. Kahle in this case 
5 ongoing and the continuing ongoing representation. 
6 So because it's already been made earlier in a 
7 form of a motion in this case, we have no objection to 
8 it being made now an exhibit in the evidence presented 
9 to the court. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Longeteig? 
11 MR. LONGETEIG: No objection. 
12 THE COURT: Exhibit 71 admitted. 
13 (Exhibit 71 admitted.) 
14 BY MR. BECKER: 
15 Q. Let's tum to page 3 of Exhibit 71, 
16 Mr. Sallaz. 






MR. SMITH: Page what? 
MR. BECKER: Page 3. 
MR. SMITH: In the affidavit? 
MR. BECKER: Yes. 
MR. SMITH: 
BY MR. BECKER: 









Mr. Sallaz, on page 3? 
A. I remember it well. 
Okay. You agree that you provided facts that 
were used in preparing a complaint; correct? 
A. We!lr I expand that to include many, many 
6 Mr. Runft filed this action with your 
7 You wo,ked on it diligently. 
8 Q. Can you please respond to the question? 
9 A. I thought I did. 
10 Q. Did you assist with providing facts that were 
11 used in preparing the complaint? 
12 A. Of course. Plus a lot of other things. 
13 MR. BECKER: Let's hand the witness Exhibit 134. 
14 You can keep that affidavit in support of the 
15 motion to disqualify. We'll be coming back to it. 
16 MR. LONGETEIG: 134 is already in? 
17 MR. BECKER: 134 is in, I believe. It is not 
18 admitted yet? 
19 THE COURT: Sue, is 134 in? 
20 THE CLERK: No. You sustained the objection. You 
21 sustained the objection. They moved to admit earlier, 
22 but you sustained the objection. 
23 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
24 MR. LONGETEIG: I thought it's already in. 
. 25 
1 
THE COURT: There was a motion to admit it, 
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Q. You've also had other attorneys of record in 
2 this case; correct? 
3 A. I'm sure I have. 
4 Q. Well, Mr. Smith is sitting here right now? 
5 A. I'm sure he is. 
6 Q. He's your attorney of record; correct? 
7 A. I'm sure he is. 
8 Q. Is that a yes or no? 
9 A. Yes or no? 
10 MR. LONGETEIG: I thought he said yes. 
11 TI-IE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Longeteig. 
12 BY MR. BECKER: 
13 Q. He's your attorney of record; correct? 
14 TI-IE COURT: We'll wait for you to was that an 
i5 objection? 
16 MR. LONGETEIG: No. 
17 TilE COURT: Okay. 
18 
19 
MR. LONGETEIG: Observation. 
MR. BECKER: Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: I'm sure that's -- I'm not sure that 
?1 that's permitted under the rules, but whatever. 
~2 BY MR. BECKER: 
~3 Q. Ycu also had Ray Schild as an attorney of 
!4 record in this case; correct? 
Did! 
1 objection to it, and I sustained the objection. 
2 MR. LONGETEIG: Okay. 
TI-IE COURT: At that point. 3 
4 MR. SMITH: All right. We have it. 
5 BY MR. BEC.<ER: 
6 Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Sallaz? 
7 A. I do. 134? 
8 Q. Yes. 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. And these are discovery responses provided by 
11 you; correct? 
12 A. That's what it fooks like. 
13 Q. In this case; correct? 
14 A. That's what it looks like. 
15 Q. Do you have any reason to believe it's not? 
16 A. Well, I haven't looked at every page. 
17 Q. If you'd like to take a minute to do so, 
18 please go right ahead. 
19 A. I'm su,e this is -- this is what I had. 
20 Q. And you signed it under oath? 
21 A. :rm sure I did. 
22 Q. And Scott Gatewood was your attorney of 
23 record; correct? 
24 A. Well, I'm not sure about that. Yeah. I saw 
25 that in here . 
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1 Q. Have Ray Schild? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Now, if we could tum to interrogatory number 
4 7? 
5 MR. SMIDi: In this exhibit? 
6 MR. BECKER: In this exhibit. 
7 BY MR. BECKER: 
8 Q. Do you see that at the bottom of page 5? And 
9 then the answer continues on to page 6. 
10 A. It does. 
11 Q. It asks for any communications you've had with 
12 plaintiffs. 
13 A. It's what? 
14 Q. It asks for any communications you've had. 
15 A. Yeah. 




Now, in your supplemented answer, you state 
that you have numerous you've h;:id numerous and 
ongoing communication with his 
20 John Runft and Kahle Becker, concerning all facts and 
issues in this case as well as the pleadings filed 
Do you see that? 
A. Yeah. 
Do you agree 
Eugene Rice, et at, v. Dennis 5a .. at, Case No. GV2009-11355 11lT~1TL013 
1 statement. 





both of plaintiffs' attorneys in both person and via 
telephone conversations with information regarding the 
issues involved in this litigation, both prior to this 
action having been filed and up to the point where they 
7 breached their agreement with defendants and filed the 




Do you agree with that statement? 
A. I didn't find it in here. What -- where is 
that? 
12 Q. It's the next sentence in that same 
13 supplemented answer to interrogatory number 7 on page 6. 
14 A. Oh, okay, Absolutely. Did you say do I admit 
15 that or - what are you asking? 
16 Q. Do you agree with the full supplemented answer 
17 to interrogatory number 7 as it's reflected on page 6 
18 of--
19 A. Yeah. I absolutely confirm everything in this 
20 answer. And it should be another three or four pages 
21 long. 
22 Q. And, again, you're referring to Plaintiffs' 
23 Exhibit 134? 
24 A. I sure am. 
25 MR. BECKER: Move for the admission of Plaintiffs' 
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1 Q. Affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz, page 5? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. And do you see the third paragraph therB? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. It says, in reviewing the discovery requests 
6 of Mr. Becker, I found numerous interrogatories and 
7 requests for admission directly related to the specific 
8 information I provided to them in meetings I had with 
9 Mr. Becker and -- I'm sorry Mr. Runft and Mr. Becker 
10 over the year we were working together? 
11 A. I certainly remember every bit of it. 
12 Q. And you agree with that statement? 
13 A. Yes. And more. This is brief. 
14 Q. You understand my dients have settled with 
15 Renee Baird; correct? 
16 A. I found out after it happened, after he told 
17 me that he was getting out of the case with you because 
18 of the terrible breach of all - all of the rules and 
19 regulations of attorney actions. 
20 Q. You understand my clients settled with Renee 
21 Baird; yes? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. You understand they settled with Real 
24 
25 
Homes, LLC; correct? 
A. I think they wern 
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with 
1 Exhibit 134. 





MR_ SMITH: Once again, as I did before, I object 
to the admission of the filing of the response to 
requests for productions or for interrogatories. They 
can e.xamine from them, but they're not, as a 
7 document basically they're hearsay. 
8 So rm going -- I have no problem having him 
cross-examine or examine as an adverse witness 
Mr. Sallaz, but I've got to continue my objection, as r 
have before, to its admission as such. 
12 THE COURT: Sustained_ 
13 BY MR. BECKER: 
14 Q. let's tum to Exhibit 71. 
15 A. I have it 
16 Q. And that is, again, an affidavit in support of 
17 rr.otion to disqualify J. Kahle Becker from further 
18 representation of plaintiffs? 
19 A. It sure is. 
20 Q. Can I have you tum to page 5? 
21 A. Well, there's a whole bunch of pages here. 
22 Page 5 of - the first page 5? 
23 Q. I only have one page 5, Mr. Sallaz. 
24 A. Well, I have one right in front of me. 
25 Affidavit. Page 5. 
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1 everybody. I don't know who all was involved in their 
2 - in their fraud. 
3 Q. You contend the settlement was a fraud? 
4 A. Absolutely. 
5 Q_ And you contend that you should ilave had input 
6 in that settlement? 
1 A. More than that. Much more than - to stop is 
8 what I needed to have the information of, fmm my 
9 attorney. It was done before he ever called me. Then 
10 he apologized because she - Rice had double-crossed 
11 him. And he was really sick about it, and he was 
12 getting out of the case, taking you with him. That's 
13 exactly what he tofd me. 
14 MR. BECKER: I'd move to strike that statement as 
15 hearsay. 
16 THE WITNESS: I'll bet you do. It's --
17 MR. SMITH: Well, it's not-- it's a response to 
18 the question asked, and he doesn't like the answer he 
19 got. But it's not hearsay_ It's response to a 
20 dialogue about what he was told about the settlement. 
21 THE COURT: Okay_ I'm granting the motion to 
22 strike_ It's not relevant. 
23 BY MR. BECKER: 
24 
25 
Q. let's tum to go back 
can tum to page 13. 
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Exhibit 134. If 
are 
11/21/2013 Eugene Rice, et al., v. Dennis et al., Case No. CY.2000-11855 
1 THE COURT: What exhibit are you on now? 
2 MR. BECKER: 134. These are Dennis Sal!az's 
3 responses to plaintiffs' first set of 
4 interrogatories, requests for production. There appear 
5 to be responses to requests for admission inducted in 
6 there as welL 
7 BY MR. BECKER: 
8 Q. Mr. Sailaz, you never filed a counterclaim in 
9 this action; correct? 
10 A. I don't have a due if I did or didn't. I 
11 assume I -- I assume I would have. 
12 Q. There's no counterclaim presently before the 
13 court, is there, on your behalf? 
14 A. I don't know that one way or the other, 
15 frankly. Ask my attorney. 
16 Q. Well, do you feel you're suing my clients in 
17 this case? 
18 A. r should be. But you'll have to ask my 
19 attorney if I am. 
20 Q. Do you recall signing a counterclaim? 































A. I signed so many documents in this case that I 
-- it certainly could be there. 
Q. Are you suing Renee Baird in this case right 
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Q. Well, that's what attorneys do is they take 
care of their clients; right? 
A. That's the name of the game. Some attorneys 
don't do that. 
Q. It's unfortunate when that happens. 
A. I felt that unfortune for three or four years 
now with you and your coun!er-attorney. 
Q. Turning to page 13 of Exhibit 134, there's a 
request for admission number 15. Do you see that? 
A. I sure do. Did you say 17? 
Q. I said 15. 
A. Oh, excuse me. 
Q. It's at the top of page 13. 
A Yeah, I have it here. 
Q. And the request for admission states, admit 
Real Properties, LLC, expended $63,402.82 to prevent the 
foreclosure of 5580 [sic] Riverside Road, Canyon County, 
Idaho. Do you see that? 
A. I certainly do. 
Q. Do you see your response? 
A. I certainly do. 
Q. And it says admitted? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you agree with that? 
Su,e. He it so he could buy 
1 now? 
2 A. Weli# I thought I was. 
3 Q. Have you signed any crn.m1ten:ianms against 
4 Renee Baird at this point in this rase? 
5 A. WeHr I certainly thought rve sued her 
6 these cases. It's still pem!ing, going en. So if it's 
7 specific to this ca~ you'd have to ask my attorney. 
8 Q. Sitting here right now, are you able Ito say 
9 definitively whether Olf not you are suing mrnugh a 
10 counterdaim my dients? 
11 A. I told you I can't answer that question 
12 because I really don't know. There's so damned many 
13 documents filed and counter-documents and - I don't 
14 know. 
15 Q. I'll reprE:Sent to you that there is no 
16 counterdaim asserted by you against my dients night 
17 now. 
18 A. Then let's go on. 
19 Q. Do you agree with that? 
20 A. What did I just tell you? I don't know. And 
21 that's a fact. 
22 Q. And you're an attorney of 40 years? 
23 A. I'm a defendant sitting here with my attorneys 
24 taking care of me. And they've taken good care of me. 




























Q. And that was given under oath? 
A. What? 
Q. That admission. 
A. :r signed it,. didn't I? 
Q. Under oath. 
A. We've talked about that Of course it was 
under oath. 
MR. BECKER: Your Honor, rd move for the limited 
admission of Exhibit 134 regarding the specific answers 
that were provided in the discovery responses. 
MR. SMirn: With all due respect, I will continue 
my objection as it has been. I see nothing different 
where we're at. The rules of discovery haven't changed. 
The rules of evidence haven't changed. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SMirn: He can cross-examine him all cay long 
on the document, go through each one if he wishes_ I 
guess in that sense he can try to get it in. he's 
not otherwise going to get it into this rec.,m:I. 
THE COURT: Sust.-ained. 
MR~ BECKER: \Ve have no further questions for 
witness. 
THE COURT: 
t al., Case No. CV2009-11855 
1 of Mr. Sallaz in our case in chief. I do not desire to 
2 at this point, as you say, to cross-examine him. He was 
3 called as an adverse witness in this case. I reserve my 
4 to examine him in my direct examination --
5 THE COURT: All right. I'll permit that. 
6 MR. SMITH: -- in our case in chief --
7 THE COURT: I'll pe1mlt that. 
8 MR. SMITH: - after the plaintiff rests their 
~9 case. 
10 THE COURT: I'll permit that. So, Mr. Sallaz, you 
11 may step down. 
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 













(End of requested portion of proceeding.) 
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of the transcript of said evidence and to the best of my 
ability and according to my shorthand notes consisting 
of pages 1 through 58, inclusive. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 25th day of November 2013. 
KATHERINE J:- KLEMETSON, RPR, CSR #436 
lodged with me this 
of 2013. 
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He didn't agree to this deal day the when paid the foreclosure 
took title to the property. I reported this emergency sale to the divorce court and we went on with 
the divorce proceedings. 
Roy went to work on the properties in order to sell and Renee filed the enclosed Lis Pendem;, 
clouding the Title. 
A year or so later, the divorce court acknowledged that Real Homes was a community asset 
and decided she should have it but acknowledged that it had already been sold to a good faith buyer 
at a fair p1ice and he couldn't do anything about it. What he was thinking has been a real myste1y 
to Bevis and myseff as it was totally jibberish. Anyway, Roy has $90,000.00 plus in mortgage 
payments and somewhere around $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 in construction jmprovcmcnts and he 
really needs to sell. 
Both T rcfrcn and myself are willing and supporting Defendants and stand ready to participate 
to the max. 




1. Purchase Agreement for Sale of Interest jn Real Homes, Inc. dated 01/06/2006 
All LLC Interest 
Ail 4 Land Parcels 
2. Property Deeds dated O 1/06/2006 
3. D .L. Evans Bank Latter 
Confirms payoff of foreclosure with cashier's check dated 01/06/2006 
4. Real Homes Annual Report- Sallaz & Trefren Owners 
5. Lis Pendens- Renee Baird dated 07/25/2006 
6. Articles of Real Properties, LLC dated 01/06/2006- Roy Rice 
u 0 











D ED .I rn l I ;o 
THIS INDENTURE, Made this&!: day of~,, 2006, between GLEN TREFREN, a single man, and as sole Owner, Mem~r of Tradesman Contractors Construction LLC, of Boise, Idaho, "Grantor", and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC "Grantee"; 
WITNESSETH that the said grantor does by these presents remise, release, and forever QUITCLAIM unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assigns all of that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Caldwell, County of Canyon, State o Idaho, commonly known as 15580 Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605, and more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, All and singular the said premises, together with the appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written. 
./£.L~·-· 
GLEN TREFREN~ man and as 
State of Idaho \ "c Sole Owner, Member and Manager of County of ~anyon J vv. • • . Tradesman Contractors Construction I hereby certify that the foregoing ~n~trument 1s ~,,,,•""'"'•,,t:,LC ' a true and correct copy of the original as the,~'\'(;. 0 F / D ..</ ' ,~, 
same appears inlAhis o/lce.. .. . \ \'"- ~o&u·~'f-"J'-;>.·~ 'Yo·:..~ DATED · 1 , «-? ,-, ,.. . "'"' ., "0 I I i_q " f .; I \ {! L!:J ! £: C'J 0°0 r 0 ~0 \ 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District a:iurt f :; {{ ;: r} and1:x Ofl\do Recorder : ·µ ~ ~ ~ B .,,r , I 1 ,/ /" ~ 0 ..,,.. ~ -,,, :; y 1/ \ h./,., '._,,/\ .. ~~ ..... _~·--~ @(.:;(;,) ... <\ <'..Z!.l o~ ,:~: D<::OiHV ~~ () !$ F/::;:- \) (~~ i ;; · '~ 0/ ~\,~C0~.~~0° 't;~ ~.,, 
"°~.P .... V/j ,-.,,..~a:t-o~ru~"' t:--,:~ ,~::· 






County of Ada ) 
On this Jiz_ dayc4~o6, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appearf(~I_;EN tJkE~REN , known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
QUITCLAIM DEED - PAGE 2 




A portion. of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, Township 3 North, 
Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest corner of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
thence 
South 0°35'14" West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 745.15 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North boundary of the Northeast Qusrter of said 
Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence continuing 
North 89°45'51" East parallel with said North boundary a distance of249.00 feet; thence 
South 0°35'14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet; thence · South 89°45'51" West parallel with the North boundary of said Northeast Quarter a 
distance of249.00 feet; thence 
North 0°35' 14" East parallel with the West boundar,y of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeruit Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCELZA 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17. Township 3 North. 
Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly descn'bed 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest corn.er of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
thence 
South 0°35'14'' West along the West bllun.ruuy of said South.west Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 7 45 .15 feet; thence North 89°45' 51" East parallel wit the North boundary of the Northeast Quarter of said 
Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet; thence South 0°35•14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence North 89°45'51" West parallel with the North bounda.ty of said Northeast Quarter a 
distance of 152.50 feet; thence 
South 0°35'14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 302.80 feet; thence South 89°39'25" West parallel with the South boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 152.50 feet; thence 
•I 
\ 
North 0°35' 14" East parallel 
Northeast Quarter a of303.09 
!:he West boundary of said Southwest Quarter the TRUE POINT OF BEGINtUNG. 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the North.east Quarter of Section 17, Township 3 North, Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described as follows: 
COMMEN'CING at the Northwest comer of said Southwest Quarter of the·Northeast Quarter; thence 
South 0°35' 14" West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of745.15 feet; thence · North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North boundary of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet; thence 
South 0"35'14 .. West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel wifu the North boundary of. said Northeast Quarter a distance of 152.50 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence continuing North 89°45'51" East parallel with said North boundary a distance of 363.32 feet to a point on the centerline of the Burris Canal; thence South 45°39'48" West along said centerline a distance of 434.92 feet; thence South 89°39'25" West parallel with the South boundary of sard Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of55.35 feet; thence North OQ35'14" East parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the. Northeast Quarter a distance of302.80 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
m 
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THIS INDENTURE, Made this~ day of~ 2006, between GLEN TREFREN, a single man, and as sole Owner, Mem~;~~! ~igjr of Tradesman Contractors Construction LLC, of Boise, Idaho, "Granter'', and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC " Grantee"; 
WITNESSE TH that the said grantor does by these presents remise, release, and forever QUITCLAIM unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assigns all of that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Caldwell, County of Canyon, State o Idaho, commonly known as 15580 Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605, and more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, All and singular the said premises, together with the appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written. 
·~=~·. GLEN TREFREN~man and as State of Idaho } Sole Owner, Member and Manager of County of Canyon ss. Tradesman Contractors Construction I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is ., • ,•"""''•,,kLC ' a true and correct copy of the original as the .. ,•\ c. 0 F ID ,c./ 1 · ,~ same appears.in;this o/lce. ~· .,..;-.,_ y-- :;:,•;'t/-:'J"·~·. 1Y o .~,.~ .. DATED I I , ' <::;,' ...... -~ . ' . .... .., • 0 V I / I _9 ', l l \ t; ·~{ ... ()t :) 5' f,:) 
0°0 r ~Q~ '.~ CHRIS)AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District cyuct ! \ {.{ ~ c.) and'Ex Oflip1e Recorder ::: ';:{ ~ :l _ :;; B ,r t,. ( ·\ J/ / ' ' ~ o ~- • ,, ~ Y--~~r..,¥. ·-~··I' .• .,.,~ \. ~ ~.._." ·- .. ···- , ........ ~ """" ~ 't,j / ) ~-l....:s,:,~ o· . ~~ DeotJ1~1 ,~ t._, "1o r ,t::· () <, ~ .:..., ·' ~¢,_ 0 1 ~c~('Qv\,,/,o~., ~ · ~"' 
•,.,.J',.. V;1 '--r-~'..:o()i._~ r.\>,~ . ..:~ 







County of Ada ) 
On this£ day~06, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appear~LEN ~~REN , known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
\ . 
EXHIBIT 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, Township 3 North, 
Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest corner of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
thence 
South 0°35'14" West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 745.15 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North boundary of the Northeast Qwtrter of said 
Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet to the TRlJE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence continuing 
North 89°45'51" East parallel with said North boundary a distance of249.00 feet; thence 
South. 0°35'14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet; thence · Sou.th 89°45'51" West parallel with the North boundary of said Northeast Quarter a 
distance of 249.00 feet; thence 
North 0°35'14" East parallel with the West bounda.r,y of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGlNNJNG. 
PARCELZA 
A portion ofth.e Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, Township 3 North. 
Rang~ 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly descnoed 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest comer of said Southwest Quarter of the North.east Quarter; 
thence 
South 0°35'14'' West along the West boUD.dary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
N orthea.st Quarter a distance of 7 45 .15 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel wit the North boundary of the Northeast Quarter of said 
Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet; thence South 0°35' 14'' West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
North 89°45'51" West parallel with the North boundary of said Northeast Quarter a 
distance of 152.50 feet; thence 
South 0"35' 14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of302.80 feet; thence South 89°39 '25" West parallel with the South boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 







North 0°35' 14" the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter Northeast a '""'"'=''" to TRUE BEGINNING. 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Nort.heast Quarter of Section 17, Township 3 North. Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest comer of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; thence 
South 0°35' 14" West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of 745.15 feet; thence · North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North boundary of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet; thence 
South 0°35'14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North bounda.cy of. said Northeast Quarter a distance of 152.50 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence continuing North 89°45'51" East parallel with said North boundary a disU111ce of 363.32 feet to a point on the centerline of the Burris Canal; thence South 45°39'48" West along said centerline a distance of 434.92 feet; thence South 89°39'25" West parallel with the South. boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of 55.35 feet; thence North 0°35'14" East parallel with. the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the: Northeast Quarter a distance of302.80 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNmG. 
' J 
"-' 0 
,n C /;I? 












I THIS INDENTURE, Made this_{;,_ d~y o~
0
;006, between GLEN TREFREN, a single man, and as Co-Owner, MemhdMii/a.ger of REAL HOMES, LL , 
of Boise, Idaho, "Grantor", and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, "Grantee"; 
WITNESSETH that the said grantor does by these presents remise, release, and 
forever QUITCLAIM unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assigns all of that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Caldwell, County of Canyon, State o Idaho, commonly known as 15580 Riverside Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605, and more 
particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, All and singular the said premises, together with the appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written. 
DEED- PAGE 1 
~~-
GLEN TREFREN,Angkmanand as 
Co.Owner, Member and Manager of 






of Ada ) 
On this y:; day of before me, a Notary Public in and for said 
State, personally appeared FREN , known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above writte~n. 
''"'""••t.r ·· .... , '1111 ........ ~~SON ".,, "- I ........ ~ 'v ••• !) ....... .., * 1 .· 
: ~ I' "l .... \.iQ,.l..... ===-.~=-==--"'-='--! . I ~ 0 11.~.Y Public for Idaho 
:: ~ 1 ,:.. I ..... o\..,,~ -"i ' B . Idah - : en•\ o l .._, i~l&Jng m: 01se, o 
: ~ z ~cq ~ti . . . ~ - / 
\ ~ \
0 
~ ..-,:s ~omnuss1on expires: ¥~ ~ ;.,'-2;,_ • •• ,t,. ~ ~ -y ••••••••• .<V ,,:0 ,~ * I,.\. .. . 11,.,. s 1: r>- .... .. .,,.,.,, .......... , .. 
QUITCLAIM DEED - PAGE 2 
EXHIBIT 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17. Township 3 North. 
Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Ca.nyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest corner of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
thence 
South 0°35'14" West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of745.15 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North boundary of the Nortliel:'.St Quarter of said 
Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINN.[N'G; thence continuing 
North 89°45 '51" East parallel with said North boundary a distance of 249 .00 feet; thence 
South 0°35'14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet; thence · South 89°45'51" West parallel with the North boundary of said Northeast Quarter a 
distance of 249.00 feet; thence 
North 0°35' 14" East parallel with the West boundar,y of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL2A 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, Township 3 North, 
Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest CQJ.Uer of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
thence 
South 0¢35'14'' West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
North.east Quarter a distance of745.15 feet; thence North 89°45'51" East parallel wit the NorJi boundary of the Northeast Quarter of said 
Section 17 a di.stance of 40.00 feet; thence South 01135•14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 180.00 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
North 89°45'51" West parallel with the North boundary of said Northeast Quarter a. 
distance of 152.50 feet; thence 
South 0°35'14" West parallel with the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 302.80 feet; thence South 89°39'25" West parallel with the South. boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter a distance of 152.50 feet; thence 
No.rah 0"'35' 14" East parallel with the West bo'l.llldary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a 303.09 to the TRUE POINT BEGINNING. 
A portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 17, Tow:ri.sh.ip 3 North, Range 3 West of the Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho and is more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northwest comer of said Southwest Quai.-ter of the·Northeast Quarter; thence 
South 0°35'14" West along the West boundary of said Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter a distance of 745.15 feet; thence · North 89°45'51" East parallel with the North boundary of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 17 a distance of 40.00 feet; thence 










ro ,..----------·-----------1--1--~-·-~-.,---·~~-------, .,..t:__ QUITCLAI· 
THIS INDENTURE, Ma~e this/:, ·d~ 
TREFREN, a single man, and as sole Owner, Mem rand ager ofTradesma.n 
Contractors Construction LLC, of Boise, Idaho, "Grantor", and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC "Grantee"; 
WITNESSETH that the said grantor does by these presents remise, release, and 
forever QUITCLAIM unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assigns all of that certain 
lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Nampa, County of Canyon, State of 
Idaho, commonly known as 714 Smith A venue, Nampa, Idaho 83651, and more particularly described on Exhibit "A'' attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and 
remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, All and singular the said premises, together with the 
appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal the 
day and year first above written. 
St e of Idaho } 
Co nty of Canyon 
ss. 
I h reby certify !hat the foregoing instrument is ,,<>""''•,, 
a t e and correct copy of the original as,tJ;ii1~ OF / O,q '~.,~ 
Sa e appeq.rS in}lhis9~fce. .i' ~ ,,••rr5'~~-"~ lyQ~.,,." D ED ( ' ; t:; I,- ~ .... , ,.., 1, ~·o u ~ / Vo -:,, t 1. _{ :~\ / f.,J..{)\ ,.,.-~ ,~; (-0 /:IS/®r " ej'; J~~ \ 
IS YAMAMOTO, Cl~rk of the Oistr.fct CO!'.irt <;, 1-£ :, ,,;'..,tnd Ex~Offici@'Recorder ; ·tr i , -By /,--. rv', i J //., •. -·-"·--:;, ___ " 
Deputy 
D!i~ED - PAGE l 
_gL_~ 
GLEN TREFREN, As"emanand as 
Sole Owner, Member and Manager of 




County of Ada ) 
On this _J,,_ day of · ~,;,,·, SQ.6, before me, a Notary Public and for said State, personally appeared EN 'L FREN , known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day and year in this certificate first ag~~RWMtten 
'!, .. .,.. ~ ~ s-o Ji"") 
.... ~~-,\\···· .... "°,r 
DEED-PAGE2 
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INDENTURE, Made this~ daf of , 2006, between GLEN ifl :::~ITREFREN, a single man, and as Co-Owner, Member d M ager of REAL HOMES, LL , of Boise, Idaho, "Grantor", and REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, "Grantee"; 
\VITNESSETH that the said grantor does by these presents remise, release, and forever QUITCLAIM unto the said grantee, and to its heirs and assigns all of that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land, situate, lying and being in Nampa, County of Canyon, State of Idaho, commonly known as 714 Smith Avenue, Nampa, Idaho, and more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, All and singular the said premises, together with the appurtenances, unto the grantee, and to its heirs and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written. 
.LIL.~=~ 
GLEN TREF~ man and as 
Co-Owner, Member and Manager of 
State of Idaho ), ss. REAL HOMES, LLC County of Canyon J 
I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is 
a true and correct cogy of the original as the 
same appears~·· this office_. _ ,i,i'' uo"~•;,,,Q DATED , l !c-X//ln\<71 ,..,,~, -,S r- ID;~, I ! . c; /....,V \'..,J ~~ -\I'- 09 •00Q~ .</,<, "",,. CHR1S)r:'.1MAMQJd,"C1~fk of the District Gou~.,;; 0/00 UN;}_. >'o \ y:v a_~d tt>_i Off~I~ Recorder 5 A : \ ~ By c/\/t./ \.-f/1t ./.A_- ,., .. ,. ----- ... h( :; t 1:( :. D8puty ~,, ·~·~; ; : ~ 
; () ~t:.'';) /;-.,. i....... 2 ',,;, 0 ~ ,r::. (_,.~, .. :ti ,·i:::: ;/ 
~ ./ o,._, 0,., .... ..,, .-·,('\ ~"'·~- () "'" 










On this _ie__ day of ~~06, before me, a Notary Public in and said State, appeared ~REN , known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within Lnstrnment, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
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E hibit E 
VERNON K. S:'\.HTH 
:H LnY 
1900 \Y. :\bin 
hfah,, 
Te!epher:e: (20;n 3~5-1E5 
Facsim1:e: {203) 345-1 i29 
E-mail: Yksti-,"-.:-: ii~..-e-~t)m 
A.ttorm:'"· fo:- Den:1is .L Sallaz 
SEP 2 3 2012 
t),l.{PJSTOPHER D. RiCH, Clerk. 
By JERI HEATON 
DEFt.Y'f.,,., 
i:\' THf DiSTRICT COl"RT OF THE FOt RHI JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST:.\TE OF IDAHO, l:'{ Ai'\D FOR THE COU:'i"TY OF ADA 
DE\!NlS J. SAU. 





CO.\lPL.\!NT FOR AN 
li'iDEPEI\DE:t\T ACTION TO 







CO\!ES NO\V. the above named Plainrif!~ Dennis J. SallaL (hereinafter rderred to as 
'"Sallaz"\ oy ;.mJ 1h,ough counsel of Vernon K. Smith, as and for stating claims against the 
Defendant, Rene.: L Raird-Sallaz, (hereinafter rderred to ;:1s ''Baird''), in [he nature of an 
lndep~nder~t to obtain relief from a judgrnenL and therefore plec.ds and alleges as follows: 
I. 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
L is DI1 independent action .for relief fron1 ali rn.atters pre'\ziously adj'udicated in the 
proceeding enti:_le:d, Renee L Boird-Sal laz v Damis J Sallaz, Fourth. District, Ada County Case No 
04-01075 final entered on Januarv 2012 (hereinafter, "Idaho 
COMPLAIN1 -PAGE 1 
IS ;}S an action within 1he equitable 
powers the court. 
PARTIES 
; AK all times rele\-ant hereto_ t3ain1 ,xas and is a resident of Boise~ ~-\da County::: Idaho . 
. H;RISDICTiO;'{ At\D VE:'fUE 
cl-. JurisJic,i'-,n is proner 1n chis Coun pu.rsu:mt h1 LC ~ l 705 ~md the ::1:nount m 
controversy exceeds [he jurisdictionai minimum limirs of this Court of S l 0,000.00. 
::,_ Venu~ is proper in AJa Coum:·- Idaho pl,rsuant to ~md by virrne of LC.§ 5-404. 
G£:"iERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. The parties were purportedly marrie<l in ihe State of Oregon on July 4, 1996 
(hereir:afier, "'the Oregon marriage.=). 
7. Following their marriage in Oregon, rhe parties remmed to the state of Idaho where 
they lived <luring the entire course of the a!lege<l mamage including up through the date when 
divorce proceedings \Vere commenced on :'. fay 2 7, 2004, ;:md ernry of a decree granting a divorce on 
July 28, 2005_ 
8. £:\s a consequence of th~ parties:: chosen legal domicile \Vi thin the state of Idaho:" all 
property that they 2cquired after the date of iheir m:rniage while residing wirhin the state of Idaho 
was presumed to be community property. LC. § 32-906. 
9. The Defendant Baird was solely responsible for all the arrangements for the Oregon 
marr1age. 
COMPLAINT-PAGE 2 
W. showed PiaintiffSaibz some marriage dccuu1ems she said sh: 
h~r home stare 
SallazaH lice-nse. 
Later sh;;.; told Piainiiff 
SaHaz bdie'-d bcT. 
of ''Rick \Vill;:mf", who was hccnse<l m Ore_§.on w solemnize ~urnages and w.kc care of the 
requfrcd permirs, licenses ;:mu certificates. 
!2~ There is no record thnt any marr~age license requ~sr ;.)r n1~rr!ilge !!cens~ '..Vas ever 
signed by Rick \ViHarcL ihe person ,.yi,o alkgediy solemnized ihe marri;1ge. or signed by any of his 
wimcsses
0 or filed or recorded in the public records of the srnte of Oregon or any Coumy within the 
State. 
!3. There is no record that Rick Wilb.n.L the individual idenfaied to Dennis Sallaz, and 
who claimed he had the authority to solemnize the parties· alleged marriage in the Stare of Oregon, 
had &Ty vaiid pcnnit, license, or authority of any kin<l m solemnize marriages v,:ithin the State of 
Oregon_ 
l 4. ./u lhe time t~~t the PbintiffSaHaz entered into his marriage vows wirh Baird, he was 
led to bdiev,:: 1hat the per~on 1.Yho solemnized ~he marria~e was vested Witil the required authority 
under Oregon I~P.V and that the required formaJiries to validate rhe rnarriage under that State~s la\V 





BairJ haJ nm 
void ab ini1io 
16. Phimiff Sa!bz, he no\;,.-
knows rhm d,c Dd:Cndant BairJ ~nowingly wd intcntionaiiy 2cred so as w avoid the required 
ef that manage license with ihe 
appropriak pubiic record:; ofric~ i,1 the state of Oregon. 
l , , - The state of On:::gon does nor recognize common law marriage_ 
iS. fhe state of Oregon does not recognize the putative marriage doctrine. 
19. Since January !, 1996 the stare of !Jaho has not reco~,nized the cre2tion of new 
common ta,.v marfr1ges. 
20. The state of Idaho does not rccogniZe ,he putative marri:ige dornine. 
21 _ in the al1sci1ce of the good fhith ofbl1th pa:ties; no marriage arises under Oregon la\~~ 
as a result nf rhe parties' failure w comply v:ith the sra;.utory reqmren1ents for so!emnizing a 
marriage in ~h:1t state. 
22. Bec:mse the parties' marriage \Vas not '.1-lid Oregon hw, lh:u marriage was not 
valid u11der kbho h1,.v_ LC § 
existence of a recognized, ex tam mr,niage, is a prerequisite to foe exercise of 
1f ri:c parties are not the court has no 
COwIPLA!NT 
to !hem a divorce. 
2-L fo. the a no 
in respc:ct w :iny property or incom;:: rha[ they acquired after their alleged 
juiv .:L I 996 rnarriagc. ~.1J1 ;~cquircd 
property of =2"ith::r 0!~e of the p~1rr!cs. 
25 fn a divorce proceeding :1 cou,t h;:;::; no jun:::dic(ion 10 com pd one: party to convey any 
portion of his scpa,J.te propcny to rhc ,Ftl<::r rmny. PrinJ.!.le .-. Pringle:, l 09 fdaho l 026. [ 023-29, 7 l 2 
P2d 727]2.cJ-TiU (Ct..-\pp.1985!. 
16_ .. :\s a direct consequence of Lhc kno,vlng ~H1d intenr?ontd act~ of the Def~ndant Baird_ 
which consu,trn:: fraud upon ihc courL in initiating ,:;nd pursuing rhc fJaho divorce action as 
identified in p::1,~1gr.::iph l of this ct1rnpi;1inL :1::: baseu upon her earlier knO\\!ng ~mJ intentional aces 
of inducing the Plaintiff Sallaz to unkno,\ ingiy enter into a sham Oregon marriage lhat was void ab 
initio 0 this Coun should grant the P!ainii ff Sallaz the relief further requcsred by this complaint. 
COUNTO;\E 
DECLARATORY RELIEF-THE PARTIES' OREGOi'-
i\:L-\RRIAGE \VAS VOID AB INITIO 
/'t _,. The Plaintiff Sallaz herehy incorporates all the pnor allegations and factuat statements 
made in (his compiaint into this cause of J.c1ion. 
28. Under the Idaho Dccb.rC.tt0ry Judgm;;;nts s·\cL LC.§ l0-1201 er seq. 0 rhis Court h2s 
the al1thority to dcte1Tnine if the parries 1..\.-i~re ever legall_::" rn:irric:c! ur1der Oregon i::i\v. i.lnd to provide 
furthe,- rer 
29. The Defond;.'-nt Baird m~:.c:e 2. represe,,tation of fact that Ric~ \Vilbrd v,as authorized 
COMPLAINT- 5 
to solemnize: 
that the: {)reg.on rnJrri:ige license 
had c,xnpk,c::<l an<l filed in the Orcg,)n pt:blic rcco,d.s. ·,, hen in foct th:n i1<.:vcr occum.:<l. 
COC'iTTWO 
DECLAR.-\TORY RELIEF THE ACTJO:"iS OF THE 
DfFENDA:'\'T BAJRD COXSTiTLTF, FR,\UD CPO;'\ THE COURT 
made in this compbim into rhis cause 
36. ~fhe I)efCndant Baird .. as the PL.-1intiffin the p~rt~es~ Idaho divorcc3.ction: based that 
Proceeding uom1- ::md. obtained rdief in rha.t actil)l1. - ' . a representation of fact of a valid 
Oregon marriage, ,Yhich in fact was void ab inirio. 
37. The De fend:mt BairJ' s !:epresentmions concemi ng validity of the parties' Oregon 
marriage were fulse. 
33~ ~rf1e Dcfend~1.nt Baird~ s representations concerning the "~.::1.1Idity of the parties Oregon 
marri::1ge ' .. vere rna:erial to the on-going legal statEs of the parties during the aHegc<l existence of that 
marriage" as to cornmuniry property the alleged existence of that 
PAGE6 
marriage, and 3S to the the parties' in the Idaho divorce proceeding for the 
39. The Defond:mt Baird that the rq:xesentations that she made concerning the 
formation and existence of the Oregon marri:-ige \':ere false. 
40. The De frndant Baird intended thar the Pbimi ff Sa!! az would act upon, ami rely upon, 
her false represcm~uions concerning the Oregon marriage in the m~umer contemplated, such that he 
would accepr the pn::sumption of community property rhat arose under Idaho law, am.I the subsequent 
division of th::u community property in the Idaho divorce action. 
4 L The Plaintiff Sallaz ,vas, ar all times relevant to this action, ignorant of the falsity of 
representations made by the Ddendanr Baird. 
42. The Plaintiff Sallaz did rely upon the factual rep,esemations concerning ihe existence 
of the parties' Oregon marriage, and as based upon the apparent conformity of the marriage 
ceremony with Oregon law, and Baird's presumed compliance ,vii:h the other requirements of Oregon 
law in creating a valid Oregon marriage, he had a right to rely upon those representations. 
43. As a result of the Plai.rniff Sallaz's reliance upon the Defendani. Baird's false 
representations he has been consequently and proximately injured as a result of the subsequent 
divorce action bet,.veen the parties as a result of the a"v:ud of aHeged community property to Baird 
that in the absence of a valid and enforceabk marriage would not be community property and to 
which she would not otberv.tise be entitled, and to which Sallaz would be entitied_ 
COUNTTHRE£ 
THE PLAINTJFF SALLAZ IS ENTITLED TO HA YE ALL .JUDGJVIENTS E1'fTERED IN THE I\\_,_1{.TIES' DIVORCE PROCEEDING VACATED 
COMPLAil'fT - PAGE 7 
44_ 
aH tlhe prior allegations and factllml statements 
made this 
further rdief thar is necessary or proper. _ § W-1208. 
46. The aci:ions of the DeknJa,_11[ afmud upon coua in obtaining a 
divorce decree, and<li"'ision ofcommunit_y prnpaty, as based upon a sham Oregon marr:iage thanvas 
void ab initio. 
4 7 _ As a consequence of the acricms of ihe Defell!dwr Baird, ihis Court should vacate all 
judgments eotereJ in the divorce action, Rr:nee L Baird-Sallaz v Dennis J. SalfrJ:::, Fourth District. 
Ada Coumy Case No CV-DR 04-01075 ~t inch,ding all ;nvards of commuruty pmperty to the 
Defendant Baird_ 
ATTORNEY FEES 
48 _ Sallaz has been required to _retain ilie services of undersigned counsel in o:rder to bring 
this Third Party Complaint against Baird at1.d he is entitlled to .recoveT his reasonabk attorney fees 
and costs of suit incurred thereby_ pursuai-:1t to the applicable provisions ofldaho faw_ induding but 
not limited to, Idaho Code§§ 12-121, 12-123, and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54_ 
\VHEREFORE, Sallaz prays for a ju<lgme,it against Baird as follows: 
1. For Judgment against the Defendant Baird dedaring th.e parties' Oregon marriage to 
be void ab initio. 
For Judgment against lhe Defendant Baird deda.ri,.,g she committed. fraud upon 
the court in the filing and pursuit of the Idaho diYorce action, including obtaining an a"vard of 
propert'J-
COI\'1PLAI1'IJ'-PAGE 8 
For an order vacating all 
For reasonable 
). For such other relief as Coun may deem · 
DEMAND FOR .JURY TRJA1-
Sallaz hereby demands a jury ffial pur~~~mrT~i<hi-.o Rules of Civil Pm-;;ectITTe.~ule 38(b). '// _____ ,,.~ 
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STATE OF TDAHO ) 
County of \ 
) 
Dennis J~ Sal Being firs[ S\\-orn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
That 1 arn the plain ti ff in the above emitkd maEer. That I have read the: above arid foregoing 
Complain!, kno,·v- the ccmems thereof and bciicn~ th-t S[aremenrs therein contained to be true and 
correct to the best of my know!e<lgc and belief_ 
! / I ',, 
p("?"/l Subscribed and sworn to before me this /o ..---day of September, 20 I 2_ 
~-71"~ NotmyPubiic for ldano 
Residing at Boise 
My Commission Expires: _/t.~'0--_-.J_~_y __ c2(J. __Y(_~ _ 
COMPLAJNT-PAGE 10 
, hibit F 
Re .IVED 
00----~:-=-----
UI //: S(C~.u. __ _ SEP 2 8 2012 
NOV 1 3 2012 IN TH~9Ji~~ 99l1kT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH. 
OF By MARTHA LYKE 
(S'\fiV 










DENNIS J. SALLAZ, 
DekndanUAppeUant 
Civil No. CV DR 04-0I075 D 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL 
~ 
I'dIS MA TIER having been presented to the ourt on the motion of the Appellant, and the 
Court being fully 2dvised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
All further proceedin o on this appeal, including all pending briefing schedules are suspended 
untilfurtherorderoft ·scourt. DuM~. ~ ~-'t) ~:~L~~~ V~+,V\.b ~ (ttd:-o~C 1~ ~t ,e-> w.~ ~ ~ r;-!'f;::~,-· @_+ llV" '1 
DATED\M-~"{ 1-e>tJ-. ~~\Jc, . .t:rJ.,;"i \) ~Ml~~ 
~-Sh'r,lu,,-, 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER 
CLERJ<:'S CERTIFICATE OF :\'fAJLING 
one SUSPENDii''l'G 
record in this cau..<:e in envelopes addressed as foHmvs: 
K. S?\.HTH 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Streer 
Boise=- Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1 125 
Facsimile: (208) 345-I 129 
E-mail: vksh::xll@iive.com 
Renee Baird 
15584 Riverside Road 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Matthew T Christensen 
Ai'JGSThIAN JOHNSON 
3649 N. Lakeharbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Telephone: 208-384-8588 
Facsimile: 208-853-0] 17 
Email: mtc@am~stman.com 




- Electrnnic Delivery 
/ United States Mail 





Attorney for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee - Jeremy J _ Gugino 
ORDER SUSPENDING PAGE2 
Christopher D_ Rich 
CLERK OF THE COlJRT 
~~··-Depwy Clerk r , 
Exhibit G 
VERi~ON K. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
Telephone: 208-345-1125 
Facsimile: 208-345-I 129 
Email: vkslaw~live.com 
ISB# 1365 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Dennis J. Sallaz 
IN THE DISTRICT COLTRT OF TIIE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICf OF 
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 







Case No. CV DR 04 01075 D / 




















TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, RENEE L. BAIRD Pro Se and, JEREMY 
J. GUGINO the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trn'stee for the Bankruptcy Estate of RENEE L. BAIRD, 
and the Bankruptcy 
OF APPEAL 
.,,.,L=.,·~u, 3649 N_ Lakeharbor Lane, Boise,Idaho 83 703, and the ClerJrnf the above-entitled court. 
l. The above named appellant,, Dennis J. Sallaz, appeals against the above-named 
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision,, Order and Appellate 
Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on July 1, 2013, the Honorable Kathryn A Stickle~ 
Senior District Judge, presidmg, and all interlocutory or :final judgments related to that Appellate 
Judgment, as provided by Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(I)-
2. Toattheabove-namedappellanthasarighttoappealtotheidahoSupremeCourt,and 
the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule I I(a)(2). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant :from 
asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Did a valid marriage exist which vested subject matter jurisdiction in the magistrate court for the purpose of granting a divorce and dividing "community property?" 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
If so, what portion? None. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. 
6_ fu. lieu of the Standard Record provided under lA.R. 28(b ), and as provided by IA.R_ 
28(b)(l), the Appellant requests only the following documents to be included in the clerk,s record 
on this appeal. 
a. Register of Actions; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-PAGE2 
b. Suggestion of Bankruptcy (6i26/12). 
C. 
Suspension of Appeal (7/24/12). 
d. Order Recognizing Bankruptcy Automatic Sta.y and Suspending Appeal (8/21/12). 
e. Verified Petition to Intervene (Christensen for Gugino) (9/24/12). 
f. Appellant's Response to Motion to Intervene (9/24/12). 
g. Notice of the Lifting of the Bankruptcy Automatic Stay (9/28/I2). 
h. Appellant's Motion for Suspension of the Appeal (9/28/I2). 
1. Affidavit of Dennis J. Sallaz (9/28/12). 
J. Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suspend Appeal (9/28/12). 
k. Notice of Service (10/23/12). 
I. Order Suspending Appeal Denied (11/13/12). 
m. Order Lifting Appeal Suspension (11/14/12). 
n. Appellant's Brief (12/12/12). 
o. Respondent's Brief (01/18/13). 
p. Intervenor's Bnef on Appeal (01/18/13). 
q. Notice of Hearing on Verified Petition to Intervene. ( 1/25/13). 
q. Appellant's Joint Reply Brief (2/11/13). 
s. Request for Judicial Notice; Memorandum of Points and Authorities (2/20/13). 
t. Order Granting Petition to Intervene (2/22/13). 
u. Memorandum.Decision, Order, and AppeUate Judgment --.Alf:rrmed. (7 /1/ 13). 
NOTICEOFAPPEAL-PAGE3 
7. I certify: 
a copy appeal on a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: None. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk,s reconl has been paid 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
Dated this B-m day of August, 2013. 
--PAGE4 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for the Appellant 
Dennis J_ Sallaz 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I That on 8~ day of August, 2013, I to a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NO nCE OF APPEAL to the following in the manner described 
below: 
Renee L. Baird 
Respondent Pro Se 
15584 Riverside Road 
Caldwell, Idaho 83607 
(Phone & Email IAR. 17(d) & 20) 
Respondent Pro Se 
Matthew T. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
ANGSTMAN JOHNSON 
3649 N. Lakeharbor Lane 




Attorney for the Intervenor/Respondent 
Jeremy J. Gugino, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy <:tee 
For The Bankruptcy Estate of Renee L. Baird 
NOTICE 5 





L U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Electronic Delivery 
) 
